“Publicity” and “Confidentiality in Arbitral Judiciary: Approaches to Understanding and Application

The growing interest in alternative forms of dispute resolution has prompted attention to the peculiarities of the application of the principles of publicity and confidentiality in the arbitration. It is determined that the observance of the principle of publicityof the legal proceeding is the basis for ensuring justice. However, approaches to the application of this principle in arbitration differ both from the point of view of researchers and within the framework of legal regulation at the national and international levels. Some believe that the application of the principle of publicity will destroy the features of arbitration as such. However, the presented article demonstrates other approaches. The position was supported that the principle of confidentiality should be distinguished from the concepts of “privacy” or “closed trial”. In this context, publicity is often compared to concepts such as “openness”, “clarity” and “transparency” of the proceedings. Of concern is some regulatory restriction on the application of the principle of publicity, which affects the level of awareness of the activities of arbitration courts among the public and lawyers who intend to use alternative forms of dispute resolution. It is hoped that such further research will help solve similar problems.

Risk Factors Affecting Bancassurance Development in Poland

The aim of the article is to identify the risk factors affecting bancassurance development in Poland. The development is understood here as a change of gross written premiums obtained through banks in Poland. The group of risk factors selected in a survey conducted among financial sector employees was subject to statistical verification. The analysis used both variables directly related to the insurance product (e.g., a regulatory restriction of insurance acquisition costs) as well as those resulting from the specificity of the bancassurance channel, such as the sales of banking products, i.e., cash loans, housing loans and the value of funds placed by customers on deposits. The study was conducted on the basis of data on the gross premiums written in Poland in the years 2004–2019. The result of the applied model confirms the assumptions and the importance of insurance distribution in banks. Significant risk factors (statistically significant) which determine gross premiums written in the bancassurance channel are: the size of policyholder’s family (number of children, dependants) represented by the average number of people in a household in Poland, demand on mortgage loans represents by bank housing loans for households and agent’s commission, represented by the ratio of acquisition costs to gross written premium. The results of the econometric model obtained are consistent with expectations arising from the principles and practice of cooperation between banks and insurers as well as the specificity of insurance products distribution (also local) in the bancassurance channel.

Regulatory restriction on executive compensation, corporate governance and firm performance

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether regulatory restriction on executive compensation in Chinese state-owned enterprises is beneficial to firm performance. The authors also examine the role of monitoring mechanisms in offsetting the effect of compensation restriction. Design/methodology/approach Multivariate analysis is conducted using archival data from Chinese listed companies over the period of 2007-2014. Findings The findings show that the restriction on executive compensation is negatively associated with a firm’s accounting performance, and this negative effect is ameliorated in firms with good internal control and a high level of institutional shareholding. Additional analysis reveals that the negative effect of pay restriction on firm performance is more pronounced in central government-controlled listed SOEs than in those controlled by local government. Originality/value This study is the first to investigate a government’s say-on-pay policy. Specifically, the findings pinpoint the inefficacy of regulatory intervention in corporate executive compensation. The findings add to compensation literature using China’s unique institutional setting.

The Rationale of State Aid Control: A Return to Orthodoxy

The prevailing view on the rationale for State aid control is that it should be the same as, or very similar to, the rationale for competition control. It is certainly true that State aid distorts competition, as the economic definition presupposes. However, there is a subtle difference between the two, and we should return to orthodoxy in our analysis of these two concepts. The rational for State aid control is in fact to be found in the logic of the internal market principles. The tools to be used in analysing it are not identical to those used in the antitrust context. Rather, the free movement perspective should be adopted, and most problems in the arena of State aid can be better understood when approached from that perspective. It is also true that State aid procedures can be used to monitor compliance with free movement rules, and so the functional identity between the two sets of provisions is confirmed. State aid is a regulatory restriction on freedom of movement, and State aid control is an essential part of the functioning of the internal market, and so it makes sense to treat it in the same way as any other regulatory measure which has such an effect.

The Rationale of State Aid Control: A Return to Orthodoxy

The prevailing view on the rationale for State aid control is that it should be the same as, or very similar to, the rationale for competition control. It is certainly true that State aid distorts competition, as the economic definition presupposes. However, there is a subtle difference between the two, and we should return to orthodoxy in our analysis of these two concepts. The rational for State aid control is in fact to be found in the logic of the internal market principles. The tools to be used in analysing it are not identical to those used in the antitrust context. Rather, the free movement perspective should be adopted, and most problems in the arena of State aid can be better understood when approached from that perspective. It is also true that State aid procedures can be used to monitor compliance with free movement rules, and so the functional identity between the two sets of provisions is confirmed. State aid is a regulatory restriction on freedom of movement, and State aid control is an essential part of the functioning of the internal market, and so it makes sense to treat it in the same way as any other regulatory measure which has such an effect.