Two Days of the “Six Day War”

The article is based on the information of the author, who as officer of the 10th Main Directorate of the Soviet General Staff spent two days in Egypt during the Six Day War between Israel and the Arab states. It briefly analyzes the history of Moscow’s relations with Cairo after the 1952 revolution, particularly in the military field, and notes that the Soviet military leadership overestimated the combat capability of the Armed Forces of the United Arab Republic, as the Arab Republic of Egypt was then called. Although by June 1967 the situation in the Middle East was rather tense, the war was not expected by Moscow on the day Israel attacked Egypt, and its quick success, especially the defeat of the Egyptian Air Force, was a shock to Cairo and Moscow. The article describes the situation in Cairo on June 9 and 10, the Egyptians’ reaction to the resignation of President Gamal Abdel Nasser; speaks of the negative attitude of the “Arab street” to the Russians, which arose in those days, primarily because of the false information of the Egyptian authorities, who argued that unlike the USSR, the United States and Great Britain took part in the war by bombing objects in Egypt.

MAIN IMPACTS ON THE SYRIA’S CRISIS

The historical background that have influenced the Syria’s crisis is described, geographical position and demographic composition that makes Syria a convenient base for opposition forces, political contacts between France, Great Britain and Russia considering the situation in Syria are characterized. The attention is focused on the prerequisits that have lead to the crisis in Syria including both inner and external factors. In the article is mentioned two unsolved territorial disputes: the Shebaa Farms and Hatay region. Another issue, that makes Syria more diverse is Kurdish question. Colonial powers divided Middle East by not existing boarders. It has led Egypt and Syria to unite and establish the United Arab Republic. One more important question is coup d’état, which was led by representatives of the military elite Salah Jadid, Hafez al-Assad, Salim Hatum, Mustafa Tlas. The author mentioned that the civil war in Syria is mistakenly concidered to be a religious conflict. The origins of the Syrian vulnerability derive not from the sectarian divisions. In fact the deterioration of situation in Syria hugely depended on social and economic factors. Another important issue discussed in the article is that Bashar’s rulling led to the so-called Damascus Spring, which represented the most important civil society mobilization preceding the 2011 uprising.

Geopolitical Challenges

This geopolitical Chapter covers the impact of decolonization on Arab statehood and the challenge to accept the new order. It includes a discussion on the revival and reform of Arab self-determination after the mandate system was submerged. It gives an overview of independence and models of statehood. It describes the emergence of new states after the Second World War including: Saudi Arabia, the liberal monarchy model; Iran and Turkey, the secular western models. This Chapter also discusses failed attempts at regional organisation - ‘Arab disorganization’- including the United Arab Republic, the short-lived political union between Syria and Egypt between 1958 and 1961. Existing attempts at international Islamic organization in the form of the League of Arab States (now the Arab League) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) are also discussed here. The common theme being a recognition of the importance of governance and of the Islamic worldview but ultimately a failure to unite and provide alternative structures to effectively compete with inherited Westphalian structures. In a chronological progression it covers the Cold War era leading up to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, Taliban, Al-Qaida and Daesh neo medievalism.