Can the EU be a federal democracy? Assessing the horizontal and vertical dimension of the EU government from comparative perspective

The European Union remains an ambivalent polity. This uncertainty complicates the assessment of its democratic and federal quality. Drawing on comparative federalism research can contribute not only to making sense of whether, or rather which kind of federalism the EU has developed. It can also enable addressing such a compounded, but necessary inquiry into the federal and democratic character of the EU and how to ascertain which type of democratic government for which type of federal union may be appropriate. The article first elaborates a framework to assess the dimensions of federal and democratic government, drawing on comparative federalism research to delineate basic types of federal democracy. Here the democratic dimension of government is taken as referring primarily to the horizontal division of powers (among ‘branches’) of government, the federal dimension to the vertical division of powers (among ‘levels’) of governments. The framework is applied to the government of the EU in order to gauge its own type(s) of division of power arrangements and the interlinkage between them. Finally, the discussion reflects on whether or rather how the EU could comprise a federal democracy, especially in light of recent crisis challenges and subsequent institutional developments in EU governance.

State-building and the European Union: Markets, War, and Europe's Uneven Political Development

The European Union’s institutional development is highly imbalanced. It has established robust legal authority and institutions, but it remains weak or impotent in terms of its centralization of fiscal, administrative, and coercive capacity. We argue that situating the EU in terms of the history of state-building allows us to better understand the outcomes of EU governance. Historically, political projects centralizing power have been most complete when both market and security pressures are present to generate state formation. With the EU, market forces have had a far greater influence than immediate military threats. We offer a preliminary demonstration of the promise of this approach by applying it to two empirical examples, the euro and the Schengen area. Our analysis suggests that the EU does not need to be a Weberian state, nor be destined to become one, for the state-building perspective to shed new light on its processes of political development.

The State of the Health (Dis)-Union in the EU: the legacy of austerity under the trial of Covid-19

Covid-19 highlights the inadequacy of EU governance cross-border challenges, especially transnational health challenges, supporting the call for a Health Union. Health policy remains a near-exclusive national competence whose budget was heavily impacted by EU-driven austerity, especially in Southern Europe. The work provides a comprehensive empirical assessment of the pandemic case evidencing the limits of the current governance framework and tabled reform proposals. The analysis contributes an extended understanding of the implications of the lack of an effective EU public health competence. We assess comparatively (austerity-induced) geographic heterogeneities in health-care preparedness, outbreak, crisis management and outcomes, delineating the extent to which inequalities remain in the absence of a Health Union. Findings evidence an empirically grounded case for sovereignty pooling in the core transnational domain of public health while providing a preliminary policy evaluation of the proposal for a Health Union.

A new delegation design for EU governance: how preference cohesiveness of multiple principals shapes the European Commission’s discretion in trade negotiations

The Lisbon Treaty enhanced the role of the European Parliament in free trade agreements. This article offers a comprehensive theoretical and empirical account of this new delegation design in EU trade governance. Specifically, it addresses the question how the preference cohesiveness of multiple principals—the Council of Ministers as a de jure principal and the Parliament as a de facto principal—shapes the Commission’s discretion in negotiating trade agreements. Exploring these two conjectures through a combination of primary materials and interviews, this contribution posits that those configurations of low degree of cohesiveness within the Council and high cohesiveness within the Parliament or high cohesiveness of the Council and low cohesiveness within the Parliament increase Commission discretion. A configuration of low cohesiveness within and between multiple principals, by contrast, is more likely to lead to paralysis of the negotiation process.

The European Investment Bank’s ‘Quantum Leap’ to Become the World’s First International Climate Bank

In November 2019, the European Investment Bank (EIB) announced its ‘metamorphosis’ into a ‘Climate Bank.’ Associated with the EU’s Green Deal, presented a month later, the EIB claimed to be the first international climate bank and a front runner in the EU’s priority climate agenda. The EIB is mandated through the treaties to support EU policymakers. However, with its ‘makeover,’ the EIB also announced the launch of a new climate strategy and energy lending policy, ending fossil fuel financing after 2021. It is thus valuable to examine the question of whether the EIB has developed into a policymaker, and if so, how this can be best understood. In exploring this question, this article follows a principal-agent approach, attempting to discern the rational interests behind organisational rhetoric and posits that the EIB’s claimed transformation hints at a type of policymaking activism, exploiting a policy window to serve the EIB’s rational interests in a strained political and market contest. This represents a paradigm shift in the EIB’s institutional behaviour and rhetoric within the EU governance constellation and is, in fact, in this sense a ‘quantum leap’ as suggested by the EIB. However, it remains to be seen if the bank’s metrics will prove a bold departure from their current activity or simply another adaptation to a policy field of intense interest to the EU, as has occurred on several occasions in the past.

Technocracy and the Tragedy of EU Governance

In a historical perspective, technocracy, emphasising bureaucratic and technical expertise in political, social and economic areas, is a double edge sword: on the one side, it guaranteed the condition for international cooperation post-WW II, providing as an ideologically neutral basis the condition for governance in a politically bitter international climate. On the other hand, it indicates the tragedy of increasing delegitimization of EU governance, causing the alienation of political willing from the peo-ple that is (mis-)used by populists present-day and their slogan ‘back to the people’. Technocracy is theoretically symbolised through the functionalism of EU integration, politically manifest in the re-definition of democracy from “input”- to “output”-orientation by e.g. Fritz Scharpf. The tragedy of EU politics being trapped in technocratic governance as condition of the possibility and calamity of coop-eration at the same time is analytically at the heart to understand contemporary approaches of EU (dis-)integration and identity. However, in both understanding alienation and (populist) opposition to the EU integration processes as systemic phenomena, deeply seeded in the structure of the EU and of EU policy studies themselves, as well as in suggesting a triangular democratic process to rectify the EU’s birth deficit, the paper significantly goes beyond current policy studies (e.g. on EU dis-integration) and their non-normative stance. These studies are still anchored in the epistemological commitments of neo-functionalism that need finally to be overcome as they tend to ignore the human factor and agency in politics.

Foundations of Regulatory Choice: Precaution, Innovation … and Nonviolence?

Two foundations of regulatory choice, precaution and innovation, co-exist in the political system of the European Union (EU). At the conceptual level the two foundations are complementary, and are both endorsed by the EU institutions, albeit in different ways and with different legal status. In the real-life of EU policymaking processes, however, precaution and innovation often become the terrain of polarised views anchored to technocratic or populist positions that erode trust in EU governance. We propose a way forward to this state of play. Instead of seeing the two foundations as opposite, we explore their dyadic relationship. We show that a conversation between the two is possible via an original reformulation of precaution and innovation. The reconciliation of precaution and innovation, we argue, is effective only in a context of social trust about the reconciled definitions. We propose the analytical and normative framework as seal of social trust. Nonviolence can assist the EU and its citizens in the path towards innovation that is socially responsible, future-proof and accountable, and enhance precaution as internalised commitment of decision-makers as well as scientific and social communities.

Digitalization and AI in European Agriculture: A Strategy for Achieving Climate and Biodiversity Targets?

This article analyzes the environmental opportunities and limitations of digitalization in the agricultural sector by applying qualitative governance analysis. Agriculture is recognized as a key application area for digital technologies, including artificial intelligence. This is not least because it faces major sustainability challenges, especially with regard to meeting the climate and biodiversity targets set out in the Paris Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, as well as the water-related objectives of EU environmental legislation. Based on an overview of the possible applications of digital technologies in agriculture, the article offers a status quo analysis of legal acts with relevance to digitalization in the EU agricultural sector. It is found that a reliable legal framework with regard to product liability and product safety, as well as data privacy, data access, and data security is important in this context. In addition, the European Common Agricultural Policy, as the most important funding instrument for digital innovations in the agricultural sector, should be designed in such a way that it links digitalization-related objectives more closely with sustainability targets. So far, the existing EU governance does not fully exploit the potentials of digitalization for environmental protection, and sight is lost of possible negative side effects such as rebound and shifting effects. Therefore, the article also offers proposals for the optimization of EU governance.

The EU Health Technology Assessment and the Open Method of Coordination: A Relation with Potential in the Context of Network Governance

The open method of coordination (OMC)—a tool which was formalized in the early 2000s—has generated the interest of both the researchers and practitioners in the context of the new EU governance. This article is examining the literature of both network governance and OMC, with the focus particularly on one main question: is OMC a useful instrument in health policies in order to achieve concrete results by outlining norms and legislation where EU exercise limited power? Analyzing a field in which the EU competence is limited—given the budgetary implications of medicines reimbursement—from the results of the existing collaboration within EUnetHTA, we will observe the added value in this particular case of the OMC application, and the possible consequences in shaping the supranational competences. Given that the EU, with some exceptions provided by the Treaties, may only exercise actions to support, coordinate or complement the action of the Member States in the health policy, the OMC proves to be a useful tool, both from the perspective of the Member States but especially of the supranational level.