Finally, Diplomacy Backed by Force July–August 1995

In July 1995 genocide in Srebrenica led to efforts to forge a new peace plan. The Principals received a “Bosnia Endgame Strategy” paper, which proposed shoring up UNPROFOR, pushing for a political settlement with Slobodan Milošević, supporting Bosnia’s survival if UNPROFOR withdrew, providing additional support to the Bosniaks, and offering sanctions relief to induce Milošević to stay out of Bosnia. Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy Berger initiated strategizing that Madeleine Albright used to “examine how to shift from a European-led plan to an American-led plan.” Albright proposed using air power to compel the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate a peace settlement and training Federation forces. Bill Clinton endorsed this. The Croatian Army successfully regained their lands in Croatia. Discussions in the Situation Room focused on creation of a post-settlement Peace Implementation Force. Another bombing of the Markale market in Sarajevo unleashed NATO air power, and Milošević began to negotiate seriously.

Ethnic Cleansing Wins 1994

During 1994, tactics in the Situation Room over America’s role in the Balkans were plagued by procrastination, fear of the unknown, and a futile search for alternatives to bold action. A 1994 journey by the author and Madeleine Albright to the region demonstrated the difficulties in coordinating U.S. policy with the United Nations and U.S. allies. The February 5, 1994, mortar attack on Markale marketplace in Sarajevo ignited a long process of efforts to bring the war to an end. The Federation of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats united against the Bosnian Serbs. Goražde became the next battleground of Bosnian Serb pressure to capitulate, but NATO support for its security held firm. Debates in the Situation Room ended with endorsements of the status quo. Bosnian Serbs rejected the peace effort, and all slid back into war. The fate of UNPROFOR, the U.N. peacekeeping force, also dominated discussions in the Situation Room.

Epilogue

A result from which “all ugliness will flow again.” WARREN CHRISTOPHER THE BOSNIAN WAR took three years of intensive diplomacy to end, while combat and atrocities were unremitting. The talking phase of armed conflicts has veered wildly from days to decades in recent history, and often failed completely when one side fought to achieve outright military victory. There were no negotiations to end World War II; only total defeat of the Axis Powers sufficed. The Korean War ended in a stalemate absent any substantive talks, and the United States and North Korea remained, technically, at war, for decades thereafter. Negotiations to end the Vietnam War began in 1968 and continued into the next decade only to be eclipsed by the total victory of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces in 1975. The catastrophic Syrian conflict began in 2011 and continued unabated despite years of U.N.-sponsored talks in Geneva. The Colombian government and the indigenous guerilla group, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC), finally ended their civil war in 2016 with a peace agreement after 26 years of on-again, off-again negotiations....

To Stay or Not to Stay January–June 1995

The four-month cessation of hostilities agreement took effect in January 1995. There was tension between expanding UNPROFOR and the UNPROFOR withdrawal option known as OPLAN 40104. The Deputies and Principals spent early 1995 focused on Croatia and the intentions of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. The costs of UNPROFOR and OPLAN 40104 seized some Situation Room discussions. Serbian President Slobodan Milošević finally refused to mutually recognize Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as steps toward a peace deal. The Principals decided in March 1995 to maintain diplomatic engagement and provision of humanitarian relief, keep UNPROFOR deployed in Bosnia and Croatia, and take measures to contain the conflict. Washington continued to support the Bosnian government’s goal of a political settlement consistent with the Contact Group proposal but seek to lower public expectations of immediate success and avoid any illusion that the United States or NATO would intervene militarily on behalf of the Bosniaks.

Shattered Plans 1993

The year 1993 never got close to a peaceful settlement of the Balkans conflict despite the United Nations, European, and American attempts to achieve one. The siege of Sarajevo had begun in 1992 immediately after the declaration of independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. By the end of 1993, a military stalemate persisted in Bosnia as the diplomatic challenge limped along. President Bill Clinton’s cabinet of national security leaders—the Principals Committee—gathered in the Situation Room for the first time on January 28, 1993, and dealt exclusively with the situation in Bosnia. In April 1993, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, delivered a memorandum to the national security adviser recommending use of American air power. The recommendation failed to attract sufficient support, and further diplomatic efforts to end the war also failed. “Assertive multilateralism” took a beating in Situation Room discussions as 1993 wore on.

Forging Peace September–December 1995

The final months of the search for peace in Bosnia and Croatia left everyone scrambling to reach the next stage of diplomatic and military engagement. Richard Holbrooke reported no progress. The Principals approved continued NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets. Planning proceeded for the NATO-led force that would be inserted into Bosnia following a peace agreement. The Deputies bickered over plans for the Bosniaks. The Principals and Deputies strategized how to roll out peace talks, and consultations in Europe prepared the groundwork for the upcoming Dayton peace talks. Kofi Annan consulted in Washington about the U.N. role. Madeleine Albright and Holbrooke clashed over sanctions relief for Serbia. Holbrooke’s memorandum to Warren Christopher illuminated the turbulence in the Dayton talks near their conclusion. Holbrooke concluded that Slobodan Milošević had carried the day in Dayton and that Alija Izetbegović had been the most unreasonable, and, concludes the author, for understandable reasons.