Contractual Rationalities

Modern contract theories differ from one another along one principal dimension, namely the account of practical rationality that they employ. One class of theories draws upon modern expected utility theory; a second conceives of rationality in terms of deliberative reasoning. The purpose of this chapter is to offer an exposition of these two approaches. Modern utility theory is built upon the idea of imposing consistency conditions on the choices that agents make over alternatives. Utility is understood as a numerical representation of a consistent rank-ordering by individuals over alternatives. Utility theory been applied to studies of the interactions of individuals defined as rational in the required sense, in the form of game theory. Two types of game have been of particular interest to social contract theorist: positive sum bargaining games and the prisoner’s dilemma. By contrast with utility theory, there is no orthodox theory of deliberative rationality. However, there are some important formulations that shape the deliberative form of contract theory. One is the idea of the practical syllogism. Another is the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons. A third is the distinction between internal and external reasons. Both utility theory and deliberative theory should be thought to be normative. The principle of universalizability offers a distinctive conception of practical rationality that contrasts with contract theory.

Francisco Suárez on Consent and Political Obligation

Interpreters disagree on the origin that Francisco Suárez assigns to political obligation and correlative political subjection. According to some, Suárez, as other social contract theorists, believes that it is the consent of the individuals that causes political obligation. Others, however, claim that for Suárez, political obligation is underived from the individuals' consent which creates the city. In support of this claim they invoke Suárez's view that political power emanates from the city by way of "natural resultancy". I argue that analysis of Suárez's less studied De voto and De iuramento reveals that, for Suárez, consent causes both the city and the citizen's political obligation. Moreover, close inspection of the notion of causation by natural resultancy within Suárez's metaphysics shows that what emanates from the body politic in this fashion is not, as claimed, political subjection and political obligation, but rather the city's right to self-mastership. Because for him political obligation does originate in consent it is not incorrect to regard Suárez as a social contract theorist.

The Multiple Personalities of Daniel J. Boorstin: A Third Image Analysis

This article presents a new interpretation of Boorstin's political thought. I contend that there are three Daniel J. Boorstins. and that the third image represents the core of Boorstin's political thought. The third image centers on Boorstin's insistence that an essence guides and directs American politics and thought. Boorstin terms his version of essence "givenness." According to Boorstin, essence, or "givenness," was assigned to America by a Supreme Being. While Louis Hartz bases his concept of "irrational Lockeanism" in the thought of a social contract theorist. Daniel Boorstin bases his notion in the essence of God.

Francisco Suárez y la tradición del Contrato social

RESUMENesisten importantes discrepancias entre los intérpretes acerca de si Francisco Suárez fue un teórico del contrato social. En buena medida, este desacuerdo tiene que ver con la relación entre el consentimiento constitutivo (por el cual la comunidad política es creada) y la obligación política. De acuerdo con una interpretación de Suárez, el consentimiento constitutivo no crea obligación política; más bien tal obligación corresponde a la comunidad política en virtud de la clase de entidad que es(igual que las personas tienen sus derechos de autonoía por ser personas). Argumento en contra de esta interpretación de Suárez al proponer que los efectos del consentimiento constitutivo deberían ser comprendidos a la luz del tratamiento que ofrece Suárez de "actos operativos" como votos, promesas y juramentos. Defiendo que muchos de los pasajes de Suárez han sido incorrectamente interpretados como apoyo de una lectura organicista, cuando en realidad corresponden al planteamiento que hace de la causación moral.PALABRAS CLAVEFRANCISCO SUÁREZ, CONSENTIMIENTO, OBLIGACIÓN POLÍTICA, CONTRATO SOCIAL.ABSTRACTInterpretars disagree on whether Francisco Suárez was a social contract theorist. Much of this discrepancy turns on the relation between constitutive consent (that consent by wich the political community is created) and political obligation. According to one interpretation of Suárez, it is not constitutive consent that creates political obligation. Rather, such obligation belongs to the political community by virtue of he sort of being that it is (just as persons have self-rule rights by virtue of being persons, independently from their mode of production). I argue against this interpretation of Suárez by suggesting that the effects of constitutive consent should be understood in light of Suárez's treatment of "operative acts"such vows, promises, and oaths. i establish that many of Suárez's phrases incorrectly deemed as supportive of an organicist reading, bellong, in fact, to Suárez's treatment of moral causation KEYWORDSFRANCISCO SUÁREZ, CONSENT, POLITICAL OBLIGATION, SOCIAL CONTRACT