Demeanour, credibility and remorse in the criminal trial

This article, referring to South Africa as well as to selected other common law jurisdictions, proceeds from the premise that it is a well-accepted practice for judges to consider demeanour in assessing the credibility of a witness and in assessing whether the accused shows remorse when decisions regarding sentences are taken. However, the article also takes cognisance of the fact that there is a lack of generally agreed-upon objective methods for the identification of remorse. The article was prompted by recent health precautions regarding the mandatory use of face masks, in order to protect people and to contain the spread of the coronavirus, which provides an opportunity to review demeanour in general and perceptions concerning facial demeanour or facial expressions in the courtroom, in particular. The article explores the validity and reliability of findings on remorse and of making credibility assessments based on demeanour evidence. Part 1 of the article is an introduction. Part 2 of the article provides a brief overview of credibility and demeanour evidence in the courtroom. Part 3 of the article examines remorse and demeanour evidence in criminal trials. Part 4 of the article considers demeanour evidence as a ‘tricky horse to ride’. Part 5 of the article provides a discussion of empirical research studies in the field of social psychology relevant to the reliability of finding credibility and remorse on the basis of demeanour evidence. Part 6 briefly discusses COVID-19 face-covering regulations and demeanour evidence in the criminal trial. The article emphasises that although non-verbal cues could be valuable to judges, such evidence may be unreliable and that courts have cautioned against demeanour evidence being afforded undue importance. The article concludes that even when facial expressions are available to the court, it would be in the interests of justice to exercise great care concerning demeanour in general and facial expressions in particular as a guide to assessing credibility and the existence of remorse.

Understanding one’s rights when arrested and detained: An assessment of language barriers that affect comprehension

Difficult text formulations, on the one hand, as well as poor linguistic skills and comprehension on the other, can severely hamper the communication effort of basic human rights during the judicial process. The rights entrenched in s 35 of the Constitution of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996), as they apply to individuals who are arrested, detained and accused, and read out by a member of the local South African Police Service (SAPS), are written in a legal register that can be too difficult for additional language speakers to understand. This begs the question of whether arrested, detained and accused individuals are fully aware of their rights and whether they can exercise these rights if they do not understand the language that expresses them. This article appraises the potential comprehensibility of the notice of rights (SAPS 14A), as provided to arrested, detained and accused individuals by the SAPS. The researcher’s assessments indicate that the text is pitched at an English readability level suited to university graduates and could be too difficult for South Africans with limited schooling and linguistic abilities to comprehend. A revision of SAPS 14A is offered as an illustration of a possible improvement to increase readability and, subsequently, better access to the mentioned rights.

Rape: An unreasonable belief in consent should not be a defence

Section 3 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 defines rape in the following terms: ‘Any person (‘A’) who unlawfully and intentionally, commits an act of sexual penetration with a complainant (‘B’), without the consent of B, is guilty of the offence of rape.’ This paper focuses on one component of the definition, namely fault. It is argued that a mistaken but unreasonable belief in consent should not be recognised as a defence and that a normative approach could soften the focus on the behaviour of the complainant and send a clear signal that our commitment to constitutional values requires us to take due care in our interactions with others. The argument is made with full awareness that law reform is a very small cog in addressing the scourge of rape.

Comment: Telephonic entrapment

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Recent case: Criminal Procedure

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Recent case: Law of Evidence

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Sentenced by an algorithm — Bias and lack of accuracy in risk-assessment software in the United States criminal justice system

Developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning have caused governments to start outsourcing authority in performing public functions to machines. Indeed, algorithmic decision-making is becoming ubiquitous, from assigning credit scores to people, to identifying the best candidates for an employment position, to ranking applicants for admission to university. Apart from the broader social, ethical and legal considerations, controversies have arisen regarding the inaccuracy of AI systems and their bias against vulnerable populations. The growing use of automated risk-assessment software in criminal sentencing is a cause for both optimism and scepticism. While these tools could potentially increase sentencing accuracy and reduce the risk of human error and bias by providing evidence-based reasons in place of ‘ad-hoc’ decisions by human beings beset with cognitive and implicit biases, they also have the potential to reinforce and exacerbate existing biases, and to undermine certain of the basic constitutional guarantees embedded in the justice system. A 2016 decision in the United States, S v Loomis, exemplifies the threat that the unchecked and unrestrained outsourcing of public power to AI systems might undermine human rights and the rule of law.

Comment: Distinguishing between dolus directus and dolus eventualis: Ngobeni v The State (1041/2017) ZASCA 127 (27 September 2018)

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Comment: Wrongful arrest and detention

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Confronting past gross human rights violations in Ethiopia: Taking stock of the Reconciliation Commission

It is a trite fact that in the recent past decades, Ethiopia has been under a one-party dictatorship. The ruling political party encountered protracted civil protest and at times, an armed struggle. This has led to the overthrow of former party leaders and the dictatorship. The protracted protest against the party has led to change from within the ruling party. Thus, with the coming to power of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, there has been a widespread change in the political and legal landscape. Ethiopia has adopted various mechanisms including establishing a reconciliation commission as a means to reckon with legacies of a repressive past. This article takes stock of the major problematic areas of the Ethiopian Reconciliation Commission establishment law, Proclamation 1102/2018, with the aim to propose measures to be taken to rectify its blind spots.