The Effect of Prolonged Routine Security Operations on Wartime Capabilities

2020 ◽  
pp. 38-66
Author(s):  
Meir Finkel
Keyword(s):  
Full Scale ◽  
Military Organizations ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Low Intensity ◽  
Potential Loss ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Security Operations ◽  
Second Lebanon War ◽  
The Impact

The chapter presents the consequences of long periods of low intensity engagements on the ability of military organizations to shift successfully from a routine security operations (RSO) mindset (fighting norms, C2 procedures) to war, and the potential loss of doctrinal knowledge and organizational competency needed for fighting a full-scale war. The historical cases include the impact of 1967-1973 RSO on the IDF's performance in the Yom Kippur War (mainly the IAF) and the effect of RSO between 1995 and 2006 on the IDF's performance in the Second Lebanon War (mainly the ground forces). Lessons are brought forth for the necessary balance between winning the current low intensity conflict and preparing for the initial battles in a suddenly erupting war.

From Routine Security Operations to War

2020 ◽  
pp. 93-125
Author(s):  
Meir Finkel
Keyword(s):  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Organizational Experience ◽  
The Future ◽  
Rapid Transition ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Security Operations ◽  
Second Lebanon War

The chapter explores the personal and organizational cognitive and command challenges in the rapid transition from peacetime or RSO to war. The challenge is three fold: identifying the change against the background of previous personal and organizational experience; assimilating the need for a transition in superior and subordinate echelons; implementing the change, mainly in the field of C2. Three cases are presented in the Yom Kippur War: the ground forces on the southern and northern fronts and the IAF. The Second Lebanon War case is discussed first from the GHQ perspective and then from the 91st Galilee Division's perspective. Lessons for the future are drawn.

The Outbreak of War during Conceptual or Doctrinal Change

2020 ◽  
pp. 67-92
Author(s):  
Meir Finkel
Keyword(s):  
Suez Canal ◽  
Military Organizations ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Operational Concept ◽  
Second Lebanon War ◽  
Concept Of Operations

While conceptual and doctrinal debates are the "bread and butter" of military organizations in peacetime, what happens when war begins before the debate is settled? The chapter explores two cases – the debate over the defensive concept on the Suez Canal line prior to the Yom Kippur War and the IDF's 2006 concept of operations and operational concept for fighting Hezbollah in Lebanon prior to the Second Lebanon War. The aim of the chapter is to illuminate the fact that conceptual debates should be monitored and managed in a way that minimizes the likelihood of conceptual incoherency when war suddenly breaks out.

Initiative and Military Effectiveness: Evidence from the Yom Kippur War

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Grauer ◽  
Stephen L Quackenbush
Keyword(s):  
International System ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Systematic Investigation ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Military Capability ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Scholars investigating the sources of military capability have located sources of effectiveness in the structure of the international system, the characteristics of states, and features of the armed forces engaged in battle. They also point toward the likely influence of individual-level variables, but such claims tend to lack theoretical and empirical justification. We advance the literature by investigating whether individual initiative—that is, actions taken by soldiers and junior officers to achieve their commander's intent while in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise—systematically conditions armed forces’ performance on the battlefield. We develop a theory connecting individual initiative with military effectiveness, highlighting the role of “problem-solving” in facilitating the use of men and materiel in battle. We then assess the empirical validity of our claim through an examination of a uniquely informative episode in military history: Israel's fight on the Sinai front during the first three days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The case allows us to hold constant a wide range of potentially confounding variables and, to the best of our knowledge, conduct the first systematic investigation of the impact of individual initiative on the performance of units engaged in combat actions. Our findings suggest individual initiative does have systematic effects on armed forces’ effectiveness in combat. Implications and directions for future research on the development and use of military capabilities are briefly considered.

ANALISIS RISIKO OPERASIONAL MENGGUNAKAN PENDEKATAN DISTRIBUSI KERUGIAN DENGAN METODE AGREGAT

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Y. ARBI ◽  
R. BUDIARTI ◽  
I G. P. PURNABA
Keyword(s):  
Negative Binomial Distribution ◽  
Binomial Distribution ◽  
Negative Binomial ◽  
Financial Institution ◽  
Expected Value ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Limited Data ◽  
Loss Distribution Approach ◽  
Potential Loss ◽  
The Impact

Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes or external problems. Insurance companies as financial institution that also faced at risk. Recording of operating losses in insurance companies, were not properly conducted so that the impact on the limited data for operational losses. In this work, the data of operational loss observed from the payment of the claim. In general, the number of insurance claims can be modelled using the Poisson distribution, where the expected value of the claims is similar with variance, while the negative binomial distribution, the expected value was bound to be less than the variance.Analysis tools are used in the measurement of the potential loss is the loss distribution approach with the aggregate method. In the aggregate method, loss data grouped in a frequency distribution and severity distribution. After doing 10.000 times simulation are resulted total loss of claim value, which is total from individual claim every simulation. Then from the result was set the value of potential loss (OpVar) at a certain level confidence.

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