Self-Governance, Robust Political Economy, and the Reform of Public Administration

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vlad Tarko
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Administration ◽  
Robust Political Economy

SELF-GOVERNANCE, ROBUST POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND THE REFORM OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

2021 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 170-197
Author(s):  
Vlad Tarko
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Administration ◽  
State Level ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Robust Political Economy ◽  
Political Economy Analysis ◽  
Economy Analysis

AbstractThis essay explains how to use the calculus of consent framework to think more rigorously about self-governance, and applies this framework to the issue of evaluating federal regulatory agencies. Robust political economy is the idea that institutions should be designed to work well even under weak assumptions about decision-makers’ knowledge and benevolence. I show how the calculus of consent can be used to analyze both incentives and knowledge problems. The calculus is simultaneously a theory of self-governance and a tool for robust political economy analysis. Applying this framework to the case of public administration leads to the conclusion that private goods (such as medicine) tend to be over-regulated, public goods tend to be under-regulated (such as enabling too much pollution), and regulatory agencies tend to be over-centralized (and should in most cases either be replaced with certification markets or moved to state level).

Transformation of the State and Political Economy of the Governance

2020 ◽  
pp. 239-257
Author(s):  
Emek Yıldırım
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Administration ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
The State ◽  
State Model ◽  
Functional Changes ◽  
The Public ◽  
Role Of The State

By the 1980s and 1990s, neoliberal policies such as privatizations and deregulations transforming the minimal state model to regulative state model from the Keynesian social welfare state system made some structural and functional changes in the state mechanism, and the public administration has been in the first place due to the changing relationship between the state and the market. In fact, within this context, the new institutional economics (NIE) had a remarkable influence upon the debates upon the altering role of the state. Hence, the transformation of the state in this regard also revealed the argumentations on the governance paradigm along with the doctrinaire contributions of the new institutional economics. Therefore, this chapter will discuss the transformation of the state and the political economy of the governance together with a critical assessment of the new institutional economics in the public administration.

The Political Economy of Administrative Burdens: A Theoretical Framework for Analyzing the Organizational Origins of Administrative Burdens

2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 566-592 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rik Peeters
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Literature Review ◽  
Public Administration ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
The Political ◽  
Extensive Literature ◽  
Behavioral Patterns ◽  
Access To Services ◽  
Formal Procedures

Most research on administrative burdens focuses on measuring their impact on citizens’ access to services and benefits. This article fills a theoretical gap and provides a framework for understanding the organizational origins of administrative burden. Based on an extensive literature review, the explanations are organized according to their level of intentionality (deliberate hidden politics or unintended consequences) and their level of formality (designed into formal procedures or caused by informal organizational practices). The analysis suggests that administrative burdens are often firmly rooted in a political economy of deeply engrained structures and behavioral patterns in public administration.

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