Collective Rationality

1998 ◽  
pp. 208-224
Author(s):  
László Mérő
Keyword(s):  
Collective Rationality

The Analysis of Willingness to Cooperate for Farmers to Participate in Water Management Based on Game Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 448-453 ◽  
pp. 1002-1010
Author(s):  
Cong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Water Management ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Collective Rationality ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Evolution Analysis ◽  
Prisoners Dilemma ◽  
Willingness To Cooperate

To analyze the willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management, we base on game theory and first carry on single static game analysis of willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management, and find that farmers are into a Prisoners Dilemma in a single game, individual rationality comes into conflict with collective rationality, at this time farmers have a tendency to "free riders", so it is difficult to achieve cooperation between the farmers. Then trying to break the prisoners' dilemma, we carry on the farmers repeated dynamic game, the analysis is carried on in the context of incomplete information and limited rationality, we carry on game evolution analysis for willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management. In order to guarantee the rationality of the study, we conduct a survey of willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management in province of Zhejiang and finally confirm that the study is reasonable. And through the analysis of the full text, we conclude six important conclusions.

Voting and Collective Rationality

2019 ◽  
pp. 199-212
Author(s):  
Julia Maskivker
Keyword(s):  
Political Influence ◽  
Common Morality ◽  
Collective Rationality ◽  
Collective Self ◽  
Good Individual

This concluding chapter offers a final overview of the argument for a Samaritan duty of justice via the vote. It reminds us that voting with care is not the stuff of experts but of informed regular citizens, and that it is not the task of Saints—it is well within the scope of common morality. The chapter offers a condensed summary of the skeptics’ views against the morality of voting and highlights their most evident errors and fallacies. If voting carelessly is wrong despite its negligible impact as an individual act, that means that good individual votes ought not to be dismissed as morally trivial because they are drops in a proverbial ocean of votes, either. There is something else to the morality of voting, it is the commitment it denotes on the part of citizens who, together, can make a difference. The chapter also addresses the possibility that we can value voting (and democracy) instrumentally because of its capacity to bring about justice as well as intrinsically because of its power to reflect equality of political influence and collective self-government.

scholarly journals Response threshold variance as a basis of collective rationality

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 170097 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatsuhiro Yamamoto ◽  
Eisuke Hasegawa
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Choice Experiment ◽  
Swarm Robotics ◽  
Basic Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Response Threshold ◽  
Collective Rationality ◽  
Graded Responses ◽  
Graded Response

Determining the optimal choice among multiple options is necessary in various situations, and the collective rationality of groups has recently become a major topic of interest. Social insects are thought to make such optimal choices by collecting individuals' responses relating to an option's value (=a quality-graded response). However, this behaviour cannot explain the collective rationality of brains because neurons can make only ‘yes/no’ responses on the basis of the response threshold. Here, we elucidate the basic mechanism underlying the collective rationality of such simple units and show that an ant species uses this mechanism. A larger number of units respond ‘yes’ to the best option available to a collective decision-maker using only the yes/no mechanism; thus, the best option is always selected by majority decision. Colonies of the ant Myrmica kotokui preferred the better option in a binary choice experiment. The preference of a colony was demonstrated by the workers, which exhibited variable thresholds between two options' qualities. Our results demonstrate how a collective decision-maker comprising simple yes/no judgement units achieves collective rationality without using quality-graded responses. This mechanism has broad applicability to collective decision-making in brain neurons, swarm robotics and human societies.

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