The hiatus of history

When Henry Luce famously called the twentieth century the "American Century," he strongly implied that it was the "first" American century (i.e., not the only one). Subsequent commentators have misunderstood Luce because they have failed to identify the relevant "width of a time point" for world-historical analysis. World-historical trends unfold over centuries, not decades. Demographic change is also slow but sure. China's low fertility rate means that China's population will soon by declining. By 2100 China may have roughly the same population as the Anglo-Saxon core of the American Tianxia. Francis Fukuyama's famous "end of history" is thus much more stable than he has subsequently maintained. The American Tianxia is the universal homogeneous state that Fukuyama once claimed was to be found at the end of history. The Pax Americana of the American Tianxia is very stable because it is based on personal incentives, not interstate relations. It constitutes a new, postmodern world-system, the millennial world-system, that is likely to last for several centuries.

One master, one sovereign

Contrary to declinist narratives, the dominance of the United States in the contemporary world-system is increasingly solid and stable. The US economy remains vibrant, but the US benefits also from the desire of people to participate in the global economic system that has the United States at its core. The fact that the American Tianxia acts on an individual basis at least as much as on an international one massively privileges US individuals, organizations, and institutions. Others pay this price due to the network externalities gained from membership in the system. These flows counteract political entropy -- the tendency of imperial political systems to disintegrate. The American Tianxia thus does not fit the "new medievalism" model of international relations; as Vladimir Putin protests, it is a unipolar system with "one master, one sovereign." Advocates of a return to multipolarity (including Vladimir Putin) point to the rise of China as their main hope, but forecasts of China's continuing economic rise are vastly oversold.

Right concept, wrong country

For most of its history, China was at the center of an East Asian interstate system, the Chinese tianxia. The Chinese word for China, Zhongguo, even means "central state" (or "middle kingdom"). By contrast, the modern interstate system is usually understood as an anarchic system of competing states. In reality, the 21st century interstate system is a central state system like the Ming Dynasty Chinese tianxia, but centered on the United States, not on China. The American-centered system began to form much earlier than is usually understood, and was clearly described by many intellectuals in the aftermath of World War One. It is now in its prime, not its decline. Like the historical Chinese tianxia, the current American Tianxia is strongly hierarchical, but unlike the Chinese tianxia, it is not relational. This calls into question the key conceit of Westphalian sovereignty, the sovereign equality of states. But it is also responsible for the relatively peaceful conduct of international relations under the American Tianxia.

One belt, one road to nowhere

China faces many hostile neighbours; relations with Japan are particularly fraught. China has thus sought friends farther afield, abandoning the Deng-Hu "keeping a low profile" (KLP) strategy for Xi Jinpeng's expansive "striving for achievement" (SFA) strategy. The centerpiece of SFA is the One Belt, One Road (1B1R) initiative. China's Silk Road Economic Belt is often said to have sparked a new "Great Game" for influence in Central Asia, but Central Asian economies are much too small to have any substantive impact on Eurasian geopolitics. China's 21st Century Maritime Silk Road to Southeast Asia and beyond has been influential only in Africa, where it has little impact on global power structures. Like the fifteenth century voyages of Zheng He, the ultimate purpose of 1B1R may be to legitimate the Chinese government's rule at home. Even in this it is failing, as elite Chinese seek citizenships abroad. Birth tourism to the United States has emerged as their most important family exit strategy.