The Intentionality of Actions

2019 ◽  
pp. 90-121
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson

According to the definition proposed by this chapter you intentionally perform the basic bodily action of causing p now if you now have an occurrent decisive desire to cause p directly—that is, without causing anything as a means to it—and this desire now causes something because you correctly and justifiably think that it is p. Since it has been claimed that conscious occurrences are not causally related, this account has to be modified to suit mental acts such as visualizing something. In this connection some rival theories of intentional action which refer to acts of will or volitions are critically examined. Finally, building on the definition of an intentional basic action, the notion of an intentional non-basic action is defined.

Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson

The principal aim of this book is to analyse what it is to act for a reason in such a way that we intentionally do what we have a reason for doing and intentionally attain the end for which we perform this action, as specified by the reason. The analysis is mainly developed to suit physical actions, but it is considered how it needs to be modified to cover mental acts. It is also adapted to fit the notion of letting something be the case by refraining from acting. The analysis of intentional action presented is reductionist in the sense that it does not appeal to any concepts that are distinctive of the domain of action theory, such as a unique type of agent-causation, or irreducible mental acts, like acts of will, volitions, decisions, or tryings. Nor does it appeal to any unanalysed attitudes or states essentially related to intentional action, like intentions and desires to act. Instead, the intentionality of actions is construed as springing from desires conceived as physical states of agents which cause facts because of the way these agents think of them. A sense of our having responsibility that is sufficent for our acting for reasons is also sketched.


1972 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 275-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annetie C. Baier

In this paper I shall give reasons for rejecting one type of analysis of the basic constituents of action, and reasons for preferring an alternative approach. I shall discuss the concept of basic action recently presented by Alvin Goldman, who gives an interesting version of the sort of analysis I wish to reject. Goldman agrees with Danto that bodily movements are basic actions, and his definition of ‘basic’ resembles Danto's fairly closely. What is new is a useful concept of level-generation between actions, which Goldman uses both in his recursive definition of action (45) and in his definition of a basic action (67, 72), as one whose performance does not depend on level-generational knowledge. In brief, an action is an event which is level-generated by or capable of level-generating another action, and a basic action is one which is not level-generated by any other action. I shall examine this concept of level-generation, and point out incoherences I think endemic to views of this sort. In the last part of the paper I shall indicate the direction in which a more satisfactory account of basic action is to be sought. The criterion of basicness I shall sketch will select as basic actions not bodily movements, but a more interesting class of actions, and one whose demarcation can help us see the relation between actions and intentions, and the differences between intentions and other states of mind.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 377-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rhett Diessner ◽  
Rico Pohling ◽  
Shawnee Stacy ◽  
Angelika Güsewell

This review of the trait of appreciation of beauty (AoB) draws from the literature in personality psychology, philosophy, religion, neuroscience, neuro-aesthetics, evolutionary psychology, and the psychology of morality. We demonstrate that AoB can be mapped onto a definition of appreciation that includes perceptual, cognitive, emotional, trait, virtue, and valuing elements. A classic component of defining beauty, unity-in-diversity, is described based on the works of a variety of major philosophers. We next describe that there are at least four channels of appreciation of beauty: natural beauty, artistic beauty, moral beauty, and beautiful ideas. Examining the neuro-aesthetics research indicates that many networks of the brain are involved in mental acts of appreciating beauty, but the medial orbital front cortex (mOFC) is implicated across all four channels of beauty. We then explain how the trait of AoB is a member of three different families of traits: traits of love, traits of transcendence, and traits of inquiry. Next we briefly explain why Kant may have been more correct than Hegel concerning beauty and the good soul. We then present evidence that women may appreciate beauty somewhat more than men. Data from many cultures and nations consistently indicate this. After that we claim AoB leads to individual and collective flourishing. We examine and summarize studies that indicate appreciation of natural beauty leads to a wide variety of positive outcomes; we focus on the importance of open-mindedness that accompanies engagement with artistic beauty; and we summarize studies regarding the moral emotion of elevation and appreciation of moral beauty. Suggested future directions for research are embedded in each subsection of the paper.


Author(s):  
Il'yas Latypov

The presented theory-oriented article describes the main elements of the counter-finality production mechanism in the constitutive order, and provides an empirical illustration. The counter-finality in Elster’s theory is an unintended consequence that generates collective action in order to overcome this contradiction and contribute to social change. However, this approach ignores the very process of producing counter-finality and does not correspond to the realities of everyday life. Focusing on everyday interactions allows to describe the counter-finality production process and to define this phenomenon in a different way. Firstly, the connection between counter-finality and the constitutive order is indicated: counter-finality occurs when the constitutive order is violated, but counter-finality creates conditions for the constitution of a new order. Then, a set of concepts is derived from the definition of counter-finality, its properties and examples, and from the description of the constitutive order conception: intentional action, lack of coordination, space, time, informational background, and sequence of actions. These concepts can be used to describe the process and conditions for counter-finality production in the constitutive order. In a specific empirical study, the case of a queue in a subway car, these concepts are elements of the production mechanism that influence each other and together create counter-finality.


2019 ◽  
pp. 160-164
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson

The overarching aim of this book is to provide a reductionist analysis of what it is to act for a reason in such a way that we intentionally perform the action that we have a reason for performing—an action that will in the end be a basic action—and intentionally achieve the end or goal for which we do this action, as specified by the reason. This analysis of intentional action is reductionist in the sense that it does not appeal to any irreducibly action-theoretical concepts. It does not refer to anything that is unanalysably an action in virtue of involving either a unique type of agent-causation, or anything like a volition, trying, or decision that is assumed to be an act(ion) in a primitive sense. Nor does it refer to any unanalysable states or attitudes that are essentially directed at actions, like intentions and desires (to act). It does refer to a kind of desire—decisive desire—but it is in turn analysed as the causal power of some physical states in conjunction with propositional thinking. The direction of fit between thought and fact here is not that something is thought to fit the facts, but that something is caused to be fact because of how it is thought of....


Dialogue ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 459-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Michael McGuire

ABSTRACTThis article defends the idea that causal relations between reasons and actions are wholly irrelevant to the explanatory efficacy of reason-explanations. The analysis of reason-explanations provided in this article shows that the so-called “problem of explanatory force” is solved, not by putative causal relations between the reasons for which agents act and their actions, but rather by the intentions that agents necessarily have when they act for a reason. Additionally, the article provides a critique of the principal source of support for the thesis that reason-explanations are causal explanations, namely, Davidson's argument in “Actions, Reasons, and Causes.” It is shown that Davidson's argument for this thesis rests crucially on two mistakes: his definition of intentional action and his ontological prejudice against intentions.


1966 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 3-5
Author(s):  
W. W. Morgan

1. The definition of “normal” stars in spectral classification changes with time; at the time of the publication of theYerkes Spectral Atlasthe term “normal” was applied to stars whose spectra could be fitted smoothly into a two-dimensional array. Thus, at that time, weak-lined spectra (RR Lyrae and HD 140283) would have been considered peculiar. At the present time we would tend to classify such spectra as “normal”—in a more complicated classification scheme which would have a parameter varying with metallic-line intensity within a specific spectral subdivision.


1975 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 21-26

An ideal definition of a reference coordinate system should meet the following general requirements:1. It should be as conceptually simple as possible, so its philosophy is well understood by the users.2. It should imply as few physical assumptions as possible. Wherever they are necessary, such assumptions should be of a very general character and, in particular, they should not be dependent upon astronomical and geophysical detailed theories.3. It should suggest a materialization that is dynamically stable and is accessible to observations with the required accuracy.


1979 ◽  
Vol 46 ◽  
pp. 125-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Allen

No paper of this nature should begin without a definition of symbiotic stars. It was Paul Merrill who, borrowing on his botanical background, coined the termsymbioticto describe apparently single stellar systems which combine the TiO absorption of M giants (temperature regime ≲ 3500 K) with He II emission (temperature regime ≳ 100,000 K). He and Milton Humason had in 1932 first drawn attention to three such stars: AX Per, CI Cyg and RW Hya. At the conclusion of the Mount Wilson Ha emission survey nearly a dozen had been identified, and Z And had become their type star. The numbers slowly grew, as much because the definition widened to include lower-excitation specimens as because new examples of the original type were found. In 1970 Wackerling listed 30; this was the last compendium of symbiotic stars published.


Author(s):  
K. T. Tokuyasu

During the past investigations of immunoferritin localization of intracellular antigens in ultrathin frozen sections, we found that the degree of negative staining required to delineate u1trastructural details was often too dense for the recognition of ferritin particles. The quality of positive staining of ultrathin frozen sections, on the other hand, has generally been far inferior to that attainable in conventional plastic embedded sections, particularly in the definition of membranes. As we discussed before, a main cause of this difficulty seemed to be the vulnerability of frozen sections to the damaging effects of air-water surface tension at the time of drying of the sections.Indeed, we found that the quality of positive staining is greatly improved when positively stained frozen sections are protected against the effects of surface tension by embedding them in thin layers of mechanically stable materials at the time of drying (unpublished).


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