The Case for Stance Dependent Reasons

Many philosophers maintain that neither one’s reasons for action nor well-being are ever grounded in facts about what we desire or favor. Yet our reasons to eat a flavor of ice cream we like rather than one we do not seem an obvious counter-example. I argue that there is no getting around such examples and that therefore a fully stance independent account of the grounding of our reasons is implausible. At least in matters of mere taste our “stance” plays a normative role in grounding reasons.

McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis (1866–1925)

McTaggart was one of the last of the ‘British Idealists’, the group of British philosophers, such as B. Bosanquet and F.H. Bradley, who took their inspiration from Hegel. In his early writings from the 1890s, McTaggart gave a critical exposition of themes from Hegel’s logic before advancing his own distinctive idealist positions concerning time, the mind, and reality in general. But in his writings from 1910 he developed an independent account of the structure of existence from which he then argued for the same idealist positions as before. The thesis for which McTaggart is now most famous is that of the unreality of time; what is even more difficult to come to terms with is his thesis that the ultimate reality of the world comprises a community of selves wholly constituted by their loving perceptions of each other. This thesis is a manifestation of a mysticism that is an essential element in McTaggart’s philosophy; yet this mysticism is combined with a rationalist determination, reminiscent of Spinoza, to vindicate mystical insights by the light of pure reason alone.

Problems with Moral Principle Accounts

In offering accounts of the obligation accrued by a promisor on the basis of his promise some theorists invoke a social convention or practice of promising and some do not. Promise theorists of both types generally assume that the primary obligation of a promisor is a moral requirement derived from a moral principle. Taking Thomas Scanlon’s prominent practice-independent account as its focus, this chapter argues that moral principle approaches cannot account for the inevitability of a promisor’s obligation. Nor can they account for its directedness. They cannot therefore account for a promisee’s demand-right which is equivalent to the directed obligation of his promisor. The demand-right problem for promises, therefore, remains unsolved.

CFTC adopts amendments to position limit aggregation rules

Purpose To explain the final position limit aggregation rules and exemptions pertaining to derivative positions in nine agricultural commodities adopted by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission on December 5, 2016 and effective February 14, 2017, the notice filing deadline with respect to which was extended by the CFTC by limited time no-action relief until August 14, 2017. Design/methodology/approach Explains the position limit aggregation rules and exemptions pertaining to equity interests in owned entities, ownership or equity interests in pooled accounts or positions, positions of an “eligible entity” in connection with client positions carried by an “independent account controller,” positions held by futures commission merchants (FCMs) in discretionary accounts or customer trading program accounts, equity interests of underwriters based on unsold allotments of securities in distributions, broker-dealers if the equity interest is acquired in the normal course of business and positions for which information cannot be collected without risk of violating a law. Findings Unless an exemption from aggregation is available, all positions in accounts for which any person controls the trading or holds a 10 per cent or greater ownership or equity interest must be aggregated with positions held, and trading done, by such person. The final rule adds several new exemptions, including for persons with a 10 per cent or greater ownership or equity interest in an entity so long as certain conditions establishing independence are met. The final rule requires notice filing to take advantage of most exemptions from aggregation. Originality/value Practical guidance from experienced lawyers specializing in securities, funds, and investment management.

Validity of Bartram’s Painted Vulture (Aves: Cathartidae)

William Bartram described the Painted Vulture (Vultur sacra) as a new species in his 1791 book on travels in Florida and other southeastern states. However, no specimen of this bird survives, and it has not been reported by any subsequent or-nithologist. Bartram’s detailed description is not presently endorsed by the American Ornithologists’ Union and has been widely regarded as a myth, a misdescribed King Vulture Sarcoramphus papa (Linnaeus), a misdescribed Northern Carac-ara Caracara cheriway (Jacquin), or a garbled mixture of species. In fact, his description bears almost no resemblance to a Northern Caracara, but it does match the King Vulture in all important respects except tail color (which is uniform dark brown in all ages and sexes of King Vultures but was white with a dark brown or black tip in Bartram’s description). Most 20th century ornithologists commenting on Bartram’s bird have been reluctant to accept his description because of the tail-color discrepancy. Only McAtee (1942) concluded that his description could be fully accurate as written, indicating a bird closely related to, but different from, a typical King Vulture. Paralleling Bartram’s description is an apparently independent account and painting of a vulture of uncertain geo-graphic origin by Eleazar Albin (1734). Details of Albin’s description, including tail color, are very similar to those of Bartram’s description. The only discrepancies are minor differences in color of softparts and tail that seem explicable as intraspecific variation. Available evidence suggests that Bartram knew nothing of Albin’s description, and if so, Albin’s bird provides quite persuasive support for the validity of Bartram’s bird. Equally important, none of the arguments offered historically against the validity of the Painted Vulture is persuasive when examined closely. Together, these and other fac-tors make a strong case for acceptance of Bartram’s Painted Vulture as a historic resident of northern Florida and likely other adjacent regions.

Three new species and one new record of Campylaimus (Diplopeltidae, Nematoda) from Argentine coasts (Buenos Aires and Santa Cruz, Argentina)

Two new Campylaimus species from Arroyo Pareja, Buenos Aires province and one new species and one new record of Campylaimus from Puerto San Julián, Chubut province are described. The three species are characterized by the shape of the copulatory apparatus of the male and the presence of precloacal papillae. Campylaimus bonariensis sp. nov. has slen-der and arcuate spicules, with well-developed cephalization at the proximal end, tubular gubernaculum and three preclo-acal papillae; Campylaimus arcuatus sp. nov. has curved spicules, with well-developed cephalization at the proximal end, gubernaculum with dorso-caudally directed apophysis and five precloacal papillae; Campylaimus patagonicus sp. nov. has slender and arcuate spicules without proximal cephalization, gubernaculum with dorso-caudally directed apophysis and two precloacal papillae. An emended diagnosis of the genus Campylaimus and an identification key to species based on male characters are giventhe tail-color discrepancy. Only McAtee (1942) concluded that his description could be fully accurate as written, indicating a bird closely related to, but different from, a typical King Vulture. Paralleling Bartram’s description is an apparently independent account and painting of a vulture of uncertain geo-graphic origin by Eleazar Albin (1734). Details of Albin’s description, including tail color, are very similar to those of Bartram’s description. The only discrepancies are minor differences in color of softparts and tail that seem explicable as intraspecific variation. Available evidence suggests that Bartram knew nothing of Albin’s description, and if so, Albin’s bird provides quite persuasive support for the validity of Bartram’s bird. Equally important, none of the arguments offered historically against the validity of the Painted Vulture is persuasive when examined closely. Together, these and other fac-tors make a strong case for acceptance of Bartram’s Painted Vulture as a historic resident of northern Florida and likely other adjacent regions.

Logical Space and the Space of Sight: The Relevance of Wittgenstein's Arguments to Recent Issues in the Philosophy of Mind

ABSTRACTIn this article, I show and discuss the relevance of Wittgenstein's arguments as to the spatial structure of sight to recent issues in the philosophy of mind. The first, bearing upon the dimensionality of the manifolds at play in depiction, plays a critical role in Clark's attempt to provide an independent account of qualia and of their differentiative properties. The second, pertaining to the properly spatial structure formed by the data of sight, is explicitly appealed to in the debate on the realistic character of any genuinely spatial scheme. I argue that if Wittgenstein rightly assumes that the simultaneous presence of sensible places in vision is a key condition for objectivity, he fails nevertheless to warrant the allegedly realistic character of the scheme employed in his own search for a phenomenological description of the visual field.

The Acceptance of a Legal System

The interest of political theory in the acceptance of law is obvious. If one believes that a regime is legitimate only if it governs with the consent of the governed, then the notion of acceptance is deeply linked with the notion of legitimacy, a fundamental concern of political theory. The interest of legal theory in the notion of acceptance is less obvious. I construe it to arise in the following way. One central tradition in legal theory is that of positivistic or content-independent theories of law. Positivism, crudely speaking, is characterized by some form of the Separation Thesis—that the existence of law is one thing and its merit or demerit another. But if it is important for positivistic legal theory to mark the separation of law and the merits of law, then it must also be important to mark the separation between law and the acceptance of law. The existence of law must be one thing and its acceptance as meritorious another. In deference to the separation of existence and merit, positivism tries to find a content-independent account of the validity of law. Equally, in deference to the separation of law and acceptance, positivism tries to find a content-independent account of the acceptance of law. The topic of this paper is whether the separation of law and the acceptance of law is possible. I shall try to suggest, in service of a non-positivistic or content-dependent approach to law, that this separation is not possible. I will attempt to argue on the basis of points which legal positivism itself has acknowledged to form valid constraints on any theory of acceptance. My ambitious thesis is that positivism has presented us with the reasons for rejecting it. Even if that thesis is not made out, I have a less ambitious thesis which I am confident of securing, that the demand for an account of law which permits law to be accepted ‘for any reason whatever’ is not a theoryneutral demand which might decide between positivism and natural law theory. Rather, it is an expression of a prior commitment to positivism. It is the familiar demand of natural law theory that the convergence of attitudes towards law which makes for acceptance of law must be a convergence for the right kind of reasons; ones that have to do with the value of law.