scholarly journals The More Supply Chain Control Power, the Better? A Comparison among Four Kinds of Cooperation Models

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weihua Liu ◽  
Shuqing Wang ◽  
Donglei Zhu

This paper introduces the parameter of supply chain control power into existing supply chain coordination models and explores the impacts of control power on the profits of manufacturer, retailer, and the overall supply chain under four modes of decision-making, including the decentralized decision-making dominated by manufacturer, the decentralized decision-making dominated by retailer, centralized decision-making, and Nash negotiation decision-making. Some significant conclusions are obtained. Firstly, supply chain control power does have great impact on the supply chain profits. The profit of the whole supply chain with centralized decision-making is higher than those of the other three modes, while the overall profit of supply chain with decentralized decision-making is superior to the profit when retailer and manufacturer dominate the supply chain together. Secondly, with decentralized decision-making, for manufacturer and retailer, it is beneficial to gain the control powers of the supply chain; however, control power has an optimal value, not the bigger, the better. Thirdly, under certain circumstances, order quantity will increase and the wholesale price will decrease when control power is transferred from manufacturer to retailer. In this case, the total profit of supply chain dominated by retailer will be greater than that dominated by manufacturer.

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Jian Cao ◽  
Yuting Yan ◽  
Lingyuan Wang ◽  
Xihui Chen ◽  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
...  

The uncertainty caused by emergencies will influence the normal operation of the supply chain. Considering demand disruptions, a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two competing retailers based on decentralized decision-making is considered. In the supply chain, one retailer recovers end-of-life products while the other does not. Analytic results show that, when the disturbance of demand occurs, the manufacturer and retailers adjust the wholesale price and retail prices of products according to the direction of the market demand disruptions. Under demand disruptions, the retailer who participates in recovering can gain more profits, especially in the case of the positive disruption. Theoretic and pragmatic references for the emergency decision-making of closed-loop supply chain enterprises are provided.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Wu ◽  
Yuxiang Yang

In this paper, we study the supply chain coordination problem between a manufacturer and a retailer regarding consumers’ low-carbon preferences. The retailer considers the market demand to determine the order quantity; the manufacturer chooses how to reduce emissions according to the retailer’s order quantity. We consider four cases, including the non-emission abatement, the emission abatement of decentralized decision-making, the centralized decision-making and the retailer providing a cost-sharing contract. By comparing the four cases, we find that the case of a retailer providing a cost-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain, achieving a Pareto improvement for the manufacturer and retailer. In addition, we use the Rubinstein bargaining model to determine the cost-sharing ratio. Finally, numerical simulations are given to analyze the impact of the cost-sharing ratio on the equilibrium results, including the profit and the emission abatement level. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of the cost-sharing ratio and consumers’ low-carbon awareness on the profits of the members in the supply chain. We find that the equilibrium results, including the order quantity, the emission abatement level and the profits of the members in the supply chain under contract, are higher than the ones under centralized decision-making. The results show that in the higher low-carbon awareness market, retailers should formulate a reasonable cost-sharing ratio to achieve emission reduction coordination.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Feng Wei ◽  
Yan Zhu

Mutual shifts in offline and online demand have become the norm in supply chain operations. The online-to-offline (O2O) supply chain system consists of a platform vendor, a physical store, and a product. The platform vendor sells the product directly online and governs either the centralized decision-making of a self-operated store or the decentralized decision-making of a franchised store offline. In this study, supply chain decision models with and without demand shifts are constructed to obtain optimal wholesale and selling prices and to maximize profit. The coordination mechanism under decentralized decision-making is designed to optimize the O2O supply chain, and the validity and applicability of the model are verified by numerical simulation. Results show that, regardless of whether a store is self-operated or franchised, the total profit of the system increases, and online and offline prices depend on a range of demand shifts. With an increased proportion of online demand shifts, the offline selling price and total profit of the system increase, whereas the online selling price and profit of the platform vendor decrease under decentralized decision-making. When the fixed transfer payment fee is within a certain range, a two-part-tariff contract can effectively coordinate the supply chain. This study not only contributes to the theoretical literature on O2O supply chain systems but also provides practical decision-making support for managers.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Chongfeng Lan

Considering the ubiquity of consumer balking behavior (CBB) in real-life economics and the importance of product quality control (QC) to supply chain (SC) competitiveness, this paper explores the SC coordination under both the QC and the CBB. Specifically, the consumer’s loss aversion behavior was illustrated at a fixed balking probability, and the SC models were created for centralized and decentralized decision-making modes. After that, the optimal strategies for the retailer and the manufacturer were identified, and the comparative static analysis was adopted to explore the effects of the CBB and QC on the optimal decision-making of the SC. The research results show that the QC-based SC under the CBB cannot be coordinated by wholesale price contract alone, but can be coordinated perfectly by this contract when the retailer shares the quality effort and the manufacturer shares the oversupply cost and analyzed through the fuzzy environment with the formulation. This finding sheds new light on the theory and application of wholesale price contract in SC coordination. Finally, the parameter sensitivity analysis was performed on balking probability and product qualification rate (PQR) through numerical experiments, which further discloses the impacts of the CBB and product QC on the optimal decision-making and profit of the SC.


Author(s):  
Wei Liu

Due to the conflict between traditional channels and electronic channels in the e-commerce dual-channel supply chain, retailers are threatened and need to be compensated in some way. Based on this, an e-commerce dual-channel supply chain coordination compensation model based on optimized genetic algorithm is designed. Based on the problem description and basic assumptions, analyze the manufacturer’s profit and the retailer’s maximum profit in the case of centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making. The genetic algorithm is optimized by introducing a collaborative genetic operator, and the optimized genetic algorithm is used to obtain dual e-commerce channels. The maximum profit of the supply chain, so far, the model design is completed. Through comparative experiments, the optimized genetic algorithm used in the model is compared with two traditional algorithms. Experimental results show that the proposed algorithm takes shorter iteration time to solve the problem, its convergence is better, and it can effectively obtain a global optimal solution instead of a local optimal solution.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tong Shu ◽  
Fang Yang ◽  
Shou Chen ◽  
Shouyang Wang ◽  
Kin Keung Lai ◽  
...  

This paper explores a coordination model for a three-echelon supply chain including two different manufacturers, one distributer and one retailer via the combined option and back contracts. And one manufacturer provides the high wholesale price with low supply disruption risk and the other is completely the opposite. This differs from the previous supply chain coordination model. Firstly, supply disruption is added to the three-echelon supply chain. Secondly, considering the coordination of the supply chain, we deploy the combined option and back contracts which are seldom used in the previous study. Furthermore, it is interesting that supply disruption risk and buyback factor do not affect the distributor’s order quantity from the manufacturer who has low product price and unreliable operating ability, while the order quantity increases with the rise of option premium and option strike price. The distributor’s order quantity from the manufacturer, which has high product price and reliable operating ability, increases with the rise of supply disruption risk but decreases when the buyback factor, option premium, and option strike price decrease.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bengang Gong ◽  
Xuan Xia ◽  
Jinshi Cheng

Given consumers’ willingness to pay different prices for new energy vehicles (NEVs) and traditional vehicles, we construct a utility model of ordinary and green consumers. We establish pricing game models for centralized and decentralized decisions in an NEV’s supply chain in order to study the impact of changes in consumers’ low carbon preference heterogeneity on supply chain pricing and member profit. The results show that consumers’ low carbon preferences and the ratio of green consumers increases with the ex-factory and selling prices of NEVs. An increase in the percentage of green consumers under centralized decision-making will reduce the total profit of the supply chain. Manufacturers’ profits under decentralized decision-making are greater than the dealers’ profits, and the sum of the two members’ profits under decentralized decision-making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision-making. We design a revenue-sharing contract to eliminate the double marginal effect.


Author(s):  
Bo Yan ◽  
Gaodi Liu ◽  
Xiaohua Wu ◽  
Jiwen Wu

The price risk of fresh agricultural products has been a significant topic in recent years. Taking the two-level fresh agricultural product supply chain as the research object, this paper studies the optimal ordering and coordination of supply chain based on two-period price, wholesale price and option contract. The optimal order decision of the retailer at the single period price and the optimal decision corresponding to the supplier are obtained when the output of the supplier is uncertain under decentralized decision-making. The range of penalty cost parameter that avoids supplier default is also obtained. The effect of two-period price on the optimal order decision and supply chain profits is discussed when the production yield of the supplier is fixed. Cost-sharing contract is introduced to increase the order quantity and achieve coordination because the option contract cannot completely make the supply chain coordination with two-period price. This paper provides a low-cost approach that can be applied in fresh agricultural supply chain to solve financing and order problems.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pan Liu ◽  
Shu-ping Yi

In a Big Data environment, in order to study the decision-making problem of Big Data information investment and the effects of using Big Data information to improve industry cost on supply chain coordination, firstly the importance of Data Company in supply chain was analyzed, and the original supply chain model was built. Meanwhile, some changes of consumer behavior were analyzed in a Big Data environment. Based on these, the market demand function and the benefit model of stakeholder were built and analyzed. Findings:(1)The first finding is whether an enterprise was suitable for gaining Big Data to improve its costs, which was determined by the cost improvement coefficient; namely, it was related to the ability of excavating and using the value of Big Data.(2)Whether the supply chain was the decentralized decision-making and the centralized decision-making, the thresholds of acquisition costs on Big Data information were equal. Moreover, the maximum value that they could undertake was same.(3)Meanwhile the fact that the quantity discount contract could achieve a win-win outcome for supply chain members was proved. The discount coefficient was related to consumers’ behavior preference in a Big Data environment.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weifan Jiang ◽  
Jian Liu

Overconfidence is a universal psychological behavior. Overconfidence on demand awareness will have a significant impact on operation decisions. The supplier estimated the demand with excessive precision which influences the inventory financing decision-making deeply. We built the demand function based on the supplier’s overconfidence. Then we established the retailer, supplier, and the Bank’s profit function, respectively. Through the analysis of the bilevel Stackelberg game, we obtained the order quantity of the retailer with the capital constraint, the wholesale price of overconfident supplier, and the loan-to-value ratio of Bank, and we analyzed the influence of overconfidence on the decision variables. We have several findings as follows. First, the overconfidence makes the decisions of the retailer, supplier, and Bank deviate from the rational decisions. Second, the space of the market profit will affect the decision variables in the joint decision-making. Third, the financing supply chain (including the Bank and supply chain) should have a positive attitude towards the overconfidence of the supplier. Forth, in the joint decision-making, the supplier need determines the buyback price according to the capital demand; and in the decentralized decision-making, the supplier should try to use high buyback price strategy.


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