The Justice Dilemma

This chapter analyses the theory about the justice dilemma and derives testable hypotheses on how international justice shapes patterns of exile, civil war duration, and mass killing onset. It offers both quantitative and qualitative evidence to assess the theory on the justice dilemma in multiple ways. It also points out how exile traditionally offered an attractive golden parachute for all embattled rulers and provided a mechanism for leaders to give up power in a manner that is relatively costless. The chapter reviews the recent trend toward holding leaders accountable for atrocity crimes that are irrespective of national borders, which complicates the exile option. It refers to the signing of the ICC's Rome Statute and the arrest of former Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet that made the threat of arrest on foreign soil appear far more realistic.

The Justice Dilemma

Abusive leaders are now held accountable for their crimes in a way that was unimaginable just a few decades ago. What are the consequences of this recent push for international justice? This book explains why the “golden parachute” of exile is no longer an attractive retirement option for oppressive rulers. The book argues that this is both a blessing and a curse: leaders culpable for atrocity crimes fight longer civil wars because they lack good exit options, but the threat of international prosecution deters some leaders from committing atrocities in the first place. The book diagnoses an inherent tension between conflict resolution and atrocity prevention, two of the signature goals of the international community. It also sheds light on several important puzzles in world politics. Why do some rulers choose to fight until they are killed or captured? Why not simply save oneself by going into exile? Why do some civil conflicts last so much longer than others? Why has state-sponsored violence against civilians fallen in recent years? While exploring these questions, the book marshals statistical evidence on patterns of exile, civil war duration, and mass atrocity onset. It also reconstructs the decision-making processes of embattled leaders to show how contemporary international justice both deters atrocities and prolongs conflicts.

Executive compensation and corporate social responsibility: does a golden parachute matter?

PurposeThis study examines the efficacy of compensation in encouraging corporate executives to promote corporate social responsibility (CSR). In particular, it closely examines the effect of a golden parachute (GP) on an executive's behavior toward CSR.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses longitudinal data on 1,301 US firms for the period from 1993 to 2013. The data comes from Compustat, MSCI ESG STATS, RiskMetrics and ExecuComp.FindingsWe find an inverse association between current and long-term compensations and GP on firms' CSR. However, a test on the moderating effect discloses that a GP and long-term compensation jointly and positively increase the firms' CSR performance. This increase supports the idea that executives with a GP seek to maximize their long-term wealth by approving CSR projects that add value. The results also show that female executives are more likely to promote CSR than their male counterparts, and older executives are less willing to engage in CSR projects.Practical implicationsAdding a GP contractual clause to the executive compensation package could encourage greater engagement in CSR projects. The CEO with a GP will ensure that the firm engages in only value-enhancing CSR projects; this should align the interest of the society (greater firm engagement in CSR) with the interest of the firm (value maximization).Originality/valueThis study contributes to the literature by examining the moderating effect of a GP on the association between CSR and executive compensation.

Funkcjonowanie angielskiego wyrażenia golden parachute w języku polskim i rosyjskim

Wraz z przejściem polskiej i rosyjskiej gospodarki na kapitalistyczny model rozwoju gospodarczego w języku polskim i rosyjskim pojawiło się nowe słownic-two odnoszące się do tej sfery, głównie o anglojęzycznej proweniencji. Zasoby leksykalne obu języków wzbogaciły się o kalki frazeologiczne złoty spadochron (parasol) i золо-той парашют, rozpowszechnione w środowisku ekonomiczno-finansowo-biznesowym. Internacjonalny charakter tego typu reproduktów świadczy o globalizacji praw i dzia-łań w sferze finansowej. Za sprawą elit symbolicznych (dziennikarzy), wypowiadają-cych się na łamach prasy niespecjalistycznej (ogólnopolskiej), frazeologizmy te znane są także szerokiemu kręgowi odbiorców-niespecjalistów. W polszczyźnie i ruszczyźnie, jak zaświadczają to konteksty w prasie niespecjalistycznej (2019/2020), wyrażenie to zaczyna też funkcjonować w dodatkowym nieekonomicznym (nieterminologicznym) znaczeniu.

The effect of a golden parachute on managed earnings

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of executive compensation on the propensity to manage earnings. In particular, the authors examine an executive contractual clause known as a golden parachute (hereafter GP is interchangeably used). Usually, the triggering of a GP occurs for the following reasons: in a takeover, in termination of employment, and if the executive remains with the company through a recessionary cycle. Specifically, the authors ask the following questions: for firms that their CEO have a GP, do these firms manage earnings more? Does the age of the CEO matter for firms that have adopted a GP concerning the managing earnings? Design/methodology/approach The sample is based on a review of the literature on GPs and managed earnings. the authors’ data come from COMPUSTAT, CRSP, EXECUCOMP and Risk Metrics, and consist of 1,184 US firms from 1992 to 2011. A GP is binary, whereas the authors represent managed earnings through accruals and real activity. Findings The authors find that the propensity to manage earnings varies on the type of methods strategically used. However, controlling for the effect of SOX reveals that GP firms are more likely to manage earnings. Younger CEOs are less likely to exacerbate earnings upward. Research limitations/implications The authors are limited to small sample based on when the data were collected. Practical implications The evidence shows that GP alleviates CEOs’ concerns on short-term profits. However, it entrenches CEOs. Particularly, CEOs with a GP are more likely to exacerbate earnings. Thus, there is a need for compensation committees to give considerable attention to how GPs are assigned. Originality/value To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that explores the effect of a GP on a firm’s propensity to manage earnings.

Analyzing Change-in-Control Payments Since the Enactment of Say-on-Pay

Since the enactment of Say on Pay in January 2011, companies are required to disclose the amounts payable to named executive officers as a results of an acquisition. There have been 1,524 U.S. public takeovers from 2011 to 2017, which have disclosed golden parachute payments to executives. The author describes payments made by sector, payment types, triggering events and the propensity of voters to accept, or reject, golden parachute payments based some of the more concerning pay practices.