Inference in Social Cognition

Inferences are ubiquitous in social cognition, governing everything from first impressions to the communication of meaning itself. Social cognitive inferences are typically varieties of diagnostic reasoning or, more properly, “abductive” reasoning, in which people infer simple but plausible—although not deductively certain—underlying causes for observable social behaviors. Abductive inference and its relationship to inductive and deductive inference are first introduced. A description of how abductive inference operates on a continuum between those that arise rapidly and automatically (and appear like deductions) and those that inspire more deliberative efforts (and thus often recruit more inductive information gathering and testing) is then given. Next, many classic findings in social cognition, and social psychology more broadly, that reveal how widespread this type of inference is explored. Indeed, both judgements under uncertainty and dual-process theories can be illuminated by incorporating the abductive frame. What then follows is a discussion on the work in ecological and evolutionary approaches that suggest that, although these inferences often go beyond the information given and are prone to predictable errors, people are good enough at social inference to qualify as being “ecologically rational.” The conclusion explores emerging themes in social cognition that only heighten the need for this broader understanding of inference processes.

Spontaneous State Inferences

Perceivers routinely draw inferences about others from their behavior in an attempt to make sense of the world. Previous research has established that spontaneous inferences include stable characteristics such as traits and a number of variable person-related concepts such as goals, intentions, and motivations. The current research investigated the occurrence of more general spontaneous state inferences. In a series of four preregistered studies (N = 883), we adapted two established experimental paradigms frequently used in spontaneous social inference research to the investigation of spontaneous trait and state inferences. In Studies 1 and 2, we observed evidence for the occurrence of spontaneous state inferences from state-implying statements. In Studies 3 and 4, we observed the simultaneous occurrence of spontaneous trait and state inferences from statements that allowed for both inferences. In a fifth study (N = 97), we provide evidence that people represent states and traits as functionally different: Participants judged the likelihood of behavioral repetition higher when the same behavior was related to a trait-inference than a state inference. The observation of multiple simultaneous spontaneous inferences in the current research suggests that further theory building regarding the underlying mechanisms and processes of spontaneous impression formation in person perception from behavior is warranted.

Great ape communication as contextual social inference: a computational modeling perspective

Human communication has been described as a contextual social inference process. Research into great ape communication has been inspired by this view to look for the evolutionary roots of the social, cognitive, and interactional processes involved in human communication. This approach has been highly productive, yet it is often compromised by a too-narrow focus on how great apes use and understand individual signals. In this paper, we introduce a computational model that formalizes great ape communication as a multi-faceted social inference process that relies on information contained in the signal, the relationship between communicative partners, and the social context. This model makes accurate qualitative and quantitative predictions about real-world communicative interactions between semi-wild-living chimpanzees. When enriched with a pragmatic reasoning process, the model explains repeatedly reported differences between humans and great apes in the interpretation of ambiguous signals (e.g. pointing gestures). This approach has direct implications for observational and experimental studies of great ape communication and provides a new tool for theorizing about the evolution of uniquely human communication.

Story et al. 2021 A Social Inference Model of Idealization and Devaluation

People often form polarized beliefs about others. In a clinical setting this is referred to as a dichotomous or ‘split’ representation of others, whereby others are not imbued with possessing mixtures of opposing properties. Here, we formalise these accounts as an oversimplified categorical model of others’ internal, intentional, states. We show how a resulting idealization and devaluation of others can be stabilized by attributing unexpected behaviour to fictive external factors. For example, under idealization, less-than-perfect behaviour is attributed to unfavourable external conditions, thereby maintaining belief in the other’s goodness. This feature of the model accounts for how extreme beliefs are buffered against counter-evidence, while at the same time being prone to precipitous changes of polarity. Equivalent inference applied to the self creates an oscillation between self-aggrandizement and self-deprecation, capturing oscillatory relational and affective dynamics. Notably, such oscillatory dynamics arise out of the Bayesian nature of the model, wherein a subject arrives at the most plausible explanation for their observations, given their current expectations. Thus, the model we present accounts for aspects of splitting that appear ‘defensive’, without the need to postulate a specific defensive intention. By contrast, we associate psychological health with a fine-grained representation of internal states, constrained by an integrated prior, corresponding to notions of ‘character’. Finally, the model predicts that extreme appraisals of self or other are associated with causal attribution errors.

Failure to engage the temporoparietal junction/posterior superior temporal sulcus predicts impaired naturalistic social cognition in schizophrenia

Schizophrenia is associated with marked impairments in social cognition. However, the neural correlates of these deficits remain unclear. Here we use naturalistic stimuli to examine the role of the right temporoparietal junction/posterior superior temporal sulcus (TPJ-pSTS)—an integrative hub for the cortical networks pertinent to the understanding complex social situations—in social inference, a key component of social cognition, in schizophrenia. 27 schizophrenia participants (SzP) and 21 healthy controls watched a clip of the movie “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly” while high resolution multiband fMRI images were collected. We used inter-subject correlation (ISC) to measure the evoked activity, which we then compared to social cognition as measured by The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT). We also compared between groups the TPJ-pSTS BOLD activity 1) relationship with the motion content in the movie, 2) synchronization with other cortical areas involved in the viewing of the movie, and 3) relationship with the frequency of saccades made during the movie. Activation deficits were greatest in middle TPJ (TPJm) and correlated significantly with impaired TASIT performance across groups. Follow-up analyses of the TPJ-pSTS revealed decreased synchronization with other cortical areas, decreased correlation with the motion content of the movie, and decreased correlation with the saccades made during the movie. The functional impairment of the TPJm, a hub area in the middle of the TPJ-pSTS, predicts deficits in social inference in SzP by disrupting the integration of visual motion processing into the TPJ. This disrupted integration then affects the use of the TPJ to guide saccades during the visual scanning of the movie clip. These findings suggest that the TPJ may be a treatment target for improving deficits in a key component of social cognition in SzP.