Intellectual Motivation and the Good of Truth

This chapter is one of Zagzebski’s papers on the problem of what makes knowledge more valuable than mere true belief, otherwise known as the value problem. I distinguish four ways a belief can possess value by its relation to the good of truth: (i) a belief can have value because truth is its consequence; (ii) a belief can have teleological value in the Aristotelian sense if truth is a necessary component of a good natural end; (iii) a belief can be valuable in that truth is its aim; and (iv) a belief can be good in virtue of arising from a good motive—namely, valuing truth or disvaluing falsehood. She argues that the fourth way is superior to the first three in explaining what makes knowledge better than mere true belief.

A Common Misunderstanding of Intention

The moral act consists of object, intention, and circumstances. The word intention, as commonly used, is often mistaken for the technical meaning of the word intention as employed by philosophers. This produces confusion in the description of moral acts. The common use of intention signifies motive, or one's reason for action. We commonly say that someone has a good intention even though what he or she does is wrong. For example, we describe someone who wants to alleviate suffering, and so euthanizes a patient, as having a good intention. To the contrary, in the Catholic moral tradition, intention means an action that is done voluntarily and knowingly. A nurse who kills a patient has a bad intention because he or she acts freely and with knowledge. Alleviating suffering is indeed a good motive for action, but motives are formulated through deliberation prior to action.

How altruistic organ donation may be (intrinsically) bad

It has traditionally been assumed that organ donation must be altruistic, though the necessity of altruistic motivations has recently been questioned. Few, however, have questioned whether altruism is always a good motive. This paper considers the possibility that excessive altruism, or self-abnegation, may be intrinsically bad. How this may be so is illustrated with reference to Tom Hurka’s account of the value of attitudes, which suggests that disproportionate love of one’s own good—either excessive or deficient—is intrinsically bad. Whether or not we accept the details of this account, recognising that altruistic motivations may be intrinsically bad has important implications for organ procurement. One possible response is to say that we should take further measures to ensure that donors have good motives—that they are altruistic is no longer enough. An alternative is to say that, since altruistic donation need not be intrinsically good, we have less reason to object to other motivations.

Hakekat Hukuman Dalam Pendidikan Islam

Punishment is something that is prescribed and one of the most successful educational tools that educators may require from time to time. But there is a very excessive use of this mean, making it as if the dangerous tool and resulted in the opposite. A teacher is required to provide the best for his students, including punishment. Do not let when giving the punishment, stuents looked at it as a torture. The educational tool in the form of punishment is something unpleasant in return for a bad deed. But keep in mind that in the punishment, a teacher must have the motivation for giving punishment that can be a good motive for the learners. Indeed, the purpose of imposing punishment in Islamic Education is nothing but to provide guidance and improvement. Therefore, it should be noted the character and condition of the child must be concerned before a teacher sentenced him. By understanding the meaning of punishment in Islamic Education based on al-Qur'an and hadith, it is expected that punishment could generate positive meaning to the learners.