Philosophy and Proclamation

This chapter considers the issue of religious proclamation. It is claimed that we must be able to understand any such proclamation through relating it to our experience of our own lives, otherwise it would be an obscure superstition. It is argued that Kierkegaard and Heidegger sought for this understanding in relation to existence, and offered four tests for a proclamation: does it leave the individual at the mercy of the crowd or not? Does it enable them to remain true to their existence as becoming and possibility or not? Does it offer an absolute certainty or instead leave room for the individual to assume their own responsibility? And does it subordinate existence to thought? It is argued on this basis that a proclamation cannot become identified with a social ideology, so that it is a mistake to use the Christian proclamation as the basis for a political and ethical position.

On Kierkegaard’s Account of the Doubling of the Relations of Spirit

This chapter begins with a discussion of Kierkegaard’s account of the self in The Sickness unto Death. It is argued that for Kierkegaard, because we experience a demand, we must understand the self as a synthesis of infinity and finitude, and that through relating to this demand the human existence as openness and possibility (becoming and movement) is constituted. This synthesis however places the self in a contradictory position, which it tries to forget either by sinking into the finitude of life in the crowd, or abstracting away into the infinitude of Hegelian speculation. As well as trying to escape a fundamental tension which cannot in fact be resolved, both these options drain away the passion that comes from engaging with this tension, and thus come at a significant loss to the human spirit.

The Absolute Demand of Concrete Existence

This chapter critiques Kierkegaard’s conception of the infinite demand. Kierkegaard’s demand remains abstract because he tries to derive content from form: namely, to derive its content from the fact that it is infinite, where this means that its aim is for the finite individual to know that they are nothing before God. But it is then impossible to treat this infinite demand as connecting to our relation with other people, and each involves radically different conceptions of guilt and responsibility. To avoid this problem, it is argued that we should think in terms of an ethical demand which remains between individuals, but which is also distinct from the social norms, as the person on whom the demand falls is ‘isolated’ and so must take individual responsibility for their response to the other, rather than merely following social norms and thereby being confined to life in the crowd.

On Kierkegaard’s Account of the Problem of Taking over Concrete Existence

This chapter considers the question of how the desire to be an authentic individual can be realized in concrete existence. It is argued that Heidegger does not really deal with this issue, but that it is central to Kierkegaard. For Kierkegaard, to achieve this the individual must decide to act not in the light of the finite and temporal, but of the infinite and eternal which is the ground of their existence, which is thus to act in the light of an infinite demand which comes from God, and to realize that before God the individual is nothing. It is argued, however, that this leaves the individual with insufficient grounds for action in the finite world, as illustrated in Kierkegaard’s treatment of the ‘edifying diversion’ of a trip to the Deer Park which is discussed in Concluding Unscientific Postscript.

Kierkegaard and Heidegger on ‘Life in the Crowd’

This chapter considers a fundamental problem which is central to Søren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger, namely how to avoid living a life that is governed by others and so is inauthentic, trapped within the hum-drum and the mundane—a life in the crowd. Focusing first on Kierkegaard, and his critique of ‘busyness’, it then turns to Heidegger, and his account of ‘idle talk’. However, it is argued that Kierkegaard’s approach differs from Heidegger’s in being fuelled by an ethical passion, which is partly driven by his hostility to Hegelianism, and also to contemporary Danish Christendom. Moreover, while on Heidegger’s account, life in the crowd is made an inevitable and therefore neutral feature of human existence, for Kierkegaard it can be avoided. How this might be possible for Kierkegaard is considered in subsequent chapters.

Thinking and Existence

This chapter considers the relation between thought and existence as it arises in the context of Kierkegaard’s work. It is argued that Kierkegaard saw a clear contrast between the two, which he formulated in various ways: as the contrast between the universal and the particular; between disinterestedness and interest; and atemporality and temporality. At the same time, Kierkegaard was not suggesting that thinking simply be abandoned when it comes to existence, as this is itself to think in too abstract a way. On the contrary, thinking must acknowledge and learn to live with an irresolvable tension here, which will precisely give rise to the kind of movement and becoming which is essential to the analysis of existence offered by Kierkegaard, and which must be made fundamental to a truly philosophical conception of thinking, which no longer seeks to impose itself on existence, but to remain open to it.

Kierkegaard and Heidegger on the Concept of Guilt

This chapter considers the role of guilt in the thought of Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Kierkegaard contrasts the quantitative and external guilt which belongs to life in the crowd with the guilt that attaches to the infinite demand, which is qualitative and internal, and thus falls under the category of ‘totality’. This means, however, that guilt feeds of itself, as one comes to feel guilty for feeling guilty. Like Kierkegaard, Heidegger does not just consider guilt in relation to ordinary ethical and judicial norms, but also in relation to one’s existence, but this means that for Heidegger it becomes ontological, as we feel guilty even for existing. Thus, both Kierkegaard and Heidegger draw similar distinctions between forms of guilt, and make guilt in its fundamental form inescapable, but while Heidegger gives this a purely ontological basis, for Kierkegaard it takes an ethical form in relation to an infinite demand.

The Relation between Heidegger’s and Kierkegaard’s Analyses of Existence

This chapter considers how Heidegger’s account of existence relates to his conception of life in the crowd, and how it compares to Kierkegaard’s position. It is argued that while they share broadly the same view of the self as involving becoming and movement, whereas for Kierkegaard this can be traced back to its relation to the infinite demand, for Heidegger it can be traced back to ‘care’ or ‘Sorge’, through which the individual takes on responsibility for themselves in a way that can never be finished or concluded. The chapter also contrasts the role that the infinite plays in Kierkegaard’s account with the role that death plays in Heidegger’s, which then leads to differences in their respective treatments of anxiety and nothingness.