Interindividual cooperation mediated by partisanship complicates Madison’s cure for “mischiefs of faction”

Political theorists have long argued that enlarging the political sphere to include a greater diversity of interests would cure the ills of factions in a pluralistic society. While the scope of politics has expanded dramatically over the past 75 y, polarization is markedly worse. Motivated by this paradox, we take a bottom–up approach to explore how partisan individual-level dynamics in a diverse (multidimensional) issue space can shape collective-level factionalization via an emergent dimensionality reduction. We extend a model of cultural evolution grounded in evolutionary game theory, in which individuals accumulate benefits through pairwise interactions and imitate (or learn) the strategies of successful others. The degree of partisanship determines the likelihood of learning from individuals of the opposite party. This approach captures the coupling between individual behavior, partisan-mediated opinion dynamics, and an interaction network that changes endogenously according to the evolving interests of individuals. We find that while expanding the diversity of interests can indeed improve both individual and collective outcomes, increasingly high partisan bias promotes a reduction in issue dimensionality via party-based assortment that leads to increasing polarization. When party bias becomes extreme, it also boosts interindividual cooperation, thereby further entrenching extreme polarization and creating a tug-of-war between individual cooperation and societal cohesion. These dangers of extreme partisanship are highest when individuals’ interests and opinions are heavily shaped by peers and there is little independent exploration. Overall, our findings highlight the urgency to study polarization in a coupled, multilevel context.

Polarization and tipping points

Research has documented increasing partisan division and extremist positions that are more pronounced among political elites than among voters. Attention has now begun to focus on how polarization might be attenuated. We use a general model of opinion change to see if the self-reinforcing dynamics of influence and homophily may be characterized by tipping points that make reversibility problematic. The model applies to a legislative body or other small, densely connected organization, but does not assume country-specific institutional arrangements that would obscure the identification of fundamental regularities in the phase transitions. Agents in the model have initially random locations in a multidimensional issue space consisting of membership in one of two equal-sized parties and positions on 10 issues. Agents then update their issue positions by moving closer to nearby neighbors and farther from those with whom they disagree, depending on the agents’ tolerance of disagreement and strength of party identification compared to their ideological commitment to the issues. We conducted computational experiments in which we manipulated agents’ tolerance for disagreement and strength of party identification. Importantly, we also introduced exogenous shocks corresponding to events that create a shared interest against a common threat (e.g., a global pandemic). Phase diagrams of political polarization reveal difficult-to-predict transitions that can be irreversible due to asymmetric hysteresis trajectories. We conclude that future empirical research needs to pay much closer attention to the identification of tipping points and the effectiveness of possible countermeasures.

Varieties of populist parties

Can parties such as the Swedish Democrats, the Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary, the UK Independence Party and the Italian Lega Nord all be classified consistently as part of the same family? Part I of this study summarizes the conceptual framework arguing that the traditional post-war Left-Right cleavage in the electorate and party competition has faded, overlaid by divisions over authoritarian-libertarianism and populism-pluralism. Building on this, part II discusses the pros and cons of alternative methods for gathering evidence useful to classify party positions. Part III describes how these are measured in this study, using Chapel Hill Expert Survey data in 2014 and 2017, and how they are mapped on a multidimensional issue space. Part IV compares European political parties on these scales – including Authoritarian-Populist parties – across a wide range of European countries. The conclusion in part V draws together the main findings and considers their implications.

The Political Economy of Economic Conservatism in India: From Moral Economy to Pro-business Nationalism

Economic conservatism in India today is associated with the BJP’s embrace of markets and competition. This article argues that conservatism within the nationalist movement was founded on rejecting both the market and the planned economy, embracing instead ‘moral economy’ principles of economic life guided by social norms, and development founded on small-scale craft production. After independence, conservative nationalists, while acknowledging the need to enhance state power through industrial growth, protected the moral economies of craft-based and agrarian production. But as the Congress party fractured, farmers’ movements asserted interests in market-based agricultural transformation and liberalization shifted the issue space of economic debate, new pro-business conservatives presented a new vision based on enhancing national wealth and strength through capitalist enterprise.

Special Delivery: Post Office to Issue Space-Themed Stamps

Letter writers will be able to adorn their envelopes this year with full-disk images of the planets, Pluto, and the full Moon, as well as Star Trek icons.

The democratic potential of systemic pluralism

This article analyses how, and under what conditions, a systemically-pluralist structure of international law provides a springboard for global democratization. I argue that contestation and deliberation – core values of democracy – can and do arise within systemic pluralism. Specifically, I contend that institutional heterarchy between legal orders and forum shopping by different actors provide a means to engender these democratic values. I maintain that democratization can be sought on both horizontal and vertical planes: the former being the sphere of multilateral negotiations; the latter being governance which links individuals directly to sites of public power. In making this argument, I analyse recent developments within global intellectual property law, establishing and treating the multiple jurisdictions in this issue-space as an instantiation of systemic pluralism. This article thus provides a normative strategy for ongoing democratization of international law. Systemic pluralism must still prove its merits in terms of stability, the rule of law, and other values. However, I provide a method to advance transnational democracy that takes seriously empirical realities and competing normative visions.