Escaping Stalemate

Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press

This chapter analyzes the durability of stalemate. It investigates whether the situation can be reversed once countries reach the point where neither can disarm the other. For geopolitical competition to be greatly mitigated, the path to stalemate must be a one-way street. If the opposite were true, then even the achievement of stalemate would not eliminate competitive dynamics. The chapter shows that the survivability of nuclear arsenals has varied over time. During the later decades of the Cold War, it seemed that the superpowers were permanently locked into stalemate. It talks about “counterforce” attacks that are aimed at disarming the enemy's nuclear forces and appeared impossible because the superpower arsenals were enormous and dispersed, and some weapons seemed impossible to find.

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 23-44
Author(s):  
Adam Potočňák

The article holistically analyses current strategies for the use and development of nuclear forces of the USA and Russia and analytically reflects their mutual doctrinal interactions. It deals with the conditions under which the U.S. and Russia may opt for using their nuclear weapons and reflects also related issues of modernization and development of their actual nuclear forces. The author argues that both superpowers did not manage to abandon the Cold War logic or avoid erroneous, distorted or exaggerated assumptions about the intentions of the other side. The text concludes with a summary of possible changes and adaptations of the American nuclear strategy under the Biden administration as part of the assumed strategy update expected for 2022.


2021 ◽  
pp. 193-234
Author(s):  
Sebastian Rosato

This chapter examines U.S.-Soviet relations at the end of the Cold War (1985-90). The bulk of the chapter draws on the primary and secondary historical record to evaluate how American and Soviet decision makers viewed each other’s intentions, focusing on the Soviet Union’s early unilateral arms control initiatives; Moscow’s efforts to forge a “grand compromise”; the negotiation and aftermath of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; and Moscow’s retrenchment, including its withdrawal from Afghanistan and announcement that it would make significant cuts to its conventional forces in Europe. Were they confident that their counterparts had benign intentions—that is, did they trust each other—as asserted by intentions optimists? Or were they uncertain about each other’s intentions, which is to say that they mistrusted each other, as suggested by intentions pessimism? Having shown that Washington and Moscow were acutely uncertain about each other’s intentions in each case, the chapter then describes the resulting U.S.-Soviet security competition. Finally, the chapter examines the last two years of the Cold War and demonstrates that although neither side came close to trusting the other, only the United States continued to compete for security, because the Soviet Union could not afford to sustain the effort.


Author(s):  
Dirk Berg-Schlosser

Area studies have undergone significant changes over the last two decades. They have been transformed from mostly descriptive accounts in the international context of the Cold War to theory-oriented and methodological analytical approaches. More recent comparative methods such as “Qualitative Comparative Analysis” (QCA) and related approaches, which are particularly suitable for medium N studies, have significantly contributed to this development. This essay discusses the epistemological background of this approach as well as recent developments. It provides two examples of current “cross area studies,” one concerned with successful democratic transformations across four regions (Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and East Asia), the other with political participation in marginalized settlements in four countries (Brazil, Chile, Ivory Coast, Kenya) in a multilevel analysis. The conclusion points to the theoretical promises of this approach and its practical-political relevance.


Author(s):  
Jenny Andersson

Alvin Toffler’s writings encapsulated many of the tensions of futurism: the way that futurology and futures studies oscillated between forms of utopianism and technocracy with global ambitions, and between new forms of activism, on the one hand, and emerging forms of consultancy and paid advice on the other. Paradoxically, in their desire to create new images of the future capable of providing exits from the status quo of the Cold War world, futurists reinvented the technologies of prediction that they had initially rejected, and put them at the basis of a new activity of futures advice. Consultancy was central to the field of futures studies from its inception. For futurists, consultancy was a form of militancy—a potentially world altering expertise that could bypass politics and also escaped the boring halls of academia.


Author(s):  
Andrej Krickovic

Over the last four decades, Russia has been at the very center of peaceful change in international relations. Gorbachev’s conciliatory New Thinking (NT) fundamentally transformed international relations, ending the Cold War struggle and dismantling the Soviet empire and world communist movement. Contemporary Russia is at the forefront of the transition away from American unipolarity and toward what is believed will be a more equitable and just multipolar order. Over time, Russia has moved away from the idealism that characterized Gorbachev’s NT and toward a more hard-nosed and confrontational approach toward peaceful change. The chapter traces this evolution with a particular emphasis on the role that Russia’s unmet expectations of reciprocity and elevated status have played in the process. If they are to be successful, future efforts at peaceful change will have to find ways to address these issues of reciprocity and status, especially under circumstances where there are power asymmetries between the side making concessions and the side receiving them. Nevertheless, despite its disappointments, Russia’s approach to change remains (largely) peaceful. Elements of NT, including its emphasis on interdependence, collective/mutual security, and faith in the possibility of positive transformation, continue to be present in modern Russian foreign policy thinking.


Slavic Review ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 566-590
Author(s):  
Patryk Babiracki

Engaging with regional, international, and spatial histories, this article proposes a new reading of the twentieth-century Polish past by exploring the vicissitudes of a building known as the Upper Silesia Tower. Renowned German architect Hans Poelzig designed the Tower for the 1911 Ostdeutsche Ausstellung in Posen, an ethnically Polish city under Prussian rule. After Poland regained its independence following World War I, the pavilion, standing centrally on the grounds of Poznań’s International Trade Fair, became the fair's symbol, and over time, also evolved into visual shorthand for the city itself. I argue that the Tower's significance extends beyond Posen/Poznań, however. As an embodiment of the conflicts and contradictions of Polish-German historical entanglements, the building, in its changing forms, also concretized various efforts to redefine the dominant Polish national identity away from Romantic ideals toward values such as order, industriousness, and hard work. I also suggest that eventually, as a material structure harnessed into the service of socialism, the Tower, with its complicated past, also brings into relief questions about the regional dimensions of the clashes over the meaning of modernity during the Cold War.


2020 ◽  
Vol 145 (2) ◽  
pp. 495-505
Author(s):  
EIRINI DIAMANTOULI

Ideologically motivated attempts to elucidate Shostakovich’s political views and to determine whether and how they may be coded into his compositions have come to characterize the Western reception of the composer’s works since his death in 1975. Fuelled by the political oppositions of the cold war, Shostakovich’s posthumous reputation in the West has been largely shaped by two conflicting perspectives. These have positioned him on the one hand as a secret dissident, bent and broken under the unbearable strain of totalitarianism, made heroic through his veiled musical resistance to Communism; and on the other hand as a composer compromised by his capitulation to the regime – represented in an anachronistic musical style. Both perspectives surrender Shostakovich and his music to a crude oversimplification driven by vested political interests. Western listeners thus conditioned are primed to hear either the coded dissidence of a tragic victim of Communist brutality or the sinister submission of a ‘loyal son of the Communist Party’.1 For those prepared to accept Shostakovich as a ‘tragic victim’, the publication of his purported memoirs in 1979, ‘as related to and edited by’ the author Solomon Volkov, presents a tantalizing conclusion: bitterly yet discreetly scornful of the Stalinist regime, Shostakovich was indeed a secret dissident and this dissidence was made tangible in his music.


2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 36-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erwin A. Schmidl

Geographically, Austria's position during the Cold War differed significantly from that of Switzerland or Sweden, let alone Ireland. Austria, like Finland, was situated along the Iron Curtain. In 1945, Austria was divided between East and West, and the Soviet Union hoped that the Austrian Communists could quickly gain power by largely democratic means. This effort failed, however, when the Communists lost decisively in the November 1945 elections. Over the next decade, Austria remained under Soviet and Western military occupation. The formal adoption of a neutral status for Austria in May 1955, when the Austrian State Treaty was signed, was a compromise needed to ensure the departure of Soviet forces from Austria. Although some other orientation might have been preferred, neutrality over time became firmly engrained in Austria's collective identity.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-95
Author(s):  
Christian Nuenlist ◽  
Anna Locher ◽  
Garret Martin

Four distinguished analysts of French foreign policy under Charles de Gaulle provide in-depth assessments of the new book edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin, Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969, published by Lexington Books. The commentators praise the book's wide scope and many of its essays and broad themes, but they raise questions about Garret Martin's contention (shared by a few, though not all, of the other contributors to the volume) that de Gaulle had a coherent if ultimately unsuccessful strategy to overcome the Cold War and move toward the unification of Germany and Europe. In article-length commentaries, both Andrew Moravcsik and Marc Trachtenberg take issue with Martin's view, arguing that de Gaulle's foreign policy involved more bluff and bluster than any genuine attempt to bring about the reunification of Germany or to end the Cold War. Moravcsik also provides a spirited defense of the “revisionist” conception of de Gaulle's policy toward Europe, which sees the general as having been guided mostly by his domestic economic and political interests—a conception that Trachtenberg has also come to accept. The forum ends with a reply by Nuenlist, Locher, and Martin to the four commentaries.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document