Consideration of approaches to forming a team when preparing students to participate in competitive events

The competitiveness of a modern university graduate is determined by his professional knowledge and skills, personal qualities, as well as the ability to make decisions, plan and organize work, and fulfill his role in team activities. Formation of the student’s ability to fulfill his role in a team is a general requirement for the training of a specialist in any field. The process of preparing university students for competitive events has great potential for the development of teamwork competencies. The aim of the study was to consider the specifics of preparing students for competitive events in the aspect of the approach of uniting students into teams. The peculiarities of preparing students for competitive programming in case of role-based and interpersonal methods of team formation were considered. The study used methods of observation, interviewing and questioning. The results of the study showed that the rolebased approach is more conducive to the development of student independence, the ability to make decisions, be responsible for the consequences of decisions, while the interpersonal approach allows to create conditions for the formation of team members’ ability to respond flexibly to changing circumstances. Thus, we can conclude about the various didactic possibilities of using role-based and interpersonal approaches to team building, about the need to use different methods for determining the composition of team members to solve educational problems in the learning process.

3. Enforceability of promises: consideration and promissory estoppel

Course-focused and comprehensive, Poole’s Textbook on Contract Law provides an accessible overview of the key areas on the law curriculum. Under English law, bargains and not gratuitous promises are enforced, thus a promise will not be enforceable if it is not contained in a deed (implying that any promise is taken seriously) or supported by consideration. Consideration refers to an act or a promise given in exchange for the promise (that is, the price for which the other’s promise was bought). The law does not recognize some acts or promises as good consideration, such as past consideration and performance of an existing legal duty. This chapter examines the general requirement in English law to provide consideration in order to enforce a contractual promise. The consideration requirement is relevant not only to the formation of a contract but also to the enforceability of promises altering the terms of an existing contract (alterations). An alteration promise that is not supported by consideration may still have some binding effect on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

Zwischen Infektionsschutz und Schutz des Erblasserwillens: Das sogenannte testamentum tempore pestis conditum in C.6,23,8 (290)

Protecting the testator’s last will in times of a contagious disease: The so-called testamentum tempore pestis conditum in C. 6,23,8 (290). This paper revisits C. 6,23,8, a constitution by emperor Diocletian from 290 CE on the subject of alleviated testamentary formalities in times of a contagious disease. It is argued that the imperial rescript is to be understood against the background of an epidemic raging at that time, maybe to be identified as the smallpocks. With this constitution, it is further argued, the emperor clarifies that a former piece of legislation, not passed down to us, exempts the testamentary witnesses in such times from assembling as a group with the person of the testator, while there is no exemption from the general requirement of calling in the accustomed number of witnesses. Thus, the emperor takes account of the testator’s need to stipulate his last will in times of crisis while at the same time having an eye to the witnesses’ fear of contagion.

From Values to Design Requirements

In this paper, we aim to highlight important challenges that are integral to any design process that purports to be essentially value-driven or value-geared. For value-driven design processes specifically, we formulate a guidance requirement that serves as a general requirement for any value-driven design. Furthermore, we sketch a preliminary structure for a value-driven design process consisting of an upstream and a downstream movement that translates values into design requirements. We argue that the two movements form a design loop and that it is through the iterations of this loop that we make a design process that satisfies the guidance requirement.

Certainty and Uncertainty in Tax Law: Do Opposites Attract?

The principle of certainty of taxation is the dimension of a general requirement of certainty in the legal system. The purpose of this article is to argue the thesis that uncertainty in tax law is not always an absolute evil, sometimes it acts as a means of the most optimal (and in some cases the only possible) settlement of relations in the field of taxes. On the contrary, uncertainty and fragmentation in tax law are colossal problems subject to overcome by the efforts of scientists, legislators, judges, and practicing lawyers. Uncertainty in tax law is manifested in two ways: on the one hand, negatively—as a defect (omission) of the legislator and, on the other hand, positively—as a set of specific legal means and technologies that are purposefully used in lawmaking and law enforcement. In this context, relatively determined legal tools are an effective channel for transition from uncertainty to certainty in the field of taxation. A tendency towards increased use of relatively determined legal tools in lawmaking processes (for example, principles, evaluative concepts, judicial doctrines, standards of good faith and reasonableness, discretion, open-ended lists, recommendations, framework laws, silence of the law, presumptive taxation, analogy, etc.), and involving various actors (courts, law enforcement agencies and officials, international organizations, citizens, organizations and their associations) allow making tax laws more dynamic flexible, and adequate to changing realities of everyday life.

Legal issues in end-of-life care 2: consent and decision-making

Paramedics are legally and professionally obliged to uphold their patients' right to dignity, respect and autonomy—and this includes the general requirement to obtain their consent before proceeding with any intervention. The first instalment of this two-part article considered the challenges that this might present to the paramedic. This second article develops this theme and further explores the legal framework underpinning the decision-making process when caring for a patient approaching the end of life. It also examines issues around consent and mental capacity in more depth and addresses matters such as such as advance decisions to refuse treatment (ADRT) and do not attempt cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (DNACPR) decisions.

The Inner Resting Point and the Common Cause of Animal Motion

This contribution comments on Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium 1 (MA 1). In this chapter Aristotle gives a general introduction to the treatise, posing the question of what the common cause or explanation of animal self-movement consists in. For the first time he formulates a general requirement for all kinds of movement, namely movement presupposes something that is unmoved. Afterwards, he points out that within animals the joints serve as inner resting points and that they are required in order to facilitate the animal’s self-movement. The author argues that the structure of joints or something he calls ‘the joint model’ is significant for the understanding of some of the treatise’s key tenets.

General Requirements for Secret Investigative (Search) Actions: Procedural Characteristics

A comprehensive study of the provisions of the Criminal Procedural Code of Ukraine, which regulate the general requirements for secret investigative (search) actions, has been carried out. A comparative analysis of the legislative provisions on the issue has been carried out, which made it possible to distinguish seven groups of general requirements for the implementation of secret investigative (search) actions. The first general requirement of secret investigative (search) actions includes restrictions on their use in criminal proceedings, as they are carried out only in cases where information about the criminal offense and the person who committed it, cannot be obtained in any other way. The second general requirement for conducting secret investigative (search) actions includes restrictions on their use in criminal proceedings, in particular the fact that they are conducted exclusively in criminal proceedings for grave or especially grave offenses. The third general requirement for conducting secret investigative (search) actions is that the legal basis for their implementation is a lawful, reasoned and motivated decision of the investigating judge, issued at the request of the prosecutor or investigator, agreed with the prosecutor. The fourth general requirement for conducting secret investigative (search) actions is that the investigating judge of the appellate court has the right to make the decision to implement them, where the pre-trial investigation agency is within the territorial jurisdiction of that judge. The fifth general requirement includes rules concerning the content of the application for a permit to conduct secret investigative (search) action, the procedure for its consideration by the investigating judge and the content of the decision of the investigating judge. The sixth general requirement for conducting secret investigative (search) actions includes rules that set deadlines for their implementation. The seventh general requirement for conducting secret investigative (search) action includes the rule that the investigator, the interrogator conducting the pre-trial investigation, or, on his behalf or on behalf of the prosecutor, authorized operative units have the right to conduct secret investigative (search) actions.

Ethical Deception? Responding to Parallel Subjectivities in People Living with Dementia

Many caregivers feel that they need to lie or withhold the truth from people living with dementia, but worry that, in doing so, they are violating a duty to tell the truth. In this article, I argue that withholding the truth from and, in limited circumstances, lying to people living with dementia is not only morally permissible, but morally required by a more general requirement that we treat each other as persons worthy of respect. I do so through an analysis of the groundings of the duty to tell the truth, and a critical reflection on its cognitively ableist construction.

What should adult children do for their parents?

Adult children’s particular obligations to their parents are filial obligations. The gratitude of filial obligations that treats one’s filial obligations as duties of gratitude to one’s parents is a mainstream view. However, in terms of the requirements of such obligations, the gratitude account fails to provide practical guidance. The general requirement seems that children should benefit their parents as the beneficiary should benefit the benefactor. The question is what kinds of benefits adult children should provide to their parents? In some cases, adult children feel obligated to provide particular benefits to their parents like paying their medical bills or spending time with them. While in some other cases, it seems that they can use their own discretion to decide how to satisfy the filial obligations so long as what they do benefits their parents. In this article, I am trying to argue that although the general requirement of the filial obligations is to benefit the parents, there are two kinds of benefits that adult children are strongly obligated to provide. These are special goods that parents can only get from their children and things that meet their parents’ basic needs. In addition, although adult children have filial obligations to benefit their parents, there should be some limitations on the requirements of filial obligation. Namely, adult children do not have a filial obligation to meet their parents’ desires that could only be satisfied at the cost of adult children’s liberty related to significant aspects of their lives, or to meet their parents’ desires that could only be satisfied at the cost of infringing their capacity to fulfil other important duties.