Justice Goes Global

This chapter recounts a long history of abusive rulers that found safe havens abroad once they were no longer welcome in their countries. It introduces Ugandan dictator Idi Amin, who had presided over the killing of several thousand people in 1979 and was then exiled in Saudi Arabia. It refers to Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos, who retired to Hawaii when the People Power Revolution toppled him following a fraudulent election. It also explains why recent leaders like Muammar al-Gaddafi, Laurent Gbagbo, and Bashar al-Assad desperately clung to power whereas past leaders such as Idi Amin, Ferdinand Marcos, and François Duvalier were willing to spend their days in exile. It discusses proponents of international justice that were frequently mocked as out-of-touch idealists.

The Justice Dilemma

This chapter analyses the theory about the justice dilemma and derives testable hypotheses on how international justice shapes patterns of exile, civil war duration, and mass killing onset. It offers both quantitative and qualitative evidence to assess the theory on the justice dilemma in multiple ways. It also points out how exile traditionally offered an attractive golden parachute for all embattled rulers and provided a mechanism for leaders to give up power in a manner that is relatively costless. The chapter reviews the recent trend toward holding leaders accountable for atrocity crimes that are irrespective of national borders, which complicates the exile option. It refers to the signing of the ICC's Rome Statute and the arrest of former Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet that made the threat of arrest on foreign soil appear far more realistic.

The Mechanism

This chapter presents evidence on patterns of exile through a large dataset of political leaders and measure of leader culpability for mass atrocities. It explains why the decision to flee into exile is conditional on whether leaders can expect to face post-tenure international punishment. It also points out how culpable leaders were more likely to flee abroad than nonculpable leaders in the impunity era. The chapter provides statistical analysis with a case study of Liberia's Charles Taylor, who is one of the few culpable leaders to go into exile in the accountability era. It elaborates how the Taylor case study clarifies why some leaders still choose exile and confirms whether culpable leaders who go into exile in the accountability era actually get punished.

The Positive Effect

This chapter explores the deterrent effect of international justice and estimates that the statistical models of mass-killing onset show how the same conditions that exacerbate conflict also create deterrence. It discusses a case study of Blaise Compaoré during Burkina Faso's 2014 revolution, which complements the quantitative results. It also elaborates the Compaoré case that highlights the connection between the decision to commit atrocities and the availability of a safe exile option. The chapter explains how Burkina Faso represents a case in 2014 where a number of factors suggested that mass violence was possible. It recounts Compaoré's retirement abroad once it became clear that he could no longer maintain political control in Burkina Faso.

Grasping the Dilemma

This chapter summarizes the theory and the supporting empirical evidence on rulers who commit massive human rights abuses and are now held accountable in a way that was unthinkable just a few decades ago. It explains how the pursuit of international justice has reshaped the world politics and the trend toward holding leaders accountable for atrocity crimes complicates the exile option. It also discusses how the attractiveness of a foreign retirement is conditional on a leader's culpability for mass atrocities in the new era of accountability. The chapter refers to the justice cascade that shapes the behavior of leaders while they are still in power as they influence the viability of exile as a retirement option. It clarifies how the justice cascade deters atrocities as leaders know that committing abuses will decrease their exit options if they ever need to flee abroad.

The Perverse Effect

This chapter investigates civil war duration and shows how culpable leaders respond to incentives to fight until the bitter end. It provides quantitative analysis that demonstrates civil wars last longer when culpable leaders are in power during the accountability era. It reviews a case study of Muammar Gaddafi during the 2011 Libyan revolution, which illustrates how the justice cascade has altered the decision calculus of culpable leaders. The chapter describes Gaddafi, who was unlike his peers during the impunity era, as he worried enough about an international prosecution to spurn the exile option. It recounts Gaddafi's decision to risk it all on the battlefield, which prolonged the Libyan conflict.