Conclusion

2019 ◽  
pp. 160-164
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson

The overarching aim of this book is to provide a reductionist analysis of what it is to act for a reason in such a way that we intentionally perform the action that we have a reason for performing—an action that will in the end be a basic action—and intentionally achieve the end or goal for which we do this action, as specified by the reason. This analysis of intentional action is reductionist in the sense that it does not appeal to any irreducibly action-theoretical concepts. It does not refer to anything that is unanalysably an action in virtue of involving either a unique type of agent-causation, or anything like a volition, trying, or decision that is assumed to be an act(ion) in a primitive sense. Nor does it refer to any unanalysable states or attitudes that are essentially directed at actions, like intentions and desires (to act). It does refer to a kind of desire—decisive desire—but it is in turn analysed as the causal power of some physical states in conjunction with propositional thinking. The direction of fit between thought and fact here is not that something is thought to fit the facts, but that something is caused to be fact because of how it is thought of....

Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson

The principal aim of this book is to analyse what it is to act for a reason in such a way that we intentionally do what we have a reason for doing and intentionally attain the end for which we perform this action, as specified by the reason. The analysis is mainly developed to suit physical actions, but it is considered how it needs to be modified to cover mental acts. It is also adapted to fit the notion of letting something be the case by refraining from acting. The analysis of intentional action presented is reductionist in the sense that it does not appeal to any concepts that are distinctive of the domain of action theory, such as a unique type of agent-causation, or irreducible mental acts, like acts of will, volitions, decisions, or tryings. Nor does it appeal to any unanalysed attitudes or states essentially related to intentional action, like intentions and desires to act. Instead, the intentionality of actions is construed as springing from desires conceived as physical states of agents which cause facts because of the way these agents think of them. A sense of our having responsibility that is sufficent for our acting for reasons is also sketched.


2019 ◽  
pp. 90-121
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson

According to the definition proposed by this chapter you intentionally perform the basic bodily action of causing p now if you now have an occurrent decisive desire to cause p directly—that is, without causing anything as a means to it—and this desire now causes something because you correctly and justifiably think that it is p. Since it has been claimed that conscious occurrences are not causally related, this account has to be modified to suit mental acts such as visualizing something. In this connection some rival theories of intentional action which refer to acts of will or volitions are critically examined. Finally, building on the definition of an intentional basic action, the notion of an intentional non-basic action is defined.


Author(s):  
Alfred R. Mele

This chapter introduces key concepts and provides a preview of the book. Featured concepts include action, action-individuation, intention, intentional action, and free will. Some standard terminology in the literature on free will is introduced, including agent causation, compatibilism, determinism, incompatibilism, and libertarianism. The notion of free action central to the book is identified as moral-responsibility-level free action—free action of such a kind that if all the freedom-independent conditions for moral responsibility for a particular action were satisfied without that sufficing for the agent’s being morally responsible for it, the addition of the action’s being free to this set of conditions would entail that he is morally responsible for it.


Author(s):  
Kseniia Prуkhod`ko

The purpose of the article is to identify trends and patterns of organization of the artistic space of the modern interior of the coworking center, as well as the creation of scientifically sound methods that argue appropriate ways to solve design problems in the field of aesthetics of the XXI century. Research methodology. The theoretical, structural, philosophical, and aesthetic method is applied; method of artistic and stylistic analysis to identify features of the interior design of Kyiv coworking centers; structural-semiotic method, which determines the artistic and figurative content in the interior design of modern coworking space. Scientific novelty. The main theoretical concepts that became the basis for defining the interior of the coworking center as a unique type of artistic space are considered; -an analysis of the basic spatial concepts developed by famous philosophers who understand it as an artistic space; identified and analyzed the features of artistic solutions in the process of designing working interiors of domestic coworking centers; the factors of influence on the artistic and figurative decision of the interior of the coworking space are determined. Conclusions. Based on the analysis of existing spatial concepts, it is determined that the space of a modern coworking center can be considered one of the types of artistic space and identify certain semantic categories (according to Gabrichevsky, Spengler, Heidegger, etc.). Characteristic techniques and means of artistic expression of modern interiors of coworking centers, which are related to the understanding of space as an artistic concept, reflect the idea of ​​its polyphony and determine the artistic and aesthetic principles of domestic interior coworking center in the first decades of the XXI century. The study found that in the interiors of modern Kyiv coworking spaces ("Magazine", "Platform" (Leonardo Business Center and Art Factory), "New Work Labs", "Kooperativ", "Hub 4.0", "Creative Quarter", "LIFT99 Kyiv Hub", "Anthill Space", "Lofti Space", "Creative States", "Toloka", "Garden - Smartwork") implemented Eurasian and European types of organization of artistic space. Keywords: coworking center, interior design, artistic space, subject-spatial environment.


Author(s):  
Davlat Dadikhuda

This chapter explicates a distinctive argument that Avicenna offers for the existence of nature as a causal power in bodies. In doing that, the author shows the argument has two main targets: the Aristotelian tradition on the hand, who thought that the existence of nature, as an intrinsic principle of movement, was self-evident, and the Ash ͑arite occasionalist theological tradition on the other, who were anti-realists about all creaturely efficacious power, locating all efficacy instead in an extrinsic transcendent agent. The argument draws on two key premises: a regularity of events thesis and a version of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). Based on these two premises, Avicenna offers a response to the issue in a way that attempts to preserve something from both traditions. For it allows, with the Ash ͑aris, the causal involvement of a transcendent being in the production of some effect or range of effects from some body; and yet still maintains, against them and with the Aristotelians, that the effect must occur in virtue of some property of that body, where the property in question makes a real causal contribution to the effect’s occurrence. This amounts to a properly Avicennian account.


Author(s):  
Anton Ford

This chapter discusses Michael Thompson’s essay, “Naive Action Theory.” It argues that Thompson conflates two distinct structures that belong to intentional action. Intentional action has, on the one hand, a chronological structure, in virtue of which it unfolds in time, and, on the other hand, a teleological structure, in virtue of which it unites the means to which it is an end. In Thompson’s account these two structures come to seem as one; parts and phases are conflated. As a result of this conflation Thompson is forced to make the implausible assertion that the parts of an action are infinitely divisible.


2019 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
pp. 157-178
Author(s):  
Caroline T. Arruda ◽  

I show that defenses of the Humean theory of motivation (HTM) often rely on a mistaken assumption. They assume that desires are necessary conditions for being motivated to act because desires (and other non-cognitive states) themselves have a special, essential, necessary feature, such as their world-to-mind direction of fit, that enables them to motivate. Call this the Desire-Necessity Claim. Beliefs (and other cognitive states) cannot have this feature, so they cannot motivate. Or so the story goes. I show that: (a) when pressed, a proponent of HTM encounters a series of prima facie counterexamples to this Claim; and (b) the set of claims that seem to naturally complement the Desire-Necessity Claim as well as provide successful responses to these counterexamples turn out to deny the truth of this same claim. As a result, the Humean implicitly grants that it is at least equally plausible, if not more plausible, to claim that desires are not able to motivate in virtue of what they necessarily possess. Instead, desires contingently possess features that enable them to motivate.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto A. Gulli

Abstract The long-enduring coding metaphor is deemed problematic because it imbues correlational evidence with causal power. In neuroscience, most research is correlational or conditionally correlational; this research, in aggregate, informs causal inference. Rather than prescribing semantics used in correlational studies, it would be useful for neuroscientists to focus on a constructive syntax to guide principled causal inference.


1979 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
pp. 349-355
Author(s):  
R.W. Milkey

The focus of discussion in Working Group 3 was on the Thermodynamic Properties as determined spectroscopically, including the observational techniques and the theoretical modeling of physical processes responsible for the emission spectrum. Recent advances in observational techniques and theoretical concepts make this discussion particularly timely. It is wise to remember that the determination of thermodynamic parameters is not an end in itself and that these are interesting chiefly for what they can tell us about the energetics and mass transport in prominences.


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