Political justice, political obligation and the European Union: Lessons from Habermas

What principles of political justice ought to apply to the European Union? This question is particularly relevant considering the deepening integration process that resulted from the crises of the past decade. Habermas’s conception of a transnational democracy allows identification of the methodological components of transnational political justice: to unite in a transnational polity, people belonging to different national communities need a common purpose ( finalité), principles governing the distribution of constitutional and legislative power and a common political infrastructure that allows them to form democratic will as free and equal citizens. This article attempts to further expand these points through a public goods approach. European policies generate European public goods. These must be produced and accessed based on a fair cooperation scheme. Identifying these specific fairness conditions allows further clarification on how legislative and constitutional power ought to be distributed within the European polity.

Between Utopianism and Realism: The Limits of Partisanship as an Academic Methodology

Taking debates about democracy in the EU as an example, Fabio Wolkenstein proposes that normative theorists should adopt a ‘partisan’ approach that engages with ‘formative agents’ to advocate for transformative political and societal change, such as the creation of a transnational democracy at the EU level. He criticises those he calls ‘democratic intergovernmentalists’ for adopting a ‘first principles’ approach that forecloses both contestation and political agency by treating the principles underlying the status quo as universal. This comment disputes both the validity of his criticisms of the work of myself and others, and the coherence of the particular partisan approach motivating them. At its heart lies a dispute as to the relationship between facts and principles, and the possibility of a utopian realism of the Rawlsean kind. It is argued that Rawls’ position proves more democratic and plausible and possesses greater critical and political leverage than Wolkenstein’s partisanship alternative.

Models of shareholder democracy: A transnational approach

Existing discussions about shareholder control work with a state-centric and Westphalian conception of democracy. Therefore, they see the corporation as a state-analogue: shareholders (citizens) elect a board (legislature) charged with the responsibility to ensure that the executive follows their ‘collective interest’. We claim that state-centric models of democracy are not apt for an environment of corporate governance characterised by complex interdependence, porous boundaries, and criss-crossing relations of weak allegiances. Instead, we suggest that recent theories of transnational democracy provide us with better models for thinking about ‘popular’ control in such an environment. We look at shareholder democracy not as a system where a single body representing a ‘demos’ tries to control a single executive; instead, we view shareholders as constituting multipledêmoiwhich must coordinate and collaborate to control multiple corporate executives. We emphasise deliberation and communicative power as a central mechanism for thesedêmoiof shareholders to effectuate control.

Transnational militant democracy

Ordinarily, militant democracy is about restricting the rights of those who threaten to overthrow the very democracy that guarantees these rights. Hence, militant democracy permits the defence of democracy by disarming its opponents. Turkey’s recent constitutional reform, which arguably is a move away from liberal democracy, forces militant democracy to face up to its transnational application. Can we use militant democracy’s tools to defend not our own, but another democracy? Maybe we can and even should. This article examines the two transnational manifestations of militant democracy. The first is ‘transnational democracy gone militant’, epitomised by the European Union (EU)’s power to enforce liberal democratic standards in its Member States. The second is ‘militant democracy gone transnational’. This manifestation permits treating people rallying in the EU to attack democracy abroad in the same manner in which we are permitted to treat opponents of ‘our own’ democracy. As long as we are dealing with members of the Council of Europe (CoE), the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) gives us the instruments we need. Generally, militant democracy is a militant liberal democracy, which is not neutral towards itself, but is also an opponent of every system that is antithetical to it.

The European Model of Transnational Democracy: A Tribute to Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde

Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde is one of the most eminent German constitutional theorists of the twentieth century. The following article connects with two themes that reappear in Böckenförde's writings. The first theme, which Böckenförde actually borrowed from Hermann Heller, is that democracy presupposes “relative homogeneity.” The second theme is that there would not be any principal objection against Europe growing into a nation state.

An Exploration of the Meaning of Transnationalization of Democracy, using the Example of the European Union

Our era is marked by a growing mismatch between a world society that is becoming increasingly interdependent at the systemic level and a world of states that remains fragmented. To meet the resulting need for governance beyond the bounds of the nation-state, a number of international treaty regimes have arisen. But these regimes escape proper democratic control. These developments put the question of transnational democracy on the agenda. In this chapter, Habermas argues that a suitably reformed European Union offers us a model for a federal transnational democracy that, by contrast with the United States, does not acquire the character of a state.