Bringing Health Care to Appalachia: The Long-Run Impact of a Rural Health Care System

The U.S. government has supported rural hospitals through direct subsidies and staff recruitment programs. However, little is known about the long-run impact of large-scale changes to rural health care. The authors explore the long-run trajectory of Appalachian counties where a coal mining union introduced a pioneering rural health care program in the 1950s, anchored by a chain of high-quality hospitals. Hospital beds per capita in counties where the union built its hospitals are persistently high through 2006, even when compared to similar counties and accounting for a variety of supply- and demand-side factors. In particular, union counties defied a national hospital consolidation trend starting in the 1980s. Results are consistent with a supply-side explanation where the scale and/or innovation of the union's investment allowed hospital markets to thrive and attract patients from a broad geography.

Long-Term Care Hospitals: A Case Study in Waste

There is substantial waste in US healthcare but little consensus on how to combat it. We identify one source of waste: long-term care hospitals (LTCHs). Using the entry of LTCHs into hospital markets in an event study design, we find that most LTCH patients would have counterfactually received care at Skilled Nursing Facilities – facilities that provide medically similar care but are paid significantly less – and that substitution to LTCHs leaves patients unaffected or worse off on all dimensions we can objectively measure. Our results imply Medicare could save about $4.6 billion per year by not allowing discharge to LTCHs.

What drives different treatment choices? Investigation of hospital ownership, system membership and competition

Background Differences in ownership types have attracted considerable interest because of policy implications. Moreover, competition in hospital markets is promoted to reduce health care spending. However, the effects of system membership and competition on treatment choices of hospitals have not been considered in studying hospital ownership types. We examine the treatment choices of hospitals considering ownership types (not-for-profit, for-profit, and government), system membership, patient insurance status (insured, and uninsured) and hospital competition in the United States. Methods We estimate the probability of according the procedure as the treatment employing logistic regression. We consider all procedures accorded at hospitals, controlling for procedure type and diagnosis as well as relevant patient and hospital characteristics. Competition faced by hospitals is measured using a distance-weighted approach separately for procedural groups. Patient records are obtained from State Inpatient Databases for 11 states and hospital characteristics come from American Hospital Association Annual Survey. Results Not-for-profit hospitals facing low for-profit competition that are nonmembers of hospital systems, act like government hospitals, whereas not-for-profits facing high for-profit competition and system member not-for-profits facing low for-profit competition are not statistically significantly different from their for-profit counterparts in terms of treatment choices. Uninsured patients are on average 7% less likely to be accorded the procedure as the treatment at system member not-for-profit hospitals facing high for-profit competition than insured patients. System member not-for-profit hospitals, which account for over half of the observations in the analysis, are on average 16% more likely to accord the procedure as the treatment when facing high for-profit competition than low-for-profit competition. Conclusions We show that treatment choices of hospitals differ by system membership and the level of for-profit competition faced by the hospitals in addition to hospital ownership type and health insurance status of patients. Our results support that hospital system member not-for-profits and not-for-profits facing high for-profit competition are for-profits in disguise. Therefore, system membership is an important characteristic to consider in addition to market competitiveness when tax exemption of not-for-profits are revisited. Moreover, higher competition may lead to increasing health care costs due to more aggressive treatment choices, which should be taken into account while regulating hospital markets.

Measuring the COVID-19 Financial Threat to Hospital Markets

Many hospitals have been straining under the financial stress of treating COVID-19 patients. Those experiencing the greatest strain are in markets burdened with high levels of debt and uncompensated care. We propose a new measure of financial risk in a hospital market, combining both pre-existing financial vulnerability and COVID-19 severity. It reveals the highest concentrations of risk in counties with high poverty, low population density, and high shares of foreign-born and non-White populations. The CARES Act Provider Relief Fund helped many of the hospitals in these regions, but it left many markets with the same overall vulnerability to financial strain from the next health crisis.

Competition between Public and Private Maternity Care Providers in France: Evidence on Market Segmentation

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the potential for segmentation in hospital markets, using the French case where private for-profit providers play an important role having nearly 25% of market shares, and where prices are regulated, leading to quality competition. Using a stylized economic model of hospital competition, we investigate the potential for displacement between vertically differentiated public and private providers, focusing on maternity units where user choice is central. Building over the model, we test the following three hypotheses. First, the number of public maternity units is likely to be much larger in less populated departments than in more populated ones. Second, as the number of public maternity units decreases, the profitability constraint should allow more private players into the market. Third, private units are closer substitutes to other private units than to public units. Building an exhaustive and nationwide data set on the activity of maternity services linked to detailed data at a hospital level, we use an event study framework, which exploits two sources of variation: (1) The variation over time in the number of maternity units and (2) the variation in users’ choices. We find support for our hypotheses, indicating that segmentation is at work in these markets with asymmetrical effects between public and private sectors that need to be accounted for when deciding on public market entry or exit.