scholarly journals Comment: Decentralized decision making through adaptive minimax regret-Complex yet intuitively appealing

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (10) ◽  
pp. 1428-1430
Author(s):  
Emma McIntosh
2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1142-1151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Bernardes ◽  
Greta Cummings ◽  
Yolanda Dora Martinez Évora ◽  
Carmen Silvia Gabriel

OBJECTIVE: This study aims to address difficulties reported by the nursing team during the process of changing the management model in a public hospital in Brazil. METHODS: This qualitative study used thematic content analysis as proposed by Bardin, and data were analyzed using the theoretical framework of Bolman and Deal. RESULTS: The vertical implementation of Participatory Management contradicted its underlying philosophy and thereby negatively influenced employee acceptance of the change. The decentralized structure of the Participatory Management Model was implemented but shared decision-making was only partially utilized. Despite facilitation of the communication process within the unit, more significant difficulties arose from lack of communication inter-unit. Values and principals need to be shared by teams, however, that will happens only if managers restructure accountabilities changing job descriptions of all team members. CONCLUSION: Innovative management models that depart from the premise of decentralized decision-making and increased communication encourage accountability, increased motivation and satisfaction, and contribute to improving the quality of care. The contribution of the study is that it describes the complexity of implementing an innovative management model, examines dissent and intentionally acknowledges the difficulties faced by employees in the organization.


2021 ◽  
Vol 336 ◽  
pp. 09004
Author(s):  
Yuxin Wen ◽  
Linyi Wu ◽  
Fengmin Yao

Affected by factors such as cost, the financial constraints faced by the supply chain are becoming more and more severe. This paper constructs a financing and pricing decision-making model for the construction supply chain under capital constraints, and uses Stackelberg game theory to analyze and obtain the best financing and pricing strategy for the construction supply chain under the internal and external financing modes. The study found that when centralized decision-making is adopted, there is a profit distribution model that makes the profits obtained by construction developers and contractors greater than the profits obtained in decentralized decision-making; the internal financing model of the construction supply chain is better than external financing, and can enable the construction supply chain get higher profits.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Skewes ◽  
Dorthe Døjbak Håkonsson ◽  
Trine Bilde ◽  
Andreas Roepstorff

Collaborative decision making is central to the organization of society. Juries deliberate cases, voters elect government officials, open innovation networks converge on innovative solutions. It is common to think of such groups as decision making entities. But this language is imprecise. Real decision processes do not occur within any group or organization as an abstract entity. Collaborative decision making happens within and between autonomous individuals. This emphasizes the importance of the relationships between individual and social decision-making processes to social organization. Despite a rich body of literature on collaborative decision making we know little about how individuals decide to commit to group decision making in the first place, and how, once joined, they communicate their distributed information for optimal group performance. We introduce a general framework designed to model collaborative decision processes. Our main results are that 1) commitment and gain is enhanced when groups are designed so agents have realistic knowledge about the forgone gains and losses associated with abstaining from the group; and 2) that this effect is accelerated when communication between group members conveys more information about individual preferences. We thus demonstrate that collaborative decision making is done best when it is done by groups that are informationally open.


Author(s):  
Luiz Giacomossi ◽  
Stiven Schwanz Dias ◽  
Jose Fernando Brancalion ◽  
Marcos R. O. A. Maximo

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Jiaquan Yang ◽  
Xumei Zhang ◽  
Yating Huang ◽  
Jiafu Su ◽  
Sang-Bing Tsai ◽  
...  

The dual-channel supply chain is widely adopted by main manufacturers, potentially incurring channel conflicts between the traditional retail channel which is owned by the independent retailer and the online channel which is directly managed by the manufacturer. The purpose of this paper is to deal with the scenario where channel conflicts may arise under production capacity uncertainty, when the manufacturer tends to privilege the direct selling channel over the retail selling channel. To achieve the goal, this paper establishes a Stackelberg game model consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, studies the scenario where the manufacturer satisfies the direct selling channel first in the presence of capacity uncertainty, employs the decision optimization and the backward induction method to find the optimal inventory decision in the direct selling channel and the optimal order quantity decision making in the retail selling channel, and designs a compensation mechanism aiming to coordinate the channel conflict in the decentralized decision-making process. Results show that the optimal decisions aiming to maximize the expected profit of each supply chain member are not able to maximize the expected profit of entire dual-channel supply chain. However, when the manufacturer compensates the retailer’s profit loss based on the unsatisfied order and, in the meantime, adjusts the wholesale price to prevent the retailer which obtains the compensation from increasing order significantly, the compensation mechanism can coordinate the decision of each supply chain member, mitigate the channel conflict, maximize the expected profit of entire dual-channel supply chain, and achieve the Pareto improvement of supply chain members’ expected profit in the decentralized decision-making process.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weihua Liu ◽  
Shuqing Wang ◽  
Donglei Zhu

This paper introduces the parameter of supply chain control power into existing supply chain coordination models and explores the impacts of control power on the profits of manufacturer, retailer, and the overall supply chain under four modes of decision-making, including the decentralized decision-making dominated by manufacturer, the decentralized decision-making dominated by retailer, centralized decision-making, and Nash negotiation decision-making. Some significant conclusions are obtained. Firstly, supply chain control power does have great impact on the supply chain profits. The profit of the whole supply chain with centralized decision-making is higher than those of the other three modes, while the overall profit of supply chain with decentralized decision-making is superior to the profit when retailer and manufacturer dominate the supply chain together. Secondly, with decentralized decision-making, for manufacturer and retailer, it is beneficial to gain the control powers of the supply chain; however, control power has an optimal value, not the bigger, the better. Thirdly, under certain circumstances, order quantity will increase and the wholesale price will decrease when control power is transferred from manufacturer to retailer. In this case, the total profit of supply chain dominated by retailer will be greater than that dominated by manufacturer.


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