SELF-GOVERNANCE, ROBUST POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND THE REFORM OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

This essay explains how to use the calculus of consent framework to think more rigorously about self-governance, and applies this framework to the issue of evaluating federal regulatory agencies. Robust political economy is the idea that institutions should be designed to work well even under weak assumptions about decision-makers’ knowledge and benevolence. I show how the calculus of consent can be used to analyze both incentives and knowledge problems. The calculus is simultaneously a theory of self-governance and a tool for robust political economy analysis. Applying this framework to the case of public administration leads to the conclusion that private goods (such as medicine) tend to be over-regulated, public goods tend to be under-regulated (such as enabling too much pollution), and regulatory agencies tend to be over-centralized (and should in most cases either be replaced with certification markets or moved to state level).

Steering, Knowledge and the Challenge of Governance Evaluation: The Case of National Health Service Governance and Reform in England

Drawing from “robust political economy” (RPE) literature, we address evaluative questions concerning governance effectiveness in the face of complex, cross-cutting problems. Central to RPE is the challenge of coordination, with its fundamental epistemological dimension requiring close attention to stakeholder knowledge about policy impacts. This focus contrasts with process-orientated analysis predominant in political science and public administration and enables holistic governance evaluation that draws from various, often demarcated, research fields. This is demonstrated through a focus on the evolution of health governance in England, particularly how diabetes services in England were affected by the 2012 Health and Social Care Act.

ROBUST POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE PRIORITY OF MARKETS

This essay offers a “nonideal” case for giving institutional priority to markets and private contracting in the basic structure of society. It sets out a “robust political economy” framework to examine how different political economic regime types cope with frictions generated by the epistemic limitations of decision-makers and problems of incentive incompatibility. Focusing on both efficiency arguments and distributive justice concerns the essay suggests that a constitutional structure that prioritizes consensual exchange is more likely to sustain a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.