Problems with Moral Principle Accounts
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In offering accounts of the obligation accrued by a promisor on the basis of his promise some theorists invoke a social convention or practice of promising and some do not. Promise theorists of both types generally assume that the primary obligation of a promisor is a moral requirement derived from a moral principle. Taking Thomas Scanlon’s prominent practice-independent account as its focus, this chapter argues that moral principle approaches cannot account for the inevitability of a promisor’s obligation. Nor can they account for its directedness. They cannot therefore account for a promisee’s demand-right which is equivalent to the directed obligation of his promisor. The demand-right problem for promises, therefore, remains unsolved.
1997 ◽
Vol 48
(6)
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pp. 569-579
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2008 ◽
Vol 2008
(2)
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pp. 209-234
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2018 ◽
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