Strategic Timing of IPOs and Disclosure: A Dynamic Model of Multiple Firms

We study a dynamic timing game between multiple firms, who decide when to go public in the presence of possible information externalities. A firm's IPO pricing is a function of its privately observed idiosyncratic type and the level of investor sentiment, which follows a stochastic, mean-reverting process. Firms may wish to delay their IPOs in order to observe the market reception of the offerings of their peers. We characterize the unique symmetric threshold equilibrium, whereby pioneer firms with high idiosyncratic types endogenously emerge. The results provide novel implications regarding variation in IPO timing, sequential clustering, IPO droughts, the composition of new issues over time, and how IPO volume fluctuates over time. These include, among others, that in more populated industries, a lower proportion of firms emerge as industry pioneers, but follower IPO volume is intensified. Additionally, heightened uncertainty over investor sentiment exacerbates delay and leads to lower IPO volume.

A Global Game Model of Medical Project Crowdfunding

This paper analyzes the strategic interaction between a crowdfunding platform specialized in medical projects and a set of potential investors. The problem is cast as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the platform chooses its participation fee and selects a project. In the second stage, investors decide whether to back the project or not. We consider a crowdfunding platform which runs all-or-nothing programs and transfers funds to the entrepreneur only if an investment target is reached. Moreover, we assume that some agents present a systematic positive bias driven by positive emotions about projects with high social impact, which is a major characteristic of medical projects. We frame the second-stage investor problem as a typical global game and solve it for the threshold equilibrium. The analysis reveals that crowdfunding finance might back financially inefficient projects, a result amplified by the existence of enthusiastic investors. We further show that the optimal fee charged by the platform is related to the frequency of overoptimistic agents, a result that might explain why platforms tend to over-emphasize the social role of their projects.

Two Quarantine Models on the Attack of Malicious Objects in Computer Network

SEIQR (Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, Quarantined, and Recovered) models for the transmission of malicious objects with simple mass action incidence and standard incidence rate in computer network are formulated. Threshold, equilibrium, and their stability are discussed for the simple mass action incidence and standard incidence rate. Global stability and asymptotic stability of endemic equilibrium for simple mass action incidence have been shown. With the help of Poincare Bendixson Property, asymptotic stability of endemic equilibrium for standard incidence rate has been shown. Numerical methods have been used to solve and simulate the system of differential equations. The effect of quarantine on recovered nodes is analyzed. We have also analyzed the behavior of the susceptible, exposed, infected, quarantine, and recovered nodes in the computer network.

Do Heating Oil Prices Adjust Asymmetrically To Changes In Crude Oil Prices

This study investigated if there is an asymmetric relationships between heating oil and crude oil futures price changes for maturities of one to four months. The study finds that heating oil and crude oil futures price series of one-month to four month maturities are threshold cointegrated. The study also shows that heating oil and crude oil futures prices adjust "Asymmetrically" for deviation from equilibrium. At shorter maturities (one and two month contracts) heating oil and crude oil prices adjust faster for positive deviation from threshold equilibrium. In contrast, for longer maturities (three and four month contracts) heating oil and crude oil prices adjust faster for negative deviation from equilibrium. Finally, this study finds that only heating oil prices adjust to clear deviations from long-run equilibrium relationship.