EXPRESS: The Bright Homunculus in our Head: Individual Differences in Intuitive Sensitivity to Logical Validity

Classic dual process theories of human reasoning attribute explicit reasoning to effortful, deliberative thinking. According to these models, intuitive processes lack any access to the formal rules of logic and probability and hence rely exclusively on superficial problem features to determine a response. However, in recent years, researchers have demonstrated that reasoners are able to solve simple logical or probabilistic problems relatively automatically, a capability which has been called ‘logical intuition’. In four experiments, we instructed participants to judge the validity (Experiments 1 and 4), likeability (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and physical brightness (Experiments 2, 3, and 4) of the conclusion to several reasoning problems. Brightness judgments were made by evaluating the font shade brightness of the argument’s conclusion. Participants were also asked to complete a range of individual differences measures, drawing on cognitive ability and cognitive style, in order to evaluate the extent to which ‘logical intuitions’ were linked to measures of deliberative reasoning. The results showed that participants judged the conclusion of logically valid statements to be more valid, more likable and more physically bright. Participants with higher cognitive ability and unlimited processing time showed greater effects of logical validity in their liking judgments (varied across experiments). However, these effects were absent in the brightness tasks, suggesting that logic effects observed under instructions to judge conclusion brightness are a purer measure of ‘logical intuition’. We discuss the implications of our findings for recent dual process theories of human reasoning.

Judging accidental harm: The interplay between harm severity and intention towards the victim

When judging a perpetrator who harmed someone accidentally, humans rely on distinct cognitive processes: one that focuses on the victim’s harm and condemns the perpetrator, and another one that examines the perpetrator’s intention and exculpates the perpetrator. The present study investigates how individuals (as third-parties) solve the cognitive tension generated by the judgment of accidental harm by simultaneously manipulating harm severity, the perpetrator’s intention, and by determining the effect of reasoning style. In two pre-registered experiments, participants recruited online completed a moral judgment task consisting of short narratives which depicted the interaction between a perpetrator and a victim in a daily life context. We assessed how participants perceived the perpetrator’s behavior as wrong, blameworthy, and punishment-deserving. In experiment 1 (N = 224), we manipulated the perpetrator’s intent to harm (accidental vs. intentional harm) and the severity of outcome for the victim (mild vs. severe harm). In experiment 2 (N = 210), we used accidental harm scenarios in which we manipulated the perpetrator’s intention towards the victim (positive vs. neutral) and outcome severity (mild vs. severe harm). We additionally assessed participants’ reasoning style in both experiments and explored its role in modulating moral judgment. As expected, participants’ judgment of wrongness and punishment were harsher following severe harm relative to mild harm (experiments 1 and 2), and following intentional as compared to accidental harm (experiment 1). Moreover, participants were more lenient with the perpetrator of accidental harm whose intention towards the victim was positive (experiment 2). Importantly, in both experiments, the perpetrator’s intent not only interacted with outcome severity but also polarized moral judgments in participants with a more deliberative reasoning style, especially following mild harm. These findings extend previous studies by showing that harm severity modulates moral judgment and interacts with intent and reasoning style to shape moral judgment of accidents.

Textual and discoursal strategies of national leaders to establish their political images in the global arena

Giving speeches is one’s vital competency for creating a country’s image in the global arena. Every political speech represents the speaker’s deliberative reasoning to respond to the existing situation and is a synoptic lens of the intended judgment on particular issues. This study explores three Indonesian speakers’ textual and discoursal strategies in the opening of three political speeches. By employing qualitative research, the researchers analyzed the textual and discoursal properties in terms of features, characters, and structures of argumentation and the speakers’ flow of thinking realized linguistically. This research found that the speeches’ micro and macro components are in mutual supporting functions to accommodate the themes of the discourse. Verbally, each speaker built their image as a figure who concerns solidarity, a leader who is aware of the global crisis, and an activist who promotes Indonesia’s positive global roles. The findings imply the pivotal roles of textual and discoursal strategies to construct the national and personal image of a politician delivering a speech for the global audience. This study is expected to be beneficial for ESP, especially for the teaching of English for Public Relations.

Problems in measuring the JTC-bias in patients with psychotic disorders with the fish task: A secondary analysis of a baseline assessment of a randomized controlled trial

Background: The jumping to conclusions bias (JTC) is considered to be an important causal factor in theoretical models for the formation and maintenance of delusions. However, recent meta-analytic findings show a rather equivocal pattern of results regarding associations between JTC and delusions. Thus, the present study aims to investigate in a large sample whether the JTC-bias is more pronounced in patients with psychotic disorders in comparison to controls and whether the JTC bias is associated with a more severe delusional conviction, persecutory delusions, and positive symptoms in general.Methods: Patients with psychotic disorders (n = 300) enrolled in a therapy trial and healthy controls (n = 51) conducted a variant of the beads task (fish task) as a measure for the JTC-bias at the start of the trial. Further, clinical interviews were used to assess patients’ delusional severity and delusional conviction. Results: There were no statistically significant differences between patients with psychotic disorders (with 53% displaying the JTC-bias) and controls (41%). Furthermore, there were no statistically significant correlations between JTC measures and persecutory delusions, delusional conviction, and positive symptoms.Conclusions: We found no differences in JTC between patients with psychotic disorders and healthy controls, which is in part in line with meta-analytic findings using a wide range of JTC task variants. Interestingly, patients with psychotic disorders displayed JTC rates commonly found in the literature, while healthy control subjects showed an unexpectedly high level of JTC. The task variant we used in the present study (fish task) is discussed as a potential reason for our results, as it may induce a more deliberative reasoning style in controls as compared to the traditional beads task. Furthermore, possible implications for the measurement of the JTC-bias, in general, are discussed.Trial Registration: ISRCTN29242879 (isrctn.com), date of registration: April 12th 2006, retrospectively registered

Problems in measuring the JTC-bias in patients with psychotic disorders with the fish task: A secondary analysis of a baseline assessment of a randomized controlled trial

Background: The jumping to conclusions bias (JTC) is considered to be an important causal factor in theoretical models for the formation and maintenance of delusions. However, recent meta-analytic findings show a rather equivocal pattern of results regarding associations between JTC and delusions. Thus, the present study aims to investigate in a large sample whether the JTC-bias is more pronounced in patients with psychotic disorders in comparison to controls and whether the JTC bias is associated with a more severe delusional conviction, persecutory delusions, and positive symptoms in general.Methods: Patients with psychotic disorders (n = 300) enrolled in a therapy trial and healthy controls (n = 51) conducted a variant of the beads task (fish task) as a measure for the JTC-bias at the start of the trial. Further, clinical interviews were used to assess patients’ delusional severity and delusional conviction. Results: There were no statistically significant differences between patients with psychotic disorders (with 53% displaying the JTC-bias) and controls (41%). Furthermore, there were no statistically significant correlations between JTC measures and persecutory delusions, delusional conviction, and positive symptoms.Conclusions: We found no differences in JTC between patients with psychotic disorders and healthy controls, which is in part in line with meta-analytic findings using a wide range of JTC task variants. Interestingly, patients with psychotic disorders displayed JTC rates commonly found in the literature, while healthy control subjects showed an unexpectedly high level of JTC. The task variant we used in the present study (fish task) is discussed as a potential reason for our results, as it may induce a more deliberative reasoning style in controls as compared to the traditional beads task. Furthermore, possible implications for the measurement of the JTC-bias, in general, are discussed.Trial Registration: ISRCTN29242879 (isrctn.com), date of registration: April 12th 2006

Problems in measuring the JTC-bias in patients with psychotic disorders with the fish task: A secondary analysis of a baseline assessment of a randomized controlled trial

Background: The jumping to conclusions bias (JTC) is considered to be an important causal factor in theoretical models on the formation and maintenance of delusions. However, recent meta-analytic findings show a rather equivocal pattern of results regarding associations between JTC and delusions. Thus, the aim of the present preregistered study is to investigate in a large sample whether the JTC-bias is more pronounced in patients with psychotic disorders in comparison to controls and whether the JTC bias is associated with more severe delusional conviction, persecutory delusions and positive symptoms in general. Methods: Patients with psychotic disorders (n = 300) enrolled in a therapy trial and healthy controls (n = 51) conducted a variant of the beads task (fish task) as a measure for the JTC-bias at start of the trial. Further, clinical interviews were used to assess patients' delusional severity and delusional conviction. Results: There were no statistically significant differences between patients with psychotic disorders (with 53% displaying the JTC-bias) and controls (41%). Furthermore, there were no statistically significant correlations between JTC measures and persecutory delusions, delusional conviction and positive symptoms. Conclusions: We found no evidence for hasty decisions in patients with psychotic disorders, which is in part in line with meta-analytic findings using a wide range of JTC task variants. However, the task variant we used in the present study (fish task) is discussed as potential reason for the non-significance of our results, as it may induce a more deliberative reasoning style as compared to the traditional beads task. Furthermore, possible implications for the measurement of the JTC-bias in general are discussed. Trial Registration: ISRCTN29242879 (isrctn.com), date of registration: April 12th 2006

Contractual Rationalities

Modern contract theories differ from one another along one principal dimension, namely the account of practical rationality that they employ. One class of theories draws upon modern expected utility theory; a second conceives of rationality in terms of deliberative reasoning. The purpose of this chapter is to offer an exposition of these two approaches. Modern utility theory is built upon the idea of imposing consistency conditions on the choices that agents make over alternatives. Utility is understood as a numerical representation of a consistent rank-ordering by individuals over alternatives. Utility theory been applied to studies of the interactions of individuals defined as rational in the required sense, in the form of game theory. Two types of game have been of particular interest to social contract theorist: positive sum bargaining games and the prisoner’s dilemma. By contrast with utility theory, there is no orthodox theory of deliberative rationality. However, there are some important formulations that shape the deliberative form of contract theory. One is the idea of the practical syllogism. Another is the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons. A third is the distinction between internal and external reasons. Both utility theory and deliberative theory should be thought to be normative. The principle of universalizability offers a distinctive conception of practical rationality that contrasts with contract theory.

The Bright Homunculus in our Head: Individual Differences in Intuitive Sensitivity to Logical Validity

Classic dual process theories of human reasoning attribute explicit reasoning to effortful, deliberative thinking. According to these models, intuitive processes lack any access to the formal rules of logic and probability and hence rely exclusively on superficial problem features to determine a response. However, in recent years, researchers have demonstrated that reasoners are able to solve simple logical or probabilistic problems relatively automatically, a capability which has been called ‘logical intuition’. In four experiments, we instructed participants to judge the validity (Experiment 1 and 4), likeability (Experiment 1, 2, and 3) and brightness (Experiment 2, 3, and 4) of the conclusion to several reasoning problems. Participants were also asked to complete a range of individual differences measures, drawing on cognitive ability and cognitive style, in order to evaluate the extent to which ‘logical intuitions’ were linked to measures of deliberative reasoning. The results showed that participants judged the conclusion of logically valid statements to be more valid, more likable and more physically bright. Participants with higher cognitive ability and unlimited processing time showed greater effects of logical validity in their liking judgments. However, these effects were absent in the brightness tasks, suggesting that logic effects observed under instructions to judge conclusion brightness are a purer measure of ‘logical intuition’. We discuss the implications of our findings for recent dual process theories of human reasoning.

Failure to replicate the JTC-bias in patients with psychotic disorders: A secondary analysis of a baseline assessment of a randomized controlled trial

Background: The jumping to conclusions bias (JTC) is considered to be an important causal factor in theoretical models on the formation and maintenance of delusions. However, recent meta-analytic findings show a rather equivocal pattern of results regarding associations between JTC and delusions. Thus, the aim of the present preregistered study is to investigate in a large sample whether the JTC-bias is more pronounced in patients with psychotic disorders in comparison to controls and whether the JTC bias is associated with more severe delusional conviction, persecutory delusions and positive symptoms in general. All hypotheses were pre-specified in the trial proposal.Methods: Patients with psychotic disorders (n = 300) enrolled in a therapy trial and healthy controls (n = 51) conducted a variant of the beads task (fish task) as a measure for the JTC-bias at start of the trial. Further, clinical interviews were used to assess patients’ delusional severity and delusional conviction.Results: There were no statistically significant differences between patients with psychotic disorders (with 53% displaying the JTC-bias) and controls (41%). Furthermore, there were no statistically significant correlations between JTC measures and persecutory delusions, delusional conviction and positive symptoms.Conclusions: We found no evidence for hasty decisions in patients with psychotic disorders, possibly because the fish task induces a more deliberative reasoning style as compared to the traditional beads task. The lack of associations between JTC measures and delusion severity is in line with meta-analytic findings using a wide range of JTC task variants. JTC is not as ubiquitous as previously thought and may only manifest itself in certain situational contexts. Trial Registration: ISRCTN29242879 (isrctn.com), date of registration: April 12th 2006, http://www.isrctn.com/ISRCTN12345678

Practical Nous in the Nicomachean Ethics

The paper presses an analogy between Aristotle’s conception of practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning. It argues that theoretical reasoning has two optimal cognitive states associated with it, episteme and (theoretical) nous, and that practical reasoning has two counterpart states, phronēsis and (practical) nous. Theoretical nous is an expertise which enables those who have it to understand principles as principles, i.e. among other things, to know how to use them to derive other truths in their domain. It is a cognitively demanding state, which only experts have. Aristotelian practical nous is structurally similar to theoretical nous in that it requires the agent not only to know certain everyday truths, but also to know how and when to use them in deliberative reasoning. It is also a cognitively demanding notion, and only moral experts will have it.