The Role of Thought in Animal Voluntary Self-Locomotion

Author(s):  
John M. Cooper

This contribution comments on Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium 7 (MA 7), in particular on the difficult passages that introduce the so-called ‘practical syllogism’; at this particular point of the treatise the practical syllogism is used as part of the answer to the question of why it is that an agent, by thinking, sometimes acts but sometimes does not act. The author argues that, according to the account given in MA 7, thought plays a twofold role in the initiation of action; it is an animal’s thought that connects its desire to an end, and that connects that end to a particular, here and now: i.e. to this action for it to do in furtherance of that end. Even if the immediate psychological cause of action is desire, that desire itself is by the thought that recognizes this as an instance of what its general desire is for.

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Kathleen Harbin

AbstractPrevailing interpretations of Aristotle’s use of syllogistic language outside the Organon hold that he offers a single, comprehensive theory of the practical syllogism spanning his ethical and biological works. These comprehensive theories of the practical syllogism are plausible neither philosophically nor as interpretations of Aristotle. I argue for a multivocal account of the practical syllogism that distinguishes (1) Aristotle’s use of syllogistic language to explain aspects of his account of animal motion in MA from (2) his use of syllogistic language to explain aspects of his account of the distinctive practical cognition of the phronimos in EN. I offer a novel account of the role of syllogistic language in ethics, arguing that it elucidates a nuanced account of universals and particulars in ethics according to which acting virtuously requires an understanding of underlying universal values and a capacity to relate them to concrete, particular features of our circumstances.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michail Pantoulias ◽  
Vasiliki Vergouli ◽  
Panagiotis Thanassas

Truth has always been a controversial subject in Aristotelian scholarship. In most cases, including some well-known passages in the Categories, De Interpretatione and Metaphysics, Aristotle uses the predicate ‘true’ for assertions, although exceptions are many and impossible to ignore. One of the most complicated cases is the concept of practical truth in the sixth book of Nicomachean Ethics: its entanglement with action and desire raises doubts about the possibility of its inclusion to the propositional model of truth. Nevertheless, in one of the most extensive studies on the subject, C. Olfert has tried to show that this is not only possible but also necessary. In this paper, we explain why trying to fit practical truth into the propositional model comes with insurmount­able problems. In order to overcome these problems, we focus on multiple aspects of practical syllogism and correlate them with Aristo­tle’s account of desire, happiness and the good. Identifying the role of such concepts in the specific steps of practical reasoning, we reach the conclusion that practical truth is best explained as the culmination of a well-executed practical syllogism taken as a whole, which ultimately explains why this type of syllogism demands a different approach and a different kind of truth than the theoretical one.


2020 ◽  
pp. 219-242
Author(s):  
Karen Ng

Chapter 6 explores the transition to “Objectivity,” continuing the investigation into the role of the Gattung as an objective universal. Hegel’s chapters on “Mechanism,” “Chemism,” and “Teleology,” establish the genus not only as an objective context of predication but also as the necessary context of objective existence, determining the degree to which self-determining activity can be realized. This chapter defends Hegel’s employment of the ontological proof and argues that the being or existence that can be inferred from the Concept is being as self-individuating activity. The processes of mechanism, chemism, and external purposiveness all fall short of self-determining activity, which is marked by descriptions of striving and violence. This chapter also discusses what Hegel calls “objective judgment,” and considers its relation to the practical syllogism. Hegel’s analysis reveals that there is an irreducible role for judgment as an act of self-determination and self-constitution, an activity that is immediately manifest in the activity of life.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asher Lawson ◽  
Hemant Kakkar

Sharing of misinformation can be catastrophic, especially during times of national importance. Typically studied in political contexts, sharing of fake news has been positively linked with conservative political ideology. However, such sweeping generalizations run the risk of increasing already rampant political polarization. We offer a more nuanced account by proposing that the sharing of fake news is largely driven by low conscientiousness conservatives. At high levels of conscientiousness there is no difference between liberals and conservatives. We find support for our hypotheses in the contexts of Covid-19 and political news across 7 studies (six pre-registered; one conceptual replication) with 4,149 participants and 84,556 unique participant-news observations. Furthermore, our findings suggest the inadequacy of fact-checker interventions to deter the spread of fake news, and that a general desire for chaos drives the interactive effect of political ideology and personality on the sharing of fake news. This underscores the challenges associated with tackling fake news, especially during a crisis like Covid-19 where misinformation threatens to exacerbate the pandemic even further.


2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Schreck ◽  
Dominik van Aaken ◽  
Thomas Donaldson

ABSTRACT:In response to criticism of empirical or “positive” approaches to corporate social responsibility (CSR), we defend the importance of these approaches for any CSR theory that seeks to have practical impact. Although we acknowledge limitations to positive approaches, we unpack the neglected but crucial relationships between positive knowledge on the one hand and normative knowledge on the other in the implementation of CSR principles. Using the structure of a practical syllogism, we construct a model that displays the key role of empirical knowledge in fulfilling a firm’s responsibility to society, paying special attention to the implications of the “ought implies can” dictum. We also defend the importance of one particular class of empirical claims; namely, claims from the field of economics. Even positive economic theory, which is often criticized for endorsing profits rather than values, can cooperate in intriguing ways with non-economic concepts in the implementation of CSR goals.


Author(s):  
Imge Oranli

In Nicomachean Ethics VII Aristotle describes akrasia as a disposition. Taking into account that it is a disposition, I argue that akrasia cannot be understood on an epistemological basis alone, i.e., it is not merely a problem of knowledge that the akratic person acts the ways he does, but rather one is akratic due to a certain kind of habituation, where the person is not able to activate the potential knowledge s/he possesses. To stress this point, I focus on the gap between potential knowledge and its activation, whereby I argue that the distinction between potential and actual knowledge is at the center of the problem of akrasia. I suggest that to elaborate on this gap, we must go beyond the limits of Nicomachean Ethics to Metaphysics IX, where we find Aristotle’s discussion of the distinction between potentiality and actuality. I further analyze the gap between potential and actual knowledge by means of Aristotle’s discussion of practical syllogism, where I argue that akrasia is a result of a conflict in practical reasoning. I conclude my paper by stressing that for the akratic person the action is determined with respect to the conclusion of the practical syllogism, where the conclusion is produced by means of a ‘conflict’ between the universal opinion which is potential and the particular opinion which is appetitive.


2019 ◽  
pp. 117-154
Author(s):  
John Schwenkler

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 33-43 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by presenting Anscombe’s argument that the premises in a practical syllogism, i.e. the considerations from which a person reasons in deciding what she will do, are not supposed to provide a proof of the conclusion that is drawn from them. Close attention is paid to the difference between Anscombe’s position and that of R.M. Hare, and several objections to her argument are considered. Following this, the chapter explores Anscombe’s Aristotelian account of practical reasoning as a way of calculating means to an end. The chapter also discusses the role of desire in practical reasoning, the thesis that desire for an object involves seeing it “under the aspect of some good”, and Anscombe’s argument that a practical syllogism represents a means–end order that is present in action itself.


JAMA ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 195 (12) ◽  
pp. 1005-1009 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. J. Fernbach
Keyword(s):  

JAMA ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 195 (3) ◽  
pp. 167-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. E. Van Metre

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