Choice and performance of governance mechanisms: matching alliance governance to asset type

2009 ◽  
Vol 30 (10) ◽  
pp. 1025-1044 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glenn Hoetker ◽  
Thomas Mellewigt
2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 53-85
Author(s):  
Shkendije Himaj

Abstract Corporate governance is viewed as an important, essential, and most significant factor for well-functioning of firms. Recent academic work and policy analyses have given insight into the governance problems in banks exposed to the financial crisis and suggest possible solutions. This paper begins by explaining the importance of corporate governance and its impact on risk taking and bank performance based on the theoretical background relevant to the corporate governance of banks. I combine the literature that looks at three areas of governance: ownership structure; board structure; and risk management, with the literature on risk-taking and performance effects in order to better assess the weight of the impact that these governance mechanisms have on both performance and risk. The paper concludes by highlighting the areas where further research is needed.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arne Keller ◽  
Fabrice Lumineau ◽  
Thomas Mellewigt ◽  
Africa M. Ariño

2019 ◽  
Vol 07 (01) ◽  
pp. 1940002
Author(s):  
IDA CLAUDIA PANETTA ◽  
SABRINA LEO ◽  
FABRIZIO SANTOBONI ◽  
GIANFRANCO VENTO

This paper examines the evolution of the attention paid by a sample of EU banks on IT governance. We propose an analysis based on IT public disclosure to contribute to the less explored strand of literature on IT governance transparency. We explore if the attention paid by banks to this topic has grown after the crises and if the greater importance ascribed to IT governance is due to the Supervisors’ pressure or the value-driven decisions. In particular, we test if, as for other corporate governance mechanisms, there is a verifiable linkage between IT governance (disclosure) and banks’ performance.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Xuan Bai ◽  
Shibin Sheng ◽  
Julie Juan Li

Purpose This paper aims to examine alliance governance at different hierarchical levels. Design/methodology/approach The data is collected from both top-level and operating-level managers in 286 strategic alliances in China (a total of 572 managers). Hierarchical moderated regression models are adopted to test the hypotheses and two-stage regression analyzes are used to correct for endogeneity. Findings This paper finds that relational governance has a greater impact on alliance performance than contract utilization at the top level. Furthermore, the simultaneous use of relational governance at the top and operating levels have a detrimental impact on alliance performance. Finally, top-level contract utilization has a negative interaction with operating-level relational governance but a positive interaction with operating-level contract utilization. Research limitations/implication First, the cross-sectional nature of the data collection approach provides only a snapshot of how each type of governance mechanism and its interactions affect alliance performance. Second, the sample is limited to firms located in emerging markets. Practical implications Managers should realize that the effectiveness of contract and relational governance mechanisms varies across different management levels and they should be cautious about the cross-level governance mechanism alignment. Originality/value This study advances the interfirm governance literature in that this paper examined alliance governance at different hierarchical levels and provides new insights into the ongoing debate on whether the contract and relational governance mechanisms function as complements or substitutes by exploring the governance alignment across different alliance hierarchies.


2011 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 17-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Ibrahim ◽  
F. A. Samad

We compare corporate governance and performance between family and non-family ownership of public listed companies in Malaysia from 1999 through 2005 measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. We also examine the governance mechanisms as a tool in monitoring agency costs based on asset utilization ratio and expense ratio as proxy for agency costs. We find that on average firm value is lower in family firms than non-family firms, while board size, independent director and duality have a significant impact on firm performance in family firms as compared to non-family firms. We also find that these governance mechanisms have significant impact on agency costs for both family and non-family firms.


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