scholarly journals Canonical decomposition of dichotomous basic belief assignment

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (7) ◽  
pp. 1105-1125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Dezert ◽  
Florentin Smarandache
2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinnan Fan ◽  
Pengfei Shi ◽  
Jianjun Ni ◽  
Min Li

Multitarget detection under complex environment is a challenging task, where the measured signal will be submerged by noise. D-S belief theory is an effective approach in dealing with Multitarget detection. However, there are some limitations of the general D-S belief theory under complex environment. For example, the basic belief assignment is difficult to establish, and the subjective factors will influence the update process of evidence. In this paper, a new Multitarget detection approach based on thermal infrared and visible images fusion is proposed. To easily characterize the defected heterogeneous image, a basic belief assignment based on the distance distribution function of heterogeneous characteristics is presented. Furthermore, to improve the discrimination and effectiveness of the Multitarget detection, a concept of comprehensive credibility is introduced into the proposed approach and a new update rule of evidence is designed. Finally, some experiments are carried out and the experimental results show the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed approach in the Multitarget detection task.


1989 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael P. Levine

Two theses are central to foundationalism. First, the foundationalist claims that there is a class of propositions, a class of empirical contingent beliefs, that are ‘immediately justified’. Alternatively, one can describe these beliefs as ‘self–evident’, ‘non–inferentially justified’, or ‘self–warranted’, though these are not always regarded as entailing one another. The justification or epistemic warrant for these beliefs is not derived from other justified beliefs through inductive evidential support or deductive methods of inference. These ‘basic beliefs’ constitute the foundations of empirical knowledge. One can give a reason for the justification of a basic belief even though the justification for that belief is not based on other beliefs. Thus, according to Chisholm, if asked what one's justification was for thinking that one knew, presently, that one is thinking about a city one takes to be Albuquerque, one could simply say ‘what justifies me…is simply the fact that I am thinking about a city I take to be Albuquerque’.


1990 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Grigg

The antifoundationalist defence of belief in God set forth by Alvin Plantinga has been widely discussed in recent years. Classical foundationalism assumes that there are two kinds of beliefs that we are justified in holding: beliefs supported by evidence, and basic beliefs. Our basic beliefs are those bedrock beliefs that need no evidence to support them and upon which our other beliefs must rest. For the foundationalist, the only beliefs that can be properly basic are either self-evident, or incorrigible, or evident to the senses. Belief in God is none of these. Thus, says the foundationalist, belief in God is justified only if there is sufficient evidence to back it up.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-59
Author(s):  
Chet W Sisk

In this paper I will share the evidence of a world-wide so-cio-spiritual paradigm shift in our basic belief systems. This shift is leading to a realignment of our ethical ap-proach to common questions and requires a different col-lective approach in navigating the subject of ethics. I will also share what those different collective approaches can look like.


2005 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Bonichon ◽  
Cyril Gavoille ◽  
Nicolas Hanusse

1985 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 625-628
Author(s):  
Bredo C. Johnsen

Robert F. Almeder believes he has discovered a ‘pressing problem': ‘stating the conditions under which we determine whether a person's basic belief is true without introducing an evidence condition for knowledge’. He believes further that this is ‘a problem needing resolution before any ultimately satisfying explication of basic knowledge can be offered’.My aim is to show that Almeder has failed to discover any problem at all, but I begin by asking: how could the question how we determine the (mere) truth of another's basic belief (regardless of how we do so) have any bearing on the correct explication of the concept of basic knowledge?


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