Planning or Improvisation

This chapter assesses the role of planning in the design of governance strategies. Enthusiasm for large-scale planning—also known as overall, comprehensive, long-term, economic, or social planning—boomed and collapsed in twentieth century. At the start of that century, progressive reformers seized on planning as the remedy for the United States' social and economic woes. By the end of the twentieth century, enthusiasm for large-scale planning had collapsed. Plans could be made, but they were unlikely to be obeyed, and even if they were obeyed, they were unlikely to work as predicted. The chapter then explains that leaders should make plans while being realistic about the limits of planning. It is necessary to exercise foresight, set priorities, and design policies that seem likely to accomplish those priorities. Simply by doing this, leaders encourage coordination among individuals and businesses, through conversation about goals and tactics. Neither is imperfect knowledge a total barrier to planning. There is no “law” of unintended consequences: it is not inevitable that government actions will produce entirely unexpected results. The more appropriate stance is modesty about what is known and what can be achieved. Plans that launch big schemes on brittle assumptions are more likely to fail. Plans that proceed more tentatively, that allow room for testing, learning, and adjustment, are less likely to collapse in the face of unexpected results.

Tight or Loose Control

This chapter examines the second dilemma in the design of governance strategies, which relates to strictness of control. Leaders must choose whether to monitor and regulate behavior loosely or intensively. This is certainly true with regard to control of the everyday conduct of citizens through surveillance and policing. A similar choice must be made in the economic sphere, between a command economy and free markets. And the dilemma arises again within the apparatus of the state itself. For example, central government must decide whether to exercise more or less supervision over lower levels of government. Moreover, within each level of government, political leaders must decide whether to give more or less autonomy to bureaucrats charged with implementing their policies. In all of these contexts, similar calculations about the right measure of control must be made.

Unexceptionalism

This chapter highlights another habit of thought that compromises one's ability to think clearly about strategies for governing in the United States: the doctrine of exceptionalism—the idea that there is something unique about governance in the American context. This mistaken belief makes it harder to learn from the experience of other states. There is a temptation to suggest that the United States is exceptional only because of the emphasis that Americans put on their own exceptionality. But even this is not true. People in most countries see something special about their own circumstances. Indeed, the feeling of exceptionality is shared almost universally, and rightly so. Conditions facing leaders in any one state are different from those facing any other state. Governance strategies must fit those conditions, and consequently one should expect policies and institutions to vary as well. This is why one should be wary about “one size fits all” prescriptions for governmental reform. Still, one should not get too carried away with this emphasis on variation. Even if circumstances change, there is one important commonality: leaders in all states, at all points in time, deal with the realities of building and maintaining a state.

Time and Progress

This chapter explores the importance of the decision about the timeframe in the development of a new approach to research in public administration. The choice of timeframe—long or short—affects one's thinking about governing in many ways. For example, it influences assumptions about the malleability of institutions. If one takes a long view, one is more likely to be struck by substantial changes in the design of institutions. The choice of timeframe has other consequences. If one takes the long view, one is more likely to recognize those social and economic forces that only operate slowly. The long view also improves one's ability to see patterns in events, avoid surprise, and learn from experience. Similarly, by taking the long view, one recognizes that devastating pandemics are a familiar part of the human experience. The chapter then considers the problem of presentism in the discipline of public administration. It also looks at another assumption that shapes one's thinking about the evolution of states: the idea of progress—or, in other words, the expectation that governance strategies will generate continual improvement in human welfare.