scholarly journals The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International Order: China’s Hegemonic Prospects

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bentley Allan ◽  
Srdjan Vucetic ◽  
Ted Hopf
Keyword(s):  
International Order ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
The Future ◽  
Rise Of China ◽  
Near Term ◽  
Material Power ◽  
Hegemonic Transition ◽  
The Rise Of China

Existing theories predict that the rise of China will trigger a hegemonic transition and the current debate centers on whether or not the transition will be violent or peaceful. This debate largely sidesteps two questions that are central to understanding the future of international order: how strong is the current Western hegemonic order and what is the likelihood that China can or will lead a successful counter-hegemonic challenge? We argue that the future of international order is shaped not only by material power but also by the distribution of identity across the great powers. We develop a constructivist account of hegemonic transition that theorizes the role of the distribution of identity in international order. In our account, hegemonic orders depend on a legitimating ideology that must be consistent with the distribution of identity at both the level of elites and masses. We map the distribution of identity across nine great powers and assess how this distribution supports the current Western neoliberal democratic hegemony. We conclude that China is unlikely to become the hegemon in the near-term. First, the present order is strongly supported by the distribution of identity in both Western states and rising powers like India and Brazil. Second, China is unlikely to join the present order and lead a transition from within because its authoritarian identity conflicts with the democratic ideology of the present order. Finally, China is unlikely to lead a counter-hegemonic coalition of great powers because it will be difficult to build an appealing, universal ideology consistent with the identities of other great powers.

scholarly journals The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International Order: China's Hegemonic Prospects

2018 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 839-869 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bentley B. Allan ◽  
Srdjan Vucetic ◽  
Ted Hopf
Keyword(s):  
International Order ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
The Future ◽  
Rise Of China ◽  
Near Term ◽  
Material Power ◽  
Hegemonic Transition ◽  
The Rise Of China

AbstractExisting theories predict that the rise of China will trigger a hegemonic transition and the current debate centers on whether or not the transition will be violent or peaceful. This debate largely sidesteps two questions that are central to understanding the future of international order: how strong is the current Western hegemonic order and what is the likelihood that China can or will lead a successful counterhegemonic challenge? We argue that the future of international order is shaped not only by material power but also by the distribution of identity across the great powers. We develop a constructivist account of hegemonic transition and stability that theorizes the role of the distribution of identity in international order. In our account, hegemonic orders depend on a legitimating ideology that must be consistent with the distribution of identity at the level of both elites and masses. We map the distribution of identity across nine great powers and assess how this distribution supports the current Western neoliberal democratic hegemony. We conclude that China is unlikely to become the hegemon in the near term.

scholarly journals Future of US-China Relations: Conflict, Competition or Cooperation?

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (7) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Syed Muhammad Saad Zaidi ◽  
Adam Saud
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
International Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Political Agenda ◽  
Eastern Hemisphere ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Future ◽  
Rise Of China ◽  
The Rise Of China

In contemporary times, the geo-political agenda and geo-economic strategy of the world is being dominated by the ongoing US-China hegemonic competition. Where the United States is trying to prolong the ‘unipolar moment’ and deter the rise of China; China is trying to establish itself as the hegemon in the Eastern hemisphere, an alternate to the US. The entirely opposite interests of the two Great Powers have initiated a hostile confrontational competition for domination. This paper seeks to determine the future nature of the US-China relations; will history repeat itself and a bloody war be fought to determine the leader of the pack? or another prolonged Cold War will be fought, which will end when one side significantly weakens and collapses? Both dominant paradigms of International Relations, Realism and Liberalism, are used to analyze the future nature of the US-China relations.

scholarly journals Rethinking the Rise of China and Its Implications on International Order

2020 ◽  
Vol 02 (01) ◽  
pp. 2050005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ciwan M. Can ◽  
Anson Chan
Keyword(s):  
International Order ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Western World ◽  
Academic Field ◽  
Norms And Values ◽  
The Us ◽  
Rise Of China ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Common Destiny ◽  
The Rise Of China

The rise of China has become a central debate in the academic field of international relations. In the Western world, the scholars within this debate can roughly be divided into the ‘pessimists’ and the ‘optimists’. The pessimists see in the rise of China an inevitable hegemonic war, or at least prolonged and intense zero-sum competition, with the US as it will seek to replace the latter and overturn the existing liberal international order. The optimists, on the other hand, see an opportunity for sustained Western dominance through selective accommodation of China in exchange for China’s acceptance of the existing norms and values of the liberal international order and continued US dominance. In this paper, we maintain that both perspectives in the debate are misleading. We argue that China seeks to push for a multipolarized world rather than replacing the US, and that Beijing prefers the relations between the great powers within a multipolar order to be based on the conception of a ‘community of common destiny for humankind’. We also argue that China is unlikely to accept the existing norms and values of the liberal international order as they reflect and reinforce Western dominance. Rather, China has become an ‘order-shaper’ seeking to reform the existing institutions to better reflect the interests of the ‘Rest’, and establish new networks and institutions that will complement and augment the existing arrangements of the liberal international order, instead of challenging it.

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: How Lesser Powers Respond to Competing Great Powers in the Asia-Pacific Region

2020 ◽  
Vol 56 (02) ◽  
pp. 2040007
Author(s):  
HSIN-HSIEN WANG ◽  
SHINN-SHYR WANG ◽  
WEI-FENG TZENG
Keyword(s):  
State Power ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Pacific Region ◽  
Asia Pacific Region ◽  
The Us ◽  
Rise Of China ◽  
Middle Powers ◽  
The Rise Of China

In comparison to hegemony, lesser powers usually struggle for survival between two or more great powers under state power asymmetry, a perpetual phenomenon in international politics. With the rise of China and the increasingly strengthening role of the US in the Asia-Pacific region, it is important to learn how lesser powers manage their relations with the two. To explore this issue, we propose that the strength of state power will constrain the strategies of lesser powers as they choose between the US and China. Borrowing from existing theories and ideas on strategies that include balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging, we argue that the stronger a country’s power, the more likely it will choose a balancing strategy. At the same time, the weaker the country, the more likely that it will go with bandwagoning. Regional middle powers will show varied strategy choices, as they possess a higher degree of freedom in choosing which great power to side with. To validate these arguments, we construct two indicators — differences in trade dependence on the US and China and differences in the voting score consistent with the US and China — to quantify the strategies of lesser powers toward great powers and examine whether the variable of strategies follows the expected pattern. Our analysis shows that countries in the middle of the spectrum of state power demonstrated great freedom in choosing strategies toward the two powers.

Conclusion

2018 ◽  
pp. 191-224
Author(s):  
Michelle Murray
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Order ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Peaceful Rise ◽  
Military Presence ◽  
Rise Of China ◽  
The Rise Of China

This chapter summarizes the book’s main argument, outlines its contribution to international relations scholarship, and applies the argument to current debates about the rise of China. Two positions dominate current debates about US foreign policy and the rise of China: engagement, which calls for integrating China deeply into the global economy and institutional architecture of the international order; and containment, which sees security competition as an inevitable outgrowth of Chinese power, and calls for the United States to preemptively increase its military presence in the region. This chapter argues that by focusing narrowly on China’s economic and military interests, the current debate misses an important aspect of China’s rise because it fails to consider the social motivations of rising great powers. Building on the core argument of this book, it suggests that only by accepting China’s recognition-claims can the United States facilitate China’s peaceful rise. The chapter concludes by exploring how the United States might navigate a foreign policy that both approaches China as a recognized partner in leading the international order and also protects its regional and global interests—and if such recognition is even possible.

Thoughts on Power Transitions, Past and Future

2021 ◽  
pp. 142-154
Author(s):  
Manjari Chatterjee Miller
Keyword(s):  
Essential Elements ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Great Power ◽  
Rising Powers ◽  
Active Behavior ◽  
China And India ◽  
The World ◽  
Rise Of China ◽  
Material Power ◽  
The Rise Of China

This chapter reviews the patterns found in the book and draws conclusions about the rise of China and India today. It argues that economic power, military power, and narratives about becoming a great power are all essential elements that rising powers which became great powers possessed, and in order to actively rise, these countries recognized the current norms of great power and initially played by the rules of the international order. Those that did not possess all those elements stayed reticent. Particularly, the absence of narratives about how to become a great power stymied these countries from active behavior on the world stage even when they possessed important elements of material power. This difference between active and reticent powers helps us understand why some nations rise to become great powers, as well as the differences between China and India today.

Domestic Politics and Nationalism in East Asian Security

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall L. Schweller
Keyword(s):  
East Asia ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
East Asian ◽  
Primary Factor ◽  
Security Policies ◽  
Asian Security ◽  
Rise Of China ◽  
East Asian Security ◽  
The Rise Of China

This chapter works within the neoclassical realist tradition to examine the role of nationalism in foreign policymaking and the implication for the international politics of East Asia. Whereas the rise of China is an important structural factor necessarily affecting states' security policies throughout East Asia, China's rise does not determine these states' security policies. Rather, domestic politics ultimately determines how a state responds to changing security circumstances. In particular, nationalism can drive states to adopt more belligerent policies than warranted by their strategic environment, thus contributing to heightened bilateral conflicts and regional tension. The chapter argues that, in contemporary East Asia, rising China sets the context of policymaking, but domestic politics has been the primary factor shaping policy.

The Future of Order

2020 ◽  
pp. 228-244
Author(s):  
Kyle M. Lascurettes
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Order ◽  
First Century ◽  
Relative Power ◽  
The Future ◽  
Twenty First Century ◽  
Near Term

Chapter 9 (“The Future of Order”) reviews the empirical findings of the book and discusses their implications for the study of international relations. It then leverages these findings to address the two most important questions for international order in the twenty-first century: In the near term, what changes to the existing liberal order will the United States advocate as it continues to decline in relative power? And in the long term, what is its projected hegemonic successor, China, likely to do with the existing order when it finds itself in a position to fundamentally recast its underlying principles?

Challenges for the (Present/) Future of ird World Approaches to International Law

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 467-477
Author(s):  
Ibironke Odumosu
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Third World ◽  
International System ◽  
The Future ◽  
Future Challenges ◽  
International Legal System ◽  
Material Power

AbstractThis article examines the future of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) and its ability to meet its challenges and achieve its objectives in a hegemonic international system. It discusses the fundamental role of ideas, the challenge of ideational (and material) power, and the reconstruction of identities, in meeting the challenges of TWAIL perspectives. In discussing these components and their interaction, the article observes that while they show some promise for the future of TWAIL, they also embody severe limitations. The article concludes with some thoughts about TWAIL's future engagements and on the note that even though the challenges are arduous, TWAIL perspectives possess some potential to meet the present and future challenges of reconstructing the international legal system.

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