How diverse and inclusive are policy process theories?

Numerous published efforts have compared and contrasted policy process theories. Few assessments, however, have examined the extent to which they are inclusive or diverse. Here we summarise lessons from previous assessments, paying attention to how Paul Sabatier’s science-based criteria have shaped the contours of the field. In looking at these contours, we explore evidence of diversity and inclusivity of policy process approaches in terms of methods, concepts, topics, geography and authors. We conclude with strategies to address challenges revealed by our examination: creating space for conversations among scholars of differing perspectives and approaches; building sustained and meaningful efforts to recruit and train researchers with diverse backgrounds; establishing research coordination networks that focus on policy problems; and creating better metrics to assess our diversity and inclusivity.

E-Platform Enabled Transnational E-Entrepreneurship

This paper examines transnational e-entrepreneurs enabled by e-platforms through the lens of entrepreneurship process theories. The authors argue that transnational e-entrepreneurs engaging in necessity-driven e-entrepreneurship have been neglected in current related literature. This paper first proposes that transnational e-entrepreneurship research should be conducted in a framework of cross-country e-entrepreneurial ecosystem that combines host- and home-country entrepreneurial ecosystems and digital ecosystems. Then the framework was tested by case studies and proved to be valid. The paper found that e-platforms enabled necessity-driven transnational entrepreneurs to operate in the same manner with opportunity-drive entrepreneurship. The authors also conclude future research themes for transnational e-entrepreneurship study should separate necessity-driven and opportunity-driven entrepreneurs. It suggests the policymaker needs to emphasize necessity-driven e-entrepreneurs.

Contributing Factors to Acute Care Hospital Flow: International Ideas

High-functioning acute care hospitals enable efficient patient flow from admission to discharge with the right care from the right providers at the right time. Barriers to patient flow can result in cascading events and contribute to patient harm and caregiver burnout. Quality improvement endeavours in the UK, Switzerland, Finland, and the US have shown success through addressing workplace culture, utilizing management and process theories, altering roles and responsibilities, and taking advantage of technologies. Successful and sustainable improvements tend to involve substantial planning along with engagement of stakeholders in the design and implementation of a tailored approach.

Inference in Social Cognition

Inferences are ubiquitous in social cognition, governing everything from first impressions to the communication of meaning itself. Social cognitive inferences are typically varieties of diagnostic reasoning or, more properly, “abductive” reasoning, in which people infer simple but plausible—although not deductively certain—underlying causes for observable social behaviors. Abductive inference and its relationship to inductive and deductive inference are first introduced. A description of how abductive inference operates on a continuum between those that arise rapidly and automatically (and appear like deductions) and those that inspire more deliberative efforts (and thus often recruit more inductive information gathering and testing) is then given. Next, many classic findings in social cognition, and social psychology more broadly, that reveal how widespread this type of inference is explored. Indeed, both judgements under uncertainty and dual-process theories can be illuminated by incorporating the abductive frame. What then follows is a discussion on the work in ecological and evolutionary approaches that suggest that, although these inferences often go beyond the information given and are prone to predictable errors, people are good enough at social inference to qualify as being “ecologically rational.” The conclusion explores emerging themes in social cognition that only heighten the need for this broader understanding of inference processes.

Is the brain an organ for free energy minimisation?

Two striking claims are advanced on behalf of the free energy principle (FEP) in cognitive science and philosophy: (i) that it identifies a condition of the possibility of existence for self-organising systems; and (ii) that it has important implications for our understanding of how the brain works, defining a set of process theories—roughly, theories of the structure and functions of neural mechanisms—consistent with the free energy minimising imperative that it derives as a necessary feature of all self-organising systems. I argue that the conjunction of claims (i) and (ii) rests on a fallacy of equivocation. The FEP can be interpreted in two ways: as a claim about how it is possible to redescribe the existence of self-organising systems (the Descriptive FEP), and as a claim about how such systems maintain their existence (the Explanatory FEP). Although the Descriptive FEP plausibly does identify a condition of the possibility of existence for self-organising systems, it has no important implications for our understanding of how the brain works. Although the Explanatory FEP would have such implications if it were true, it does not identify a condition of the possibility of existence for self-organising systems. I consider various ways of responding to this conclusion, and I explore its implications for the role and importance of the FEP in cognitive science and philosophy.

EXPRESS: The Bright Homunculus in our Head: Individual Differences in Intuitive Sensitivity to Logical Validity

Classic dual process theories of human reasoning attribute explicit reasoning to effortful, deliberative thinking. According to these models, intuitive processes lack any access to the formal rules of logic and probability and hence rely exclusively on superficial problem features to determine a response. However, in recent years, researchers have demonstrated that reasoners are able to solve simple logical or probabilistic problems relatively automatically, a capability which has been called ‘logical intuition’. In four experiments, we instructed participants to judge the validity (Experiments 1 and 4), likeability (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and physical brightness (Experiments 2, 3, and 4) of the conclusion to several reasoning problems. Brightness judgments were made by evaluating the font shade brightness of the argument’s conclusion. Participants were also asked to complete a range of individual differences measures, drawing on cognitive ability and cognitive style, in order to evaluate the extent to which ‘logical intuitions’ were linked to measures of deliberative reasoning. The results showed that participants judged the conclusion of logically valid statements to be more valid, more likable and more physically bright. Participants with higher cognitive ability and unlimited processing time showed greater effects of logical validity in their liking judgments (varied across experiments). However, these effects were absent in the brightness tasks, suggesting that logic effects observed under instructions to judge conclusion brightness are a purer measure of ‘logical intuition’. We discuss the implications of our findings for recent dual process theories of human reasoning.