Getting to Stalemate

This chapter analyzes how much nuclear retaliatory capability must countries build to reliably deter nuclear attack and how easy is it to establish nuclear stalemate. It discusses competing views and explains why the outcome of the debate is crucial for understanding the central puzzle of the nuclear age. One view holds that even minimal nuclear arsenals are “enough” to create stalemate, while another contends that stalemate requires far more robust nuclear forces and the virtual certainty of retaliation. However, the chapter also shows that minimal arsenals have not been enough. It looks into the intense rivalry of the Cold War, in which the threshold of nuclear capability required to generate deterrence was higher than the capability to create the mere possibility of retaliation.

Conclusion

This chapter summarizes key findings in the proponents of the “theory of the nuclear revolution,” which contend that nuclear weapons are transformative because they greatly reduce the need for countries to engage in intense security competition. It emphasizes that although nuclear weapons are the greatest tools of deterrence ever created, they do not automatically confer national security benefits on their owners, much less guarantee enduring safety from foreign threats. The chapter looks into the unfortunate reality of international politics in the shadow of nuclear weapons, in which countries must still pay close attention to the balance of power, search for ways to change the balance when they find themselves at a disadvantage and contemplate and plan for war in order to protect vital national interests. It explains how fears that tragically drove international politics for centuries still exist and how those fears are justified. The nuclear age remains an age of power politics.

Escaping Stalemate

This chapter analyzes the durability of stalemate. It investigates whether the situation can be reversed once countries reach the point where neither can disarm the other. For geopolitical competition to be greatly mitigated, the path to stalemate must be a one-way street. If the opposite were true, then even the achievement of stalemate would not eliminate competitive dynamics. The chapter shows that the survivability of nuclear arsenals has varied over time. During the later decades of the Cold War, it seemed that the superpowers were permanently locked into stalemate. It talks about “counterforce” attacks that are aimed at disarming the enemy's nuclear forces and appeared impossible because the superpower arsenals were enormous and dispersed, and some weapons seemed impossible to find.

Deterrence under Stalemate

This chapter explores the ability of nuclear weapons to deter conventional war. For nuclear weapons to mitigate traditional security competition, they must not only render nuclear war unwinnable but also serve as a robust deterrent to major conventional attacks. It explains how a potential victim of conventional attack can make credible threats to escalate to nuclear war if the attacker can retaliate in kind. The chapter also discusses about countries facing threats of overwhelming conventional attack that have almost always opted to develop nuclear forces that are flexible enough to be used in limited ways. It shows that nuclear-armed countries that face dire prospects in conventional war are the same ones that tend to develop nuclear postures tailored to coercive nuclear escalation.