Complexes, rule-following, and language games: Wittgenstein’s philosophical method and its relevance to semiotics

This paper forges links between early analytic philosophy and the posits of semiotics. I show that there are some striking and potentially quite important, but perhaps unrecognized, connections between three key concepts in Wittgenstein’s middle and later philosophy, namely, complex (Philosophical Grammar), rule-following (Philosophical Investigations), and language games (Philosophical Investigations). This reveals the existence of a conceptual continuity between Wittgenstein’s “early” and “later” philosophy that can be applied to the analysis of the iterability of representation in computer-generated images. Methodologically, this paper clarifies to at least some degree, the nature, progress and promise of an approach to doing philosophy and semiotics from a modally modest perspective that sees in the intellectual products of humanities, and not in unreflective empiricism, the future of scientific development. This hybrid, non-reductionist approach shows, among other things, that semiotic processes are encoded by specific types of complexes in computer-generated images that display iterability in time and space.

A metafísica de 'Os Princípios da Matemática' de Russell e a controvérsia à respeito da suposta semelhança entre essa metafísica e a ontologia meinongiana

Resumo: No presente artigo, objetiva-se apresentar as principais características da metafísica do realismo lógico, desenvolvido por Russell em Os Princípios da Matemática, de 1903, e, principalmente, analisar a controvérsia sobre se os princípios dessa metafísica podem realmente ser interpretados como semelhantes aos princípios da ontologia meinongiana. São comparados os pontos de vista opostos dessa controvérsia à luz dos trechos de Os Princípios da Matemática que supostamente comprometeram Russell de ter elaborado uma gramática filosófica na qual todo e qualquer nome próprio ou descrição definida, ocupando a posição de sujeito lógico nas proposições, referem-se a objetos com alguma categoria de Ser. Ao realizar tal análise, conclui-se que o problema central diz respeito aos nomes próprios vazios e que, portanto, a metafísica de Os Princípios da Matemática expressa uma perspectiva instável da teoria da denotação de Russell. Palavras-chave: Russell; Ser; Existência; Significado. Russell’s The Principles of Mathematics metaphysics and the controversy over the supposed similarity between this metaphysics and the meinongian ontology Abstract: This article aims to present the main characteristics of the metaphysics of logical realism, developed by Russell in The Principles of Mathematics, of 1903, and, mainly, to analyze the controversy about whether the principles of this metaphysics can really be interpreted as similar to the principles of meinongian ontology. The opposing points of view of this controversy are compared in the light of the excerpts from The Principles of Mathematics that supposedly committed Russell to having elaborated a philosophical grammar in which all and any proper names or definite descriptions, occupying the position of logical subject in the propositions, refer to objects with some category of Being. In carrying out such an analysis, it is concluded that the central problem concerns empty proper names and that, therefore, the metaphysics of The Principles of Mathematics expresses an unstable perspective of Russell’s theory of denotation. Keywords: Russell; Being; Existence; Meaning. La metafísica de Los Principios de las Matemáticas de Russell y la controversia sobre la supuesta similitud entre esta metafísica y la ontología meinongiana Resumen: Este artículo tiene como objetivo presentar las principales características de la metafísica del realismo lógico, desarrollada por Russell en Los Principios de las Matemáticas, de 1903, y, principalmente, analizar la controversia sobre si los principios de esta metafísica pueden realmente interpretarse como similares a los principios de la ontología meinongiana. Los puntos de vista opuestos de esta controversia se comparan a la luz de los extractos de Los Principios de las Matemáticas que supuestamente comprometieron Russell a haber elaborado una gramática filosófica en la que todos y cualquier nombre propio o descripción definida, ocupando la posición de sujeto lógico en las proposiciones, se refieren a objetos con alguna categoría de Ser. Al realizar tal análisis, se concluye que el problema central concierne a los nombres propios vacíos y que, por lo tanto, la metafísica de Los Principios de las Matemáticas expresa una perspectiva inestable de la teoría de la denotación de Russell. Palabras clave: Russell; Ser; Existencia; Significado. Data de registro: 10/04/2020 Data de aceite: 08/12/2020

«The Outline of Universal Grammar» by L. H. Jakob: German philosophical grammar in Russia

The article looks at one of the most famous philosophical grammars written in Russia by Professor L. H. Jakob, a German philosopher, economist and lawyer. The author of the article gives a detailed analysis of the scientist's life against the background of historical events in Germany and Russia at the beginning of the of the XIX century. The author also highlights the details of his scientific career, the history of creation, use and disappearance of his main and only linguistic philosophical work «The Outline of Universal Grammar», all the facts being studied from the perspective of narrative linguistic historiography. Born into a family of farmers, he becomes rector of the University in Halle. However, the Napoleon invasion of the country forces him to flee to Kharkov and start teaching and research activities at the University there. Two years later he moves to St-Petersburg and works in the Ministry of Finance. After less than ten years in Russia, he returns to his alma mater. This article refers to the facts of instability in political and educational life of Russian society during the reign of Alexander I, and highlights their negative impact on both L. H. Jakob’s personal life and his philosophical grammar. The author of the article quotes extensively both from 19thand 20th-century biographical publications and from well-known works on the history of linguistics. The author also refers to works from certain branches of linguistics, which acknowledge the scientist’s contribution to linguistics in general and Russian linguistics in particular. The reasons for both the publication and the defeat of L. H. Jakob's grammar reflected the changing national political environment and the unstable situation in public education in the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, whatever the circumstances, they in no way diminish the significance of this work among other philosophical grammars.

Wittgenstein’s epistemological frame in »On Certainty«

It is well known that Wittgenstein wasn't interested in epistemic claims (A. Gargani, 1982), or epistemology, not until the last years of his life (A, Kenny, 1973), when he wrote -On Certainty- [1950—51). Our task isn't to expose his answer to the sceptical question which he elaborated partly againsl, Moore and especially against Descartes though the last has not been mentioned. The theme of this paper is to investigate the possibility which the logico-syntactical approach of Wittgenstein’s philosophical grammar has for the principal epistemic terms, like belief and'knowledge.The analysis is guided by considering P. K. Moser's (1988) interpreta- tion of paragraph 253 from -On Certainly-. The result is that his critique of' doxastic theories in Pollock's classification (1986) of the contemporary epis- temological theories for unexhaustivity is not adequate, because the same lack Is shown by undoxastic theories.Through the epistemic terms like doubt, grond/ reason, foundation/ basis and those already mentioned, it follows that Wittgenstein's epistemological frame heads to direct realism, challenging the confusion in Pollock's classification, discovering the current of Wittgenstein's hints at the same time.'

The Project of a Pure Logical Grammar

This chapter examines Edmund Husserl's philosophical reflections on pure logical grammar. When we talk about the meaning and genealogy of the notion of a “philosophical grammar,” the fourth of Husserl's Logical Investigations comes to mind. The central idea of the fourth Investigation is that all formal logic in the current sense— that is, the logic of validity—presupposes a logic of meaning that prevents non-sense and that is not concerned with objective validity, but instead only with the a priori laws that establish the conditions for the unity of meaning. In the first Investigation, Husserl proposes to establish the juncture between pure logic and language. The chapter suggests that the theme of the fourth Investigation is not the edification of a universal grammar, but rather of a pure grammar capable of serving as a foundation for logic.