The Outbreak of War during Conceptual or Doctrinal Change

2020 ◽  
pp. 67-92
Author(s):  
Meir Finkel
Keyword(s):  
Suez Canal ◽  
Military Organizations ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Operational Concept ◽  
Second Lebanon War ◽  
Concept Of Operations

While conceptual and doctrinal debates are the "bread and butter" of military organizations in peacetime, what happens when war begins before the debate is settled? The chapter explores two cases – the debate over the defensive concept on the Suez Canal line prior to the Yom Kippur War and the IDF's 2006 concept of operations and operational concept for fighting Hezbollah in Lebanon prior to the Second Lebanon War. The aim of the chapter is to illuminate the fact that conceptual debates should be monitored and managed in a way that minimizes the likelihood of conceptual incoherency when war suddenly breaks out.

The Effect of Prolonged Routine Security Operations on Wartime Capabilities

2020 ◽  
pp. 38-66
Author(s):  
Meir Finkel
Keyword(s):  
Full Scale ◽  
Military Organizations ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Low Intensity ◽  
Potential Loss ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Security Operations ◽  
Second Lebanon War ◽  
The Impact

The chapter presents the consequences of long periods of low intensity engagements on the ability of military organizations to shift successfully from a routine security operations (RSO) mindset (fighting norms, C2 procedures) to war, and the potential loss of doctrinal knowledge and organizational competency needed for fighting a full-scale war. The historical cases include the impact of 1967-1973 RSO on the IDF's performance in the Yom Kippur War (mainly the IAF) and the effect of RSO between 1995 and 2006 on the IDF's performance in the Second Lebanon War (mainly the ground forces). Lessons are brought forth for the necessary balance between winning the current low intensity conflict and preparing for the initial battles in a suddenly erupting war.

From Routine Security Operations to War

2020 ◽  
pp. 93-125
Author(s):  
Meir Finkel
Keyword(s):  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Organizational Experience ◽  
The Future ◽  
Rapid Transition ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Security Operations ◽  
Second Lebanon War

The chapter explores the personal and organizational cognitive and command challenges in the rapid transition from peacetime or RSO to war. The challenge is three fold: identifying the change against the background of previous personal and organizational experience; assimilating the need for a transition in superior and subordinate echelons; implementing the change, mainly in the field of C2. Three cases are presented in the Yom Kippur War: the ground forces on the southern and northern fronts and the IAF. The Second Lebanon War case is discussed first from the GHQ perspective and then from the 91st Galilee Division's perspective. Lessons for the future are drawn.

Qaddafi, Arab Unity and Islam

Worldview ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 22-24
Author(s):  
Stephen Oren
Keyword(s):  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Suez Canal ◽  
Islamic Fundamentalism ◽  
The West ◽  
Considerable Part ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Oil Embargo

The January announcement of a Libyan-Tunisian union, short-lived to be sure, was but one in a series of seemingly odd actions by Libyan President Qaddafi. In the Yom Kippur War he refused to participate in the Syro-Egyptian attack–perhaps out of pique at not being consulted beforehand. Two weeks later he angrily denounced the cease-fire and has since refused to participate in inter-Arab conferences called to discuss the post-cease-fire situation. The Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement, by which Egypt recovered the Suez Canal and a considerable part of Sinai, evoked only disapproval from Libya. Calling for ever greater oil embargoes against the West, Qaddafi's own adherence to the oil embargo is questionable. Qaddafi, known for his Islamic fundamentalism and fiery anti-Israel rhetoric, seemed for a time eager to join with Tunisia's Habib Bourguiba, a sophisticated modernist who has urged his fellow Arabs to accept the reality of Israel. Seeming contradictions abound. Yet Qaddafi's policies have a rationality of their own which may have as much to do with the Middle East's future as the impulses of those whom conventional wisdom calls saner.

Epilogue

2017 ◽  
pp. 355-360
Author(s):  
Isabella Ginor ◽  
Gideon Remez
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Future Study ◽  
Suez Canal ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
The Us ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Military Support ◽  
Anwar Sadat ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The Military

This chapter poses for future study the question why, after at least initial success of the Soviet-supported Egyptian offensive, the rift between Cairo and Moscow that did not occur, as widely believed, in the summer of 1972 did develop gradually after the Yom Kippur War, with Egypt moving into the US camp in the Cold War. Unlike the present book’s challenge to many conventional assumptions about the 1967-1973 period, here the widespread concept appears to be borne out that once Egyptian President Anwar Sadat opted for peace, he needed US influence with Israel as much as he needed Soviet military support for the military achievement which he required as a precondition. Moscow was involved in the first stages of postwar settlement, such as the reopening of the Suez Canal and the Geneva peace conference. But it was edged out of the subsequent process and did its best to back its remaining allies, mainly Syria and Palestinian groups, in opposing the Israeli-Egyptian peace as far as backing attempts on Sadat’s life.

In the Thick of the Yom Kippur War

2017 ◽  
pp. 337-346
Author(s):  
Isabella Ginor ◽  
Gideon Remez
Keyword(s):  
Suez Canal ◽  
Special Forces ◽  
Transport Aircraft ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Yom Kippur

Recent testimony from a Soviet general and others showed that the transport aircraft which evacuated the dependents of Soviet advisers from Egypt on the eve of the Yom Kippur War also flew in more advisers to assist in the crossing of the Suez Canal. Another indication of Soviet collusion is the immediate start of a Soviet resupply effort as soon as the offensive was launched on 6 October, which proves earlier prepositioning. Both advisers and Soviet special forces were involved in operations across the canal. Soviet SAM batteries were also redeployed in Egypt and Syria, especially after the tide turned against the Arab onslaught after the first days of fighting. .

Turning point in the Sinai: The great armoured battle of 14 October 1973

2020 ◽  
pp. 096834451986878
Author(s):  
David Rodman
Keyword(s):  
Turning Point ◽  
Suez Canal ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Scant Attention ◽  
Yom Kippur

The massive Israeli–Egyptian tank battle in the Sinai on 14 October 1973 constituted a turning point on the southern front during the Yom Kippur War. The crushing Israeli victory set the stage for another turning point on this front, the Israeli counter-crossing of the Suez Canal. Yet, the battle of 14 October has received rather scant attention from military historians. This article, therefore, attempts to fill a gap in the literature about the Yom Kippur War by describing and analysing the battle itself, as well as by highlighting its broader impact on the course of hostilities in the Sinai.

At the Decisive Point in the Sinai

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Even ◽  
Simcha B. Maoz
Keyword(s):  
Suez Canal ◽  
The Political ◽  
Commanding Officer ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Individual Decisions ◽  
Major General

The Yom Kippur War, also known as the Ramadan War or the October War, was fought by Israel against a coalition of Arab nations, led by Syria and Egypt. The war lasted nineteen days, with the pivotal moment being Major General Ariel Sharon’s crossing of the Suez Canal, which is known as the crossing battle In this narrative Jacob Even and Simcha B. Maoz consider the war and Sharon’s leadership as a case study of generalship for the benefit of new generations of senior field commanders. By focusing on the divisional command, Even and Maoz balance the macro view of the war (in the context of the political atmosphere of the time) with the micro view (as a cascade of individual decisions made by each commanding officer).

Sadat and the Yom Kippur War, October 1973

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Grunwald ◽  
Mark Perrin
Keyword(s):  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Yom Kippur
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