Kingly Intertwinement

Chapter 12 discusses final section of the Statesman (308b10-311c10), where Plato applies the paradigm of weaving to elucidate the statesman’s task. This chapter examines in detail what this ‘royal intertwining’ consists in. Plato distinguishes carefully between the tasks assigned to education and those assigned to statesmanship: although these tasks are so tightly connected as to make education an art even more precious than the precious arts of rhetoric, strategy, and the judiciary, they differ nonetheless in nature and scope. In addition to supervising education and the precious subordinate arts, statesmanship is crucially involved in choosing the officeholders involved in these forms of expertise. ‘The intertwining that belongs to kingship’ (Plt. 306a1: basilikē sumplokē), which the Visitor seeks to unravel in the concluding pages of the dialogue, amounts to giving prescriptions to these officeholders with the aim of maintaining concord and friendship between the two antagonistic character types in the city.

Ruling With (and Without) Laws

Chapter 9 discusses Statesman 297b5-303d3, where Plato appears to be both a legalist (ranking law based constitutions above lawless ones) and an anti-legalist (ranking the rule by a single expert individual above even law-based constitutions). While these statements can be reconciled, a deeper interpretative problem concerns Plato’s views about laws that are formulated in the absence of an expert ruler. Does he find value in such a legal order, or does the worth of a legal order depend on the expertise of its legislator? Is law valuable on the basis of its efficiency or morality or something else? Or is law valuable, simply by the fact that it provides order and regularity? This chapter argues that, for Plato, the value of law is based on expertise, but does not require the presence of a fully knowledgeable lawgiver.

Statecraft as a Ruling, Caring, and Weaving dunamis

Chapter 10 focusses on Statesman 303d4-305e7 and considers the Visitor’s seemingly three definitions of statecraft in the dialogue: 305c10-d5, 305e2-6, and 311b7-c7. By focusing on the role of the dunamis of given forms of expertise, and the metaphorical method of smelting metals at work in this section of the dialogue, it argues that a definition of statecraft (hē politikē) as ruling, caring, and weaving is reached in 305e2-6 and then fleshed out in 311b7-c7 by the explication of the ergon (task) which it is the role of that dunamis to accomplish. This is broadly consonant with a passage in Republic 5 identifying any given dunamis in terms of that over which it is set and what it accomplishes (apergazetai), a schema filled out in the Statesman by explicit reference to the ergon of a dunamis (305c4-5). Political expertise is not a passive body of knowledge but rather actively and precisely organized toward the realization of its distinctive task.

An Overview of This Volume

Gavin Lawrence (Chapter 2) opens the volume’s explorations by considering the dialogue’s overall ‘non-elenchtic method’, including collection and division but also the central roles of paradigm (paradeigma, translated also in this volume as ‘model’) and in particular of weaving as model of not only politics but also method and ontology, the latter a role that it plays in other related Platonic dialogues. Lawrence surveys the early divisions (257a1-259d6, ...

The Myth and What it Achieves

Chapter 4 discusses Statesman 268d5-277c6: why the myth does not fully deliver what it was expected to deliver, and what it achieves instead; in addition, focusing on the notion of kinship (sungeneia), the chapter also suggests how the myth could contribute to the statesman’s efforts to create the fabric of society. The first part of the chapter considers why the Eleatic Visitor in the Statesman switches from dialectic to telling a myth, what he expects from the myth, and why he feels that the myth only partially delivered what he expected. Even the negative results lead to important lessons: a myth cannot be directly subservient to dialectic, and telling good myths requires a distinct skill set. The second part of the chapter shows how the cosmological myth prepares the ground for the central positive outcome of the dialogue. In painting a vivid image of the human condition in the present cosmic age, the myth shows the natural kinship linking all humans, and emphasizes the importance of family ties and of cooperation. It could therefore be used for educational purposes by the true statesman who is tasked with creating the fabric of society by forging and fostering the bonds between citizens.

Learning from Models

Chapter 5 examines Plato’s account of the method of learning by paradeigma (‘model’) in the Statesman (277c7-283a9). It first explains what the method is and then considers the two parties who are described as using it: children who are learning to read and write and the dialogue’s two interlocutors. It highlights some parallels between each party’s use of the method. These parallels illuminate important features of dialectical inquiry in general and the Visitor and Young Socrates’ inquiry in particular, including the nature of the knowledge they ultimately hope to achieve, and one stage in the complex process by which they aim to achieve it.

Introduction

The Introduction is in three parts: a discussion of ‘politikos’ by Panos Dimas; an outline of the structure and methods in the Statesman by Susan Sauvé Meyer; and an overview of the volume by Melissa Lane. The first part addresses the meaning of the term ‘politikos’ that serves as the dialogue’s title, and the Eleatic Visitor’s claim that each part of the sprawling conversation is necessary for its dialectical purposes. It is argued that the expert politikos of the present dialogue is the philosopher-king of the Republic. It is contended that there is insufficient evidence for dating the Statesman in relation to the Sophist and Theaetetus, and good reason to be sceptical that Plato planned to write a further dialogue, Philosophos. The second part surveys the structure of the dialogue and the range of methods (dialectic, division, myth, paradeigma) it deploys. It is argued that the recurring task of distinguishing the politikos from rival claimants to that title does not count as a ‘division’ in the technical sense. The third part gives an overview of the arguments in the individual chapters.

Structure and Methods of the Dialogue

Plato’s dialogue interweaves substantive inquiry into the nature of the statesman with sustained reflection on the range of methods to be employed in such an inquiry, and periodic assessment of the interlocutors’ proficiency at those methods. The inquiry as a whole belongs to the discipline of ‘dialectic’, whose goal is to ‘display things in a formula’ – (...

Above the Law and Out for Justice

Chapter 8 focusses on Statesman 291a1-297b4 and argues that, according to the Eleatic Visitor, the single criterion for right rule (orthē archē) is the wisdom or expertise of the statesman; thus it is entirely irrelevant to right rule whether the statesman rules without laws and by force. But he also says that judges and orators possess arts that are ‘precious and related to statecraft’ (303e9-10), suggesting that law and consent will be essential to the statesman’s governance. The solution to this puzzle hangs on an elaboration of the content and teleological structure of statecraft. This expertise aims at and achieves what is beneficial (most just) to the city, and it is for the statesman to decide when laws and consent are actually beneficial. Since laws and consent are tools that typically facilitate the goals of statecraft, they are ‘marks’ of right rule, even though neither is a criterion of right rule.

Plato on Normative Measurement

Chapter 6 addresses how the passage Statesman 283b1-287b3 centres on the Eleatic Visitor’s argument for the existence of normative measure: a kind of measure which is ‘due’ or ‘right’, and not reducible to the merely comparative kind. Normative measure is what the arts [technai] strive to instantiate, so that the existence of the arts is impossible without it. In the form of the kairos, the ‘right moment’, it is crucial to the art of the statesman in particular. The passage thus belongs to a constellation of Platonic texts in which the ideas of measure and craft are closely connected with each other, and central to his thinking about objectivity, rationality, and right action; these are also part of his engagement with sophistic thought, and Protagoras in particular.