The Role of Thought in Animal Voluntary Self-Locomotion
This contribution comments on Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium 7 (MA 7), in particular on the difficult passages that introduce the so-called ‘practical syllogism’; at this particular point of the treatise the practical syllogism is used as part of the answer to the question of why it is that an agent, by thinking, sometimes acts but sometimes does not act. The author argues that, according to the account given in MA 7, thought plays a twofold role in the initiation of action; it is an animal’s thought that connects its desire to an end, and that connects that end to a particular, here and now: i.e. to this action for it to do in furtherance of that end. Even if the immediate psychological cause of action is desire, that desire itself is by the thought that recognizes this as an instance of what its general desire is for.