Margin Trading Program, External Profit Pressure and Enterprise Financialization—A Quasi-Natural Experiment Based on Double Difference Model

Based on the urgent need of the real economy to “get away from fictitious to substantial”, this paper constructs a quasi-natural experiment based on the margin trading program gradually implemented in China in 2010 and studies the influence of the margin trading program on the financialization level of the target company by using the difference-in-difference method. The results show that, because of the dominant role of financing transactions in margin trading programs in China’s capital market, financing transactions drive up the share prices of listed companies, which leads to an excessive easing of the financing constraints of listed companies and short-sighted behavior of executives, which has a significant role in promoting enterprise financialization. Moreover, the driving effect is more significant in state-owned enterprises, enterprises with a high degree of financing constraint, and enterprises with a low degree of marketization. Economic policy uncertainty will restrain the positive effect of margin trading programs on enterprise financialization through information and governance mechanisms. In contrast, the “branding” effect caused by the financial connection of senior executives will intensify the positive relationship between margin trading programs on enterprise financialization levels. When considering the intermediary effect, we find that the margin trading program will result in the optimistic deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts and cause the external profit pressure of enterprises, thus increasing the financialization trend. This study is of great theoretical significance and practical value for evaluating the policy effect of the margin trading program, improving this policy, investigating the influencing factors of enterprise financialization, and promoting the real economy to move from fictitious to substantial.

El origen de los mercados de emisiones. La mercantilización de la regulación ambiental para contaminantes aéreos en Estados Unidos.

Este artículo describe el nacimiento de la regulación de contaminantes atmosféricos, así como su transformación, que de estar bajo control estatal transitó a un régimen basado en instrumentos de mercado. Muestra la paulatina mercantilización del abordaje de los problemas de contaminación aérea, cuyos orígenes se encuentran en Estados Unidos y que se condensó en tres momentos históricos: la conformación del Emission Trading Program (1982), el programa Average between refineries (1985) y el Acid Rain Program (1995). Estos experimentos, dentro del régimen de regulación ambiental de comando y control, desembocaron en la conformación del primer mercado de emisiones atmosféricas contaminantes en la historia mundial y abrieron el camino de un nuevo régimen de regulación ambiental conocido como tope y comercio.

Carbon-Trading Pilot Programs in China and Local Air Quality

China emits twice as much CO_2 as the United States. Launched in seven regions in 2013-2014, China's pilot carbon-trading programs cover roughly 7 percent of China's CO_2 emissions. These market-based policies offer the best existing evidence as to whether the national carbon-trading program starting in 2021 will curb emissions. Here, we analyze changes in air quality using visibility measures from weather stations. We find the pilot programs improved local air quality, and this was likely a co-benefit of reduced carbon emissions. However, these improvements were modest, and there is some evidence of pollution leakage to the nonpilot regions.

Target-Setting Emissions Trading Program in Saitama Prefecture: Impact on CO2 Emissions in the First Compliance Period

This chapter investigates whether the Target-Setting Emissions Trading (TSET) Program launched in 2011 by Saitama Prefecture in Japan had an impact on CO2 emissions during the first compliance period. Facility-level data are used to estimate the causal relationship between implementation of the program and changes in CO2 emissions. The results indicate that the TSET Program spurred emission reduction efforts. In addition, this chapter shows that the TSET Program also functioned as an incentive for facilities that are not covered by the program to lower their energy consumption. These findings indicate that the TSET Program succeeded in encouraging emission reduction efforts by the facilities, even though the program includes no penalty for facilities that do not meet emission goals.