Russia will defer to China's policy on North Korea

Significance While Russia worries about the risk of instability triggered by a strict sanctions regime, its role in the North Korea crisis is limited to supporting China's calls for restraint on all sides. It has supported previous UN sanctions but is against US proposals for tougher action, partly because it insists the July 4 test was of an intermediate-range rather than intercontinental ballistic missile. Impacts Moscow will support the current UN sanctions regime while trying to block expansion and occasionally flouting the rules. South Korean automotive and hi-tech investment is more likely in European Russia than eastern Russia. Russia has neither the will nor the ability to keep North Korea provided with essential goods.

Significance This followed Pyongyang’s breach of its 17-month moratorium on missile testing with two volleys on May 4 and May 9, each personally supervised by Kim and both including short-range ballistic missile launches. Impacts Kim has given Washington until the end of the year to rethink its stance; that is possible but unlikely. Pyongyang’s new missile may be able to penetrate South Korean missile defences. South Korea will persevere with cooperation efforts for now, despite Pyongyang’s rebuffs.


Significance North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited China during January 7-10. He spent his 35th birthday in Beijing and met Chinese President Xi Jinping for the fourth time in ten months. Meanwhile, Pompeo implied on January 11 that sanctions on North Korea could be eased, with a focus on removing its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat to the United States rather than full denuclearisation. Impacts Xi might make an overdue return visit to Pyongyang in April, perhaps before Kim’s promised first visit to Seoul. Other Asian leaders may visit Pyongyang too, conferring legitimacy on Kim. South Korea may once again challenge China for influence in North Korea.


Asian Survey ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gi-Wook Shin ◽  
Rennie J. Moon

Kim Jong Un continued to consolidate his power through personnel changes, and North Korean society saw increasing consumerism, along with signs of growing inequality. The economy did well through early 2017 but the subsequent effects of sanctions remained uncertain. North Korea conducted its first test of an intercontinental ballistic missile and its sixth nuclear test, triggering heated debate in the US and elsewhere about how to respond. Kim clearly is not going to give up working on weapons of mass destruction.


Significance The message was conveyed by a South Korean delegation in Washington, briefing Trump on its talks earlier this week in Pyongyang. North Korea had said, the delegation reported, that it is “committed to denuclearisation” if regime security is not at risk. This follows months of escalating friction between North Korea and the international community that has seen Pyongyang ramp up its intercontinental missile and nuclear testing. Impacts The risk of confrontation on the Korean Peninsula could be reduced while talks are being prepared. Trump may relax his hawkish trade policy in the interim, to avoid alienating partners he needs in managing Pyongyang, including Beijing. A successful Trump-Kim meeting could gain South Korea’s president political benefits. If significant moves towards denuclearisation did occur, Trump’s administration might revise its pro-nuclear defence strategy. Any sanctions relief could be politically beneficial to the Pyongyang regime, but too much opening up could undermine it.


Significance South Korea’s unification minister (MOU) warned on April 10 that any US strike on North Korea would put “the safety of the public” at risk. A day later, Seoul’s defence (MND) and foreign (MFA) ministries dismissed rumours on local social media of an imminent war crisis as “overblown” and “groundless”, respectively. Moon Jae-in, the liberal opposition candidate whom most polls predict will win the May 9 snap presidential election, said he does not expect a US pre-emptive strike on the North. However, Moon also warned Washington that South Korea is “the concerned party” which “owns” peninsula-related matters, including the nuclear issue. Impacts Experienced military professionals in Trump’s cabinet and National Security Council are a restraining influence. South Korea and Japan, being in the front line, will counsel their US protector against any action that might imperil their security. If Moon Jae-in is elected, his desire to re-engage the North will clash with Trump’s hard-line attitude and narrow nuclear focus. After his smooth -- if insubstantial -- summit with Xi, Trump’s threatened unilateralism on North Korea is likely to stop at sanctions.


Headline NORTH KOREA: Hacking endangers South Korean security


Significance Still largely driven by a combination of criminal banditry and 'farmer-herder' conflicts but with hints of growing jihadist group involvement, the scope of insecurity has surpassed any hope of a military-led pacification campaign. Meanwhile, the pandemic and various pressing political challenges have sapped the will of President Muhammadu Buhari’s government to find political solutions to the underlying drivers. Impacts A lack of political will, insufficient local intelligence and limited manpower will impede Operation Sahel Sanity’s effectiveness. Pervasive violence and displacement across the north-west will hamper regional anti-COVID efforts and create widespread economic distress. Eased domestic travel restrictions may lead to a surge in criminal attacks and kidnappings.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-74
Author(s):  
Nam Kwang Kyu

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to present the North Korea policy pursued by the Moon Jae-in administration and discuss the possibility of a weakened alliance between South Korea and the USA. Design/methodology/approach This paper compares the North Korean policies and the ROK–US alliance under the Moon administration, analyzing the recent inter-Korean and North Korea–US summits, with a focus on the issues of denuclearization and establishing a peace regime. Findings This paper reveals that the approach taken by the Moon administration regarding North Korea is similar to that of North Korea and China, and that the ROK–US alliance is likely to weaken should there be any change concerning the North Korean nuclear issue. Originality/value Denuclearization takes place in accordance with the agreement between North Korea and the USA, there is a high likelihood of the ROK–US alliance weakening.


Significance Seoul now has full ‘missile sovereignty’. Impacts North Korea is yet to react, but may do so with a missile launch. Seoul already has all of North Korea within range and no limits on missile payload; longer-range missiles would be for targets elsewhere. Seoul’s plans to build an aircraft carrier also indicate 'middle-power' ambitions to be able to project force well beyond the peninsula. After the end of the US-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles, Moscow will be unhappy if a near neighbour and US ally develops them. Greater capabilities will make Seoul a more useful ally for Washington against Beijing, which may come to see Seoul as an increasing threat.


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