Military Agility
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Published By University Press Of Kentucky

9780813178844, 9780813179957

2020 ◽  
pp. 126-149
Author(s):  
Meir Finkel

The chapter opens with a presentation of anecdotes from American military history that illustrate the enduring and universal character of the challenge and the need for a rapid transition from peacetime to war. Following this the challenges facing the US today are discussed, mainly the Russian threat and the possible need for rapid transition to war in Europe. This challenge is intensified by the Multi-Domain Battle conceptual and the impending material transformation. The chapter ends with specific recommendations for both issues.



2020 ◽  
pp. 93-125
Author(s):  
Meir Finkel

The chapter explores the personal and organizational cognitive and command challenges in the rapid transition from peacetime or RSO to war. The challenge is three fold: identifying the change against the background of previous personal and organizational experience; assimilating the need for a transition in superior and subordinate echelons; implementing the change, mainly in the field of C2. Three cases are presented in the Yom Kippur War: the ground forces on the southern and northern fronts and the IAF. The Second Lebanon War case is discussed first from the GHQ perspective and then from the 91st Galilee Division's perspective. Lessons for the future are drawn.



2020 ◽  
pp. 150-156
Author(s):  
Meir Finkel

Recommendations for each aspect of the rapid transition to war appear at the end of each chapter and specific ones for the U.S. Army in Europe that are related to the emerging MDB concept. Broader understandings at better preparing the U.S. Army for the future transition to war are also given, with an emphasis on army training, education and career management.



2020 ◽  
pp. 67-92
Author(s):  
Meir Finkel

While conceptual and doctrinal debates are the "bread and butter" of military organizations in peacetime, what happens when war begins before the debate is settled? The chapter explores two cases – the debate over the defensive concept on the Suez Canal line prior to the Yom Kippur War and the IDF's 2006 concept of operations and operational concept for fighting Hezbollah in Lebanon prior to the Second Lebanon War. The aim of the chapter is to illuminate the fact that conceptual debates should be monitored and managed in a way that minimizes the likelihood of conceptual incoherency when war suddenly breaks out.



2020 ◽  
pp. 38-66
Author(s):  
Meir Finkel

The chapter presents the consequences of long periods of low intensity engagements on the ability of military organizations to shift successfully from a routine security operations (RSO) mindset (fighting norms, C2 procedures) to war, and the potential loss of doctrinal knowledge and organizational competency needed for fighting a full-scale war. The historical cases include the impact of 1967-1973 RSO on the IDF's performance in the Yom Kippur War (mainly the IAF) and the effect of RSO between 1995 and 2006 on the IDF's performance in the Second Lebanon War (mainly the ground forces). Lessons are brought forth for the necessary balance between winning the current low intensity conflict and preparing for the initial battles in a suddenly erupting war.



2020 ◽  
pp. 9-37
Author(s):  
Meir Finkel

The chapter focuses on the limited ability to hasten force buildup by training troops with newly acquired weapon systems when war begins earlier than envisioned or during an ongoing war. Examples are taken from the Sinai War (1956) –ground and air forces; the Six-Day War; the Yom Kippur War, and others. Suggestions are given for risk management between investing in the present versus providing a solution for the future regarding the replacement of existing proven weapons with new unproven ones.



2020 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Meir Finkel

The introduction presents the current gap in the literature that the book aims to cover – the "soft" aspects of the rapid transition from peace to war. It points to four enduring and emerging reasons why military organizations should deal with this subject, then explains the relevancy of learning from the Israeli military experience, and concludes with a description of the book's organization.



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