The Great Powers and International Order

1977 ◽  
pp. 194-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hedley Bull
Keyword(s):  
International Order ◽  
Great Powers

scholarly journals The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International Order: China’s Hegemonic Prospects

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bentley Allan ◽  
Srdjan Vucetic ◽  
Ted Hopf
Keyword(s):  
International Order ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
The Future ◽  
Rise Of China ◽  
Near Term ◽  
Material Power ◽  
Hegemonic Transition ◽  
The Rise Of China

Existing theories predict that the rise of China will trigger a hegemonic transition and the current debate centers on whether or not the transition will be violent or peaceful. This debate largely sidesteps two questions that are central to understanding the future of international order: how strong is the current Western hegemonic order and what is the likelihood that China can or will lead a successful counter-hegemonic challenge? We argue that the future of international order is shaped not only by material power but also by the distribution of identity across the great powers. We develop a constructivist account of hegemonic transition that theorizes the role of the distribution of identity in international order. In our account, hegemonic orders depend on a legitimating ideology that must be consistent with the distribution of identity at both the level of elites and masses. We map the distribution of identity across nine great powers and assess how this distribution supports the current Western neoliberal democratic hegemony. We conclude that China is unlikely to become the hegemon in the near-term. First, the present order is strongly supported by the distribution of identity in both Western states and rising powers like India and Brazil. Second, China is unlikely to join the present order and lead a transition from within because its authoritarian identity conflicts with the democratic ideology of the present order. Finally, China is unlikely to lead a counter-hegemonic coalition of great powers because it will be difficult to build an appealing, universal ideology consistent with the identities of other great powers.

Si vis pacem, para bellum: The Italian Response to International Insecurity 1830-1848

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miroslav Šedivý
Keyword(s):  
International Order ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Middle Classes ◽  
Political Behaviour ◽  
Abuse Of Power ◽  
Material Resources ◽  
External Threats ◽  
European Dimension ◽  
Good Material ◽  
The Alps

It was not after 1848 but actually before this revolutionary year that Europe witnessed the abusive proceedings perpetrated by the great powers which undermined the functionality of the post-Napoleonic international order. Even worse, their abuse of power in European and overseas affairs provoked a feeling of mistrust, pessimism and fear and led to discussions about the disappearing justice from the world among a considerable number of Europeans. By the 1840s, under the influence of various crises and conflicts members of the educated middle and upper middle classes in particular changed the way they judged and approached issues of international politics, justice, security and nation building. This process was all the more important in Italy since the search for greater security against external threats became the driving force in the spread of the idea to unite her politically from the Alps to the Sicily. This unity, along with well defensible frontiers, a strong army and navy and good material resources including colonial ones, was to ensure a more secure position within the system of European politics and thereby better prospects for a peaceful future according to the phrase Si vis pacem, para bellum. However, this power-oriented response to insecurity had devastating consequences for the generally shared desire to live in peace with other nations, represented by another aspiration deeply rooted in the national movement: to establish a better international order. To reveal this important process of pan-European dimension is the principal aim of this book, and the Italian arena of politics in 1830–1848 has been chosen to clarify this sea change in political behaviour.

“Don’t Do Stupid Shit”

2020 ◽  
pp. 294-318
Author(s):  
Christopher Preble ◽  
William Ruger
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
Barack Obama ◽  
International Order ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
First Century ◽  
Woodrow Wilson ◽  
New Strategy ◽  
Twenty First Century

This chapter uses a quote by Barack Obama to outline how foreign relations in the twenty-first century, especially for great powers such as the United States, should be handled with deftness, caution, and prudence. It emphasizes the idea that people often take action without knowing the consequences. The authors highlight the need for wisdom, patience, and restraint in important political situations and argue that Obama’s diplomatic approach provides a good model when considering a new strategy to replace approaches that have proved ineffective, counterproductive, or disruptive to what remains of the international order Woodrow Wilson helped forge.

Recognition Refused

2018 ◽  
pp. 113-140
Author(s):  
Michelle Murray
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
International Order ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
World War ◽  
Imperial Germany ◽  
World Power ◽  
Vital Interest ◽  
The First World War ◽  
Social Insecurity ◽  
First World

This chapter explores how Imperial Germany came to be viewed by the established European powers as a revisionist power. It argues that as Germany became more uncertain about its status in the international order, its fear of misrecognition increased and in response it turned to the recognitive practices constitutive of world power status to ameliorate its growing social insecurity. Specifically, Germany’s fear of misrecognition sustained the Anglo-German naval race, making a naval understanding impossible despite repeated British attempts at negotiating an arms control agreement. Moreover, the fear of misrecognition and experience of disrespect led Germany into a second confrontation with Britain over the independent status of Morocco during the Agadir Crisis. Germany’s belligerent foreign policy and willingness to risk war over matters not of vital interest led the European great powers to increasingly view Germany as a revisionist state whose power needed to be contained. The chapter shows how the experience of humiliation drove German foreign policy, contributing to its construction as a revisionist power and destabilizing the international order in the years before the First World War.

scholarly journals Rethinking the Rise of China and Its Implications on International Order

2020 ◽  
Vol 02 (01) ◽  
pp. 2050005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ciwan M. Can ◽  
Anson Chan
Keyword(s):  
International Order ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Western World ◽  
Academic Field ◽  
Norms And Values ◽  
The Us ◽  
Rise Of China ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Common Destiny ◽  
The Rise Of China

The rise of China has become a central debate in the academic field of international relations. In the Western world, the scholars within this debate can roughly be divided into the ‘pessimists’ and the ‘optimists’. The pessimists see in the rise of China an inevitable hegemonic war, or at least prolonged and intense zero-sum competition, with the US as it will seek to replace the latter and overturn the existing liberal international order. The optimists, on the other hand, see an opportunity for sustained Western dominance through selective accommodation of China in exchange for China’s acceptance of the existing norms and values of the liberal international order and continued US dominance. In this paper, we maintain that both perspectives in the debate are misleading. We argue that China seeks to push for a multipolarized world rather than replacing the US, and that Beijing prefers the relations between the great powers within a multipolar order to be based on the conception of a ‘community of common destiny for humankind’. We also argue that China is unlikely to accept the existing norms and values of the liberal international order as they reflect and reinforce Western dominance. Rather, China has become an ‘order-shaper’ seeking to reform the existing institutions to better reflect the interests of the ‘Rest’, and establish new networks and institutions that will complement and augment the existing arrangements of the liberal international order, instead of challenging it.

Orders of Exclusion

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle M. Lascurettes
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Order ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Great Power ◽  
Perceived Threat ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
Change Order ◽  
Do So

When and why do powerful countries seek to enact major changes to international order, the broad set of rules that guide behavior in world politics? This question is particularly important today given the Trump administration’s clear disregard for the reigning liberal international order in the United States. Across the globe, there is also uncertainty over what China might seek to replace that order with as it continues to amass power and influence. Together, these developments mean that what motivates great powers to shape and change order will remain at the forefront of debates over the future of world politics. Prior studies have focused on how the origins of international orders have been consensus-driven and inclusive. By contrast, this book argues that the propelling motivation for great power order building at important historical junctures has typically been exclusionary, centered around combatting other actors rather than cooperatively engaging with them. Dominant powers pursue fundamental changes to order when they perceive a major new threat on the horizon. Moreover, they do so for the purpose of targeting this perceived threat, be it another powerful state or a foreboding ideological movement. The goal of foundational rule writing in international relations, then, is blocking that threatening entity from amassing further influence, a motive Lascurettes illustrates at work across more than three hundred years of history. Far from falling outside of the bounds of traditional statecraft, order building is the continuation of power politics by other means.

The Sound of Distant Thunder

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Layne
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
World War I ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Order ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
World War ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Rapid Ascent ◽  
Rising China

The chapter compares the pre-1914 Anglo-German antagonism with the current Sino-American relationship to address two issues. First, does the rise of new great powers lead to war? Second, are rising great powers prone to challenge the existing international order into which they emerge—that is, are rising great powers “revisionists”? China’s rapid ascent has pushed these two questions to the top of the agendas of both international relations scholars and policy makers alike. This chapter shows that the United States and China are on a collision course. Like Britain and Germany before World War I, the United States and China seem fated, at best, to engage in an intense security competition; at worst, war between them is a real possibility. One reason the Sino-American rivalry is intensifying is because a rising China inevitably will seek to revise the current international order that the United States established after World War II.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document