An Agent-Based Model for Tertiary Educational Choices in Italy

Although the low level of tuition fees and the absence of other access barriers, Italy is characterized by low educational attainments at the university level. This work models the choice of young Italians to attend university or leave education and enter the labor market, by making use of an agent-based model that reproduces the Italian higher education and policy system. The aim is to analyze the determinants behind university enrollment decisions possibly causing the low level of attainment and explore three alternative scenarios that propose the expansion of financial support and the increase in the average income gap between skilled and unskilled individuals. The model implies that the individual preference to enroll at university depends upon (i) economic motivations, represented by the expectations on future income, which are formed through interaction within individuals’ social network; (ii) influence from peers; (iii) effort of obtaining a university degree. Results show that the model can reproduce observable features of the Italian system, and highlights low income levels and the following full resort to regional scholarships. Experimented scenarios show that policies expanding financial support to education are ineffective, while an increase in the gap between average income of skilled and unskilled workers leads to an increase in enrollment in university, signaling that labor market policies may be more effective than educational policies in raising the number of students in higher education.

Would you Bribe your Lecturer? A Quasi-experimental Study on Burnout and Bribery in Higher Education

Bribery is a complex and critical issue in higher education (HE), causing severe economic and societal harm. Traditionally, most scholarship on HE corruption has focused on institutional factors in developing countries and insights into the psychological and motivational factors that drive HE bribery on the micro-level mechanisms are virtually non-existent. To close this research gap, this study investigates the connection between study-related burnout and university students’ willingness to offer bribes to their lecturers to pass important exams. Conducting a vignette-based quasi-experimental replication study with 624 university students in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands we find that university students in three countries differentiate sharply between different shades of bribery and that a majority accept using emotional influence tactics to pass (failed) exams. In contrast, offering a helping hand or money (i.e., darker shades of bribery) to their lecturer was less acceptable. Study-related burnout is associated with a higher likelihood of engaging in these darker shades of bribery and students’ commitment to the public interest is but a weak factor in preventing unethical behavior. In summary, this study provides solid empirical evidence that university students are likely to use emotional influence tactics violating both the ethical codes of conduct and the formalized bureaucratic procedures of HE examination, particularly if they suffer from study-related burnout. However, the accelerating effect of burnout on bribery is conditional in that it only holds for darker shades of bribery. HE institutions may benefit from implementing the four-eye principle and from launching awareness campaigns that enable lecturers to better recognize these tactics and engage students in creating a transparent environment for testing, grading, and collaboration that is resistant to bribery.