Concluding Postscript: The World According to Kant

2021 ◽  
pp. 355-356
Author(s):  
Anja Jauernig
Keyword(s):  
Human Mind ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Intentional Objects ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Special Character ◽  
Empirical Level ◽  
The World ◽  
Thing In Itself ◽  
Levels Of Reality ◽  
Ontological Position

This completes my account of Kant’s critical idealism, understood as an ontological position, as developed in the Critique and associated theoretical writings. According to Kant, the world, understood as the sum total of everything that has reality, comprises several levels of reality, most importantly, the transcendental level and the empirical level. The transcendental level is a mind-independent level at which Kantian things in themselves exist; the empirical level is a mind-dependent level at which Kantian appearances exist. Things in themselves are mind-independent, appearances are fully mind-dependent. Things in themselves and appearances are numerically distinct and do not ontologically overlap in any way. Kantian outer appearances essentially are intentional objects of outer experience; Kantian inner appearances essentially are intentional objects of inner experience. Empirical objects are Kantian outer appearances, empirical space and time are constituted by the spatial and temporal determinations of outer appearances, pure space and time are (nothing but) forms of sensibility, and empirical selves, or empirical minds, are Kantian inner appearances. In contrast to other intentional objects, such as the intentional objects of fictions, dreams, hallucinations, illusions, and perceptions, Kantian appearances genuinely exist, that is, they exist from the point of view of fundamental ontology. This is due both to the special character of experience, in particular, the special character of outer experience and its conformity to Kant’s formal conditions of objectivity, and to the grounding of Kantian appearances in things themselves. Kantian things in themselves transcendentally affect sensibility and thereby bring about sensations, which provide the ‘matter’ for Kantian appearances and underwrite their existence. Kantian things in themselves are supersensible, non-spatial, and non-temporal, as well as distinct from God and thus finite. Each inner appearance is grounded in a unique Kantian thing in itself that is a human transcendental mind, and all outer appearances are grounded in Kantian things in themselves that are distinct from all human minds. What we commonly call ‘the external empirical world’ exists, including empirical space and time. Accordingly, there is also at least one Kantian thing in itself that is not a human mind. Moreover, there is at least one human being, that is, an entity whose ontologically basic parts include, minimally, a body (which is an empirical object), an empirical self (which is an empirical mind), and a transcendental self (which is a human transcendental mind). Since other intentional objects that are not Kantian appearances, although not genuine existents, are not nothing but have some reality and being, it is useful to conceive of Kantian reality as including yet another mind-dependent level to provide a home for these other fully mind-dependent entities—even if this conception goes beyond the direct textual evidence and may also go beyond Kant’s private, explicitly articulated thoughts on the matter. The ultimate basis for Kant’s case for transcendental idealism is the finitude of the human mind and, more specifically, its fundamentally uncreative nature in which this finitude manifests ...

The World According to Kant

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anja Jauernig
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Intentional Objects ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Special Character ◽  
Empirical Level ◽  
The World ◽  
Levels Of Reality ◽  
Ontological Position ◽  
Empirical Realism

The World According to Kant offers an interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s critical idealism, as developed in the Critique of Pure Reason and associated texts. Critical idealism is understood as an ontological position, which comprises transcendental idealism, empirical realism, and a number of other basic ontological theses. According to Kant, the world, understood as the sum total of everything that has reality, comprises several levels of reality, most importantly, the transcendental level and the empirical level. The transcendental level is a mind-independent level at which things in themselves exist. The empirical level is a fully mind-dependent level at which appearances exist, which are intentional objects of experience. Empirical objects and empirical minds are appearances, and empirical space and time are constituted by the spatial and temporal determinations of appearances. On the proposed interpretation, Kant is thus a genuine idealist about empirical objects, empirical minds, and space and time. But in contrast to other intentional objects, appearances genuinely exist, which is due both to the special character of experience compared to other kinds of representations such as illusions and dreams, and to the grounding of appearances in things themselves. This is why, on the proposed interpretation, Kant is also a genuine realist about empirical objects, empirical minds, and empirical space and time. This book develops the indicated interpretation, spells out Kant’s case for critical idealism thus understood, pinpoints the differences between critical idealism and ‘ordinary’ idealism, such as Berkley’s, and clarifies the relation between Kant’s conception of things in themselves and the conception of things in themselves by other philosophers, in particular, Kant’s Leibniz-Wolffian predecessors.

The Nature and Ontological Status of Appearances

2021 ◽  
pp. 27-109
Author(s):  
Anja Jauernig
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Status ◽  
Detailed Consideration ◽  
Intentional Objects ◽  
Empirical Level ◽  
The World ◽  
Primary Difference ◽  
Levels Of Reality ◽  
Material Conditions

It is shown that things in themselves and appearances are numerically distinct existents whose primary difference consists in that the former are mind-independent while the latter are mind-dependent, in a sense that is explicated in detail. On the proposed reading, the world, understood as the sum total of everything that has reality, comprises several levels of reality, most importantly, a mind-independent, transcendental level, at which things in themselves exits, and a mind-dependent, empirical level, at which appearances exist. Appearances are identified to be intentional objects of experience. The nature and ontological status of appearances is further investigated by way of an examination of Kant’s account of perception and his theory of experience, including a detailed consideration of the formal and material conditions of experience and of the implications of the mathematical antinomies for the specific flavor of Kant’s idealism about appearances.

Chapter I: The Aim, and the Method of Treatment

1980 ◽  
Vol 25 (S1) ◽  
pp. 3-5
Author(s):  
Richard Albert Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Human Mind ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Adequate Treatment ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The World ◽  
Philosophical Writings

But that same Where (Space), with its brother When (Time), are from the first the master-colours of our Dream-Grotto; the Canvas (the warp and woof thereof) whereon all our Dreams and Life-Visions are painted.—CARLYLE, Sartor Resartus, 1830.When Kant in his investigation of the nature and validity of human knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) undertook an examination of the nature of Space and Time as the starting point in the discussion, he struck the path which all fruitful philosophical investigation has followed since. Since Space and Time are the two ‘forms’ within which the whole system of life and nature unfolds itself to the human mind, and are at the same time the ‘warp and woof on which man elaborates his mental sense-picture of the world, an examination of these two sense-forms should be the self-evident starting point in any true cosmic philosophy. Yet it seems to have taken something more than a century for the full significance of Kant’s method to sink into the general philosophical consciousness, and it is only in our own time that its fruits have begun to mature. What strikes one in the philosophical writings of the present century, whether starting from mathematics, or science, or pure speculation, is the common assumption in all of them that some exposition of Space and Time must form the foundation of any adequate treatment of the nature of the world, the human mind, and the structure of human knowledge. The title of Professor Alexander’s book, Space, Time, and Deity (1920), is symbolic of the modern point of view.

PERANCANGAN ARSITEKTUR RUANG LIMINAL ANTARA SEBUAH DUALISME (BERTANI DAN MELAUT)

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1087
Author(s):  
Michael Gideon Josian ◽  
Maria Veronica Gandha
Keyword(s):  
General Public ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Common Space ◽  
Special Character ◽  
Ideal System ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future ◽  
Letting Go

The future of dwelling has a very board context and will continue to be discussed, it is possible that the discussions about “dwelling” is come from the environment of farming and fishing. Things that are not much cared for but still have a role in the survival of the world. Therefore this matter will be discussed using the role of architecture as space, to be able to create an ideal system by paying attention to the quality of farming and fishing for the future, and leaving a trace or memory to be able to carry messages for the future. Talking about the future of an interaction that occurs between the general public and farmers and fishermen, especially considering that farmers and fishermen themselves can be compared to two different poles, a liminal space is needed, which may already exist indirectly in the environment. By letting go of individual egos and emphasizing ego to the point of view of farmers and fishermen. To present a common space, or a place that contains a special character of a city that contains a message for the future. Keywords:  dualism; hope; liminal; trace;  Abstrak Masa depan cara berhuni memiliki konteks yang sangat luas dan akan terus diperbincangkan. Tidak menutup kemungkinan datang dari pembahasan mengenai cara berhuni dengan bertani dan melaut. Hal yang tidak banyak dipedulikan tetapi tetap memiliki peran dalam kelangsungan dunia. Oleh karena itu, masa depan berhuni ini akan dibahas dengan menggunakan peran arsitektur sebagai ruang, untuk dapat menciptakan sistem yang ideal dengan memperhatikan kualitas bertani dan melaut bagi masa depan, dan meninggalkan sebuah jejak atau kenangan untuk dapat membawa pesan bagi masa depan. Berbicara mengenai masa depan dari sebuah interaksi yang terjadi antara masyarakat umum dengan para petani dan nelayan, apalagi mengingat para petani dan nelayan itu sendiri dapat diibaratkan berada pada kedua kutub yang berbeda, maka dibutuhkanlah sebuah ruang liminal, yang mungkin sudah hadir secara tidak langsung pada lingkungan masyarakat. Dengan cara melepaskan ego individual dan menekankan ego kepada sudut pandang para petani dan nelayan. Untuk menghadirkan sebuah ruang bersama, atau sebuah tempat yang mengandung sebuah karakter tersendiri dari sebuah kota yang berisi pesan bagi masa depan.

A Leibnizian Space

Dialogue ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-100
Author(s):  
Ian Hacking
Keyword(s):  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Identity Of Indiscernibles ◽  
Literal Sense ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
The World ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Way

Leibniz said that space and time are well-founded phenomena. Few readers can make much literal sense out of this idea, so I shall describe a small possible world in which it is true. I do not contend that Leibniz had my construction in mind, but I do follow Leibnizian guidelines. The first trick is to reverse the maxim that every monad mirrors the world from its own point of view. Points of view, and hence a space of points, can be constructed from a non-relational account of the perceptions of each monad. But we cannot fabricate space alone. We must build up laws of nature simultaneously. We must also employ a measure of the simplicity of the laws of nature. Moreover we require that, in a literal sense, the perception of each monad is a sum of its Petits perceptions. The identity of indiscernibles, in its application to space, is an automatic consequence of this construction. Although I shall examine only one possible world, there is a general recipe for such constructions, in which none of the above elements can be omitted. This is a striking illustration of the way in which the many different facets of Leibniz's metaphysics are necessarily inter-connected.

Does an observer belong in physics?

Human Affairs ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Novotný
Keyword(s):  
Human Mind ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The World ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractIn this paper we comment on the opinions of great philosophers from various epochs on the relationship between computers and the human mind. We ponder over whether we might be able to gain an understanding of the human mind and a perception of the world from the scientific point of view. We focus on the relationship between these two issues.

scholarly journals ON ROMAN INGARDEN’S CONCEPTION OF ONTIC FOUNDATIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY: RESPONSIBILITY AS FOUNDATION OF ONTOLOGY?

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 601-618
Author(s):  
TOMAS SODEIKA ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Edmund Husserl ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Scientific Career ◽  
Pure Consciousness ◽  
Intentional Objects ◽  
Main Work ◽  
The World ◽  
The Difference

The Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden gained recognition primarily due to his research on aesthetics. However, he considered the ontology to be the main area of his philosophical interests. At the beginning of his scientific career, Ingarden realized that he could not agree with his teacher Edmund Husserl, who considered phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. From Ingarden’s point of view, the fallacy of this approach lies in the fact that it leads to metaphysical idealism and makes it impossible to grasp the difference between real-life objects and intentional objects, i.e. objects generated by pure consciousness. In his main work Controversy over the Existence of the World (Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt), Ingarden tried to identify the difference between the ontological structures of real and intentional objects, expecting in this way to uphold the legitimacy of a realistic point of view and to prove that the real world is not a product of pure consciousness, but exists independently of him. Nevertheless, the result achieved by using the existential and formal ontological analysis of the a priori structures of various objects turned out to be insufficient to refute Husserl’s transcendental idealism. The article focuses on the last lifetime publication of Ingarden—his book On Responsibility. Its Ontic Foundations (Über die Verantwortung. Ihre ontischen Fundamente) published in 1970. Since this work is devoted to the study of the phenomenon of responsibility, it may seem that here we are dealing primarily with research on ethics. The article attempts to show that the book can be read as an ontological study that continues the “debate about the existence of the world,” i.e. as an attempt to prove the reality of the world. However, this proof is no longer based on an analysis of the a priori structures of various objects, but on a direct experience of responsibility.

scholarly journals The hypnosis of screens: reflections on a possible awakening of televiewer

Comunicar ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (25) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aurelio del-Portillo-García
Keyword(s):  
Learning Process ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Technical Training ◽  
Childhood And Adolescence ◽  
Life Meaning ◽  
Mental Attitude ◽  
Initial Learning ◽  
Levels Of Reality ◽  
Different Levels

TV viewers suffer very often a psychical surrender in front the screens. This is a way of defencelessness against different levels of reality and veracity of TV contents. The mental attitude of viewer is a learning process usually hidden by appearance of naturalness of quotidian television device presence. But TV language is not natural, but rather a complicate system of message structures built in clearly intentional purpose. Human mind develops his learning process, that configures a life meaning, under very important psychical pressure. In which stage or step of this process the viewer mind configuration begins? Can we modify such configuration improving a critical judgement in front of television messages? All these questions move us to the most basic initial learning in childhood and adolescence periods inspiring searching works about the possible awakening of TV viewer intelligence through active technical training: we need unmasking the trick showing how television makes new realities or visions in which sometimes is difficult discriminate between truth and point of view. Se observa cómo la disposición del telespectador ante las pantallas es de alguna forma una entrega psíquica ante una representación de la que, con demasiada facilidad, no se cuestiona su nivel de realidad y/o veracidad ni se valora de forma selectiva el interés o calidad de su contenido. Es evidente que la forma de ver televisión, como lo es la de leer o escuchar música, depende de un proceso de aprendizaje que se ha obviado encubierto por la cotidianidad omnipresente del televisor, su aparente «naturalidad». Pero el lenguaje televisivo no es un lenguaje natural, sino, más bien al contrario, un complejo sistema de selecciones, exclusiones y estructuras claramente dirigidas a transmitir un mensaje con un alto contenido intencional. Se ha hablado desde hace muchos años de «educación en medios», «educomunicación», se habló incluso de la función del medio televisivo como «edutenimiento». Se han recopilado y revisado recientemente multitud de trabajos de corte reflexivo y especulativo sobre la influencia de la televisión en niños y jóvenes, tema de importante presencia social en la actualidad. Pero quizás es necesario cuestionar de una forma más directa qué tipo de actividad cognitiva se da frente a los televisores y de qué tipo de influencia procede la fascinación hipnótica que producen. En un grado mínimo de participación interactiva esa dinámica se basa fundamentalmente en la estructura rítmica que se construye precisamente para mantener la atención, para sostener la hipnosis de la que depende la eficacia integral, global, del texto. Pero se puede ver también cómo la pasividad con la que cada día se está ante los televisores está neutralizando o modificando esa actividad cognitiva, que podría ser de alguna manera distanciada y potencialmente crítica, eliminando todo tipo de reto intelectivo y favoreciendo más comportamientos propios de individuos hipnotizados, que en muchos casos piensan, dicen y hacen lo que la televisión dice, posiblemente sin darse cuenta de ello. Tanto si se atiende a las motivaciones internas, «necesidades, tendencias e impulsos que, con frecuencia, operan por debajo del umbral de la conciencia» como a las influencias y condicionantes externos que ha articulado la Psicología del Aprendizaje Social, lo que está meridianamente claro es que la mente humana desarrolla los procesos de aprendizaje que constituyen y configuran el sentido de su vida bajo la presión de importantes presiones psíquicas. ¿En qué fase de ese aprendizaje y de qué manera se produce principalmente la configuración de la mente lectora de textos audiovisuales? ¿Puede modificarse, reeducarse, esa configuración, de tal manera que favorezca el distanciamiento y juicio crítico ante los mensajes televisivos? Todos estos interrogantes nos dirigen sin duda a fases iniciales del aprendizaje, a la infancia y adolescencia, e inspiran los trabajos de investigación que estamos desarrollando para la creación de grupos de trabajo con los que experimentar a través de observación participante y grupos de discusión los efectos del aprendizaje activo del medio televisivo en la capacidad de discernimiento ante determinados productos de consumo audiovisual, y en el desarrollo de unidades didácticas audiovisuales que ayuden a desenmascarar de alguna manera el «truco» con el que la televisión construye sus campos de influencia, desde un simple encuadre selectivo que deja fuera la parte de realidad que «no interesa», hasta la forma en la que los textos televisivos construyen nuevas realidades o visiones en las que frecuentemente es difícil distinguir realidad y representación, verdad y punto de vista.

On the Accessibility of the Thing-in-itself: Kant’s Transcendentalism and Meillassoux’s Speculative Materialism

2021 ◽  
pp. 138-147
Author(s):  
Fedor I. Girenok ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
The World ◽  
Thing In Itself ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Positive Knowledge

Modern philosophy has shown an unexpected interest in materialism. Why is materialism attractive? Perhaps because of the simplicity of thought, or be­cause of the direct discernment of the truth? Among the new materialists stands out the figure of Meillassoux, who tried to justify the need to move from transcendental and phenomenological idealism to speculative material­ism. But the interest in materialism is even more unexpected among young russian researchers who became volunteers of speculative materialism without hesitation. What attracts them to materialism? The answer to this question can be obtained by analyzing the philosophy of Meillassoux. This article examines the speculative materialism of Meillassoux. His idea of contingency is com­pared with Kant’s idea of productive imagination a priori. As a result, the author concludes that Meillassoux has not found the answer to the question why laws are constant. The absolutization of factuality, on which Meillassoux insists, does not give positive knowledge about the absolute. The inconsistency of Meillassoux is that the absolute is always preceded by an anthropological process of absolutization. The author concludes that speculative materialism attracts by its theoretical simplicity, which, in turn, is based on the full and merciless deprivation the world of anthropological dimension. In the material­ism of K. Meillassoux, an inescapable longing for the absolute is expressed. The speculative materialists want to restore space and time to nature with the help of the absolute, forgetting that the dif­ference between things in them­selves and things for themselves is not based on the absolutization of time, but on the presence of subjectivity. Meillassoux refused subjectivity. He chose the absolute. For him, the subject of philosophy is not the existence of a per­son, but a certain “may-be”.

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