Exponential Income Distribution and Evolution of Unemployment Compensation in the United Kingdom

We show that an exponential income distribution will emerge spontaneously in a peer-to-peer economic network that shares the publicly available technology. Based on this finding, we identify the exponential income distribution as the benchmark structure of the well-functioning market economy. However, a real market economy may deviate from the well-functioning market economy. We show that the deviation is partly reflected as the invalidity of exponential distribution in describing the super-low income class that involves unemployment. In this regard, we find, theoretically, that the lower-bound u of exponential income distribution has a linear relationship with (per capita) unemployment compensation. In this paper, we test this relationship for the United Kingdom from 2001 to 2015. Our empirical investigation confirms that the income structure of low and middle classes (about 90% of populations) in the United Kingdom exactly obeys exponential distribution, in which the lower-bound u is exactly in line with the evolution of unemployment compensation.

The Finance of Unemployment Compensation and Its Consequences

Economists have contributed important theoretical and empirical findings to the study of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, but a deliberate study of the effect of UI taxation’s unique structure remains undone. We summarize available evidence on UI taxation, describe the history and institutions of experience rating, and outline important lines of inquiry for future work. As unemployment has risen, so has the need for a body of policy-relevant knowledge about the function and financing of UI systems.

Dual-Labor Market and Unemployment Compensation

This paper discusses the impact of unemployment compensation on the employment and wages of regular and non-regular labor in a dual-labor market. The model in this paper assumes an effective demand constraint and an imperfectly competitive market. The results obtained are as follows. An increase in unemployment compensation increases the wages of regular labor to maintain its productivity. However, this temporarily decreases the employment of regular labor, so that the productivity and wages of non-regular labor decrease. The result is an increase in the relative wage rate of regular labor and the relative amount of non-regular labor employed. This result is independent of any economic regime. In terms of the impact on employment volume, the existence of two regimes, one wage-driven and one profit-driven, is confirmed. However, the effect on employment is weaker if unemployment compensation is financed by taxing profits.

Unemployment Compensation and Wages: A Difference-in-Differences Approach to Assessing the Wage Effects of the German Hartz Reforms

This paper examines the influence of the level of unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosengeld II) on the wage level by exploiting a quasi-natural experiment formed by the German Hartz reforms in 2005. Estimations are based on data from the Socioeconomic Panel ranging from 2000 to 2007. As dependent variables both real monthly gross salary and real hourly gross wage are used. Firstly, following the approach taken by Arent and Nagl (2013, Unemployment Compensation and Wages: Evidence from the German Hartz Reforms. Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 233 (4): 450–466), a before-after estimator is applied. Secondly, in contrast to the replication study by Ludsteck and Seth (2014, Comment on „Unemployment Compensation and Wages: Evidence from the German Hartz Reforms“ by Stefan Arent and Wolfgang Nagl. Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 234 (5): 635–644) a control group is constructed and a difference-in-differences estimator (DiD) is used for further assessment. The results of the before-after estimation indicate a negative influence of the unemployment assistance reform on wages. However, the corresponding placebo regressions cast doubt on whether the estimated effect is a policy effect. The DiD approach shows that substantial time effects exist. This indicates that the before-after estimator is not suitable for assessing the policy effect. Applying the DiD estimator, a negative significant policy effect is only identified for men in West Germany.