A Critical Analysis of Blaustein’s Polemic Against Husserl’s Method

The aim of the article is to define and investigate an interpretative framework for the philosophy of Leopold Blaustein, a student of Twardowski in Lwów (Lvov, Lviv) and Husserl in Freiburg im Breisgau. The author defends the thesis that it is justified to refer to Blaustein’s philosophy not as phenomenology sensu stricto, but as a phenomenologically-oriented descriptive psychology related but not equivalent to the project expounded by Husserl in the first edition of Logische Untersuchungen as well as in his project of phenomenological psychology (as formulated in 1925). The article traces Blaustein’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenological methods, putting it in the historical context of the discussion with Ingarden. Next, the author juxtaposes Blaustein’s understanding of psychology with Husserl’s project of 1925, which makes it possible to identify not only the differences between the two projects, but also their similarities. The article also raises questions about the scope of descriptive-psychological analyses.

Study on the Consciousness of Husserl’s Intentionality Under the Influence of Psychology

Husserl accepted the influence of descriptive psychology, inherited and developed the concept of intentionality, criticized and innovated the problem of empiricism from epistemology, and Conscious Intentionality has become the core idea of Husserl’s phenomenology. By analyzing Husserl’s concept of consciousness, we can clarify the internal structure of Husserl’s definition of “consciousness” on the basis of understanding the internal relationship of Husserl’s concept of consciousness: the concept of consciousness is not equivalent to the concept of intentionality, only when the concept of consciousness based on intentionality does the real concept of Husserl’s consciousness become manifest. Husserl’s concept of consciousness not only affects Martin Heidegger and Searle, but also has an important influence on the later philosophy of mind, and promotes the integration of philosophy of mind and philosophy of language.

The Appropriation of the Husserlian Meaning of the Transcendental by Hermeneutic Phenomenology

Our goal is to investigate the extent of the appropriation, by hermeneutic phenomenology, of the concept of transcendental at work in descriptive psychology, where it plays the role of a universal principle of the constitutive genesis of intentionality. We aim to clarify how the very mode of operation of Husserlian phenomenology is crucial to the elaboration of fundamental ontology. Our hypothesis is that intentionality leads Heidegger to the discovery of time as a transcendental principle, of being as an a priori, and of comprehensibility that enables the signification of entities in general as a previous structure of the a priori.

The Problems of Medical Narrative

The significance of the analysis of medical narrative is determined by its dissemination in recent decades in the context of humanization and individualization of medicine. Comparative content analysis of the texts shows that ‘subjective understanding’ (F. Schleiermacher), ‘inner experience’ and methods of descriptive psychology (W. Dilthey) are essential components of contemporary narrative analysis. The ‘narrative turn’ in socio-humanitarian knowledge became possible only after the questions about the genuine existence of man and the ways of understanding his individuality were worked out in various directions of the continental philosophy of the twentieth century. The growing popularity of the narrative approach in the field of medicine is due to theoretical, methodological, and practical changes that occurred in medicine: the rejection of the priority of the biomedical model of health, the principle of paternalism, objectification of the patient and disease. Changes in the structure of diseases also played an important role in its spread. However, as the analysis of the content and methodological foundations of the medical narrative has shown, one should not absolutize its possibilities in solving the problems of patient individualization, preserving his/her identity and, ultimately, in optimizing the treatment process.

Approaching the Variety of Lived Experiences: On the Psychological Motives in Leopold Blaustein’s Method

SummaryThe article explores psychological motives in Leopold Blaustein’s philosophy. Blaustein was educated in Lvov, Freiburg im Breisgau and Berlin. In his original explorations, he attempted to connect a phenomenological perspective with descriptive psychology. As trained by Twardowski, he took over some motives of understanding the method of philosophy (psychology), its objectives and aims. The author situates Blaustein also in a dialogue with Stumpf and next to the context of Dilthey’s humanistic psychology is examined. Finally, the article explores the influences of Gestalt psychology on Blaustein. The ultimate thesis of the article is that Blaustein’s method can be grasped as a phenomenologically oriented descriptive psychology.