Technological Spillovers and Incentive Schemes for R&D

1995 ◽  
pp. 233-259
Author(s):  
Philip Vergauwen
Keyword(s):  
Technological Spillovers ◽  
Incentive Schemes

Oil Service Contracts: New Incentive Schemes to Promote Drilling Efficiency

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petter Osmundsen ◽  
Terje Sorenes ◽  
Anders Toft
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Schemes ◽  
Service Contracts

How Do Firms’ Internal Incentive Schemes Affect Price Levels?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Kurschilgen ◽  
Alexander Morell ◽  
Ori Weisel
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Schemes ◽  
Price Levels ◽  
Internal Incentive

scholarly journals Sustainable public health partnerships: Results from 41 European, Asian and American regions

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (Supplement_5) ◽  
Author(s):  
J Ese ◽  
C Ihlebak
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Public Sector ◽  
Social Contexts ◽  
Research Literature ◽  
Person Fit ◽  
Time Data ◽  
Incentive Schemes ◽  
The Public ◽  
Health Partnerships ◽  
Group Interviews

Abstract Background Public health problems often constitute so called “wicked problems”, and the importance of involving multiple stakeholders in order to address such problems is acknowledged, for instance through the SDG17 guidelines. Partnerships between academia and the public sector have been deemed especially promising. However, sustainable partnerships might be difficult due to divergent understandings and interests. Although there is a substantial research literature on academic-public partnerships in general, partnerships addressing public health specifically are less investigated. The aim of the project was therefore to identify enablers for sustainable public health partnerships between academia and the public sector. Methods A mixed methods design was used. A survey regarding partnerships was sent to 41 European, Asian and American regions, with a response rate of 72 %. Based on survey data, an interview guide was developed and four best cases (Canada, Bulgaria, the Netherlands and Norway) were identified. Site visits and group interviews with representatives from stakeholders of the partnerships were conducted. Interview data and answers to open ended questions from questionnaires were analysed. Results Three main findings became apparent through the analysis. Important enablers were: 1) person-to-person fit between individuals, 2) national incentive schemes for collaboration, and 3) formal partnership agreements that provided a framework that allowed for manoeuvring. The enablers identified are on a macro, miso and micro level. Furthermore, they can be categorised as political, organisational, and social. Conclusions The data support the notion that partnerships are complex social structures that need to be initiated and managed on different levels and with different measures. At the same time, data demonstrate that across different geographical, political, and social contexts the same enablers are reappearing as important for sustaining public health partnerships. Key messages Similar enablers for sustaining public health partnerships are found across geographical, political, and social contexts. Important enablers for partnerships are person-to-person fit, national incentive schemes, and formal agreements.

Nonconcave Utility Maximization with Portfolio Bounds

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Min Dai ◽  
Steven Kou ◽  
Shuaijie Qian ◽  
Xiangwei Wan
Keyword(s):  
Finite Difference ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Difference Scheme ◽  
Viscosity Solution ◽  
Finite Difference Scheme ◽  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Value Functions ◽  
Incentive Schemes ◽  
Definition Of

The problems of nonconcave utility maximization appear in many areas of finance and economics, such as in behavioral economics, incentive schemes, aspiration utility, and goal-reaching problems. Existing literature solves these problems using the concavification principle. We provide a framework for solving nonconcave utility maximization problems, where the concavification principle may not hold, and the utility functions can be discontinuous. We find that adding portfolio bounds can offer distinct economic insights and implications consistent with existing empirical findings. Theoretically, by introducing a new definition of viscosity solution, we show that a monotone, stable, and consistent finite difference scheme converges to the value functions of the nonconcave utility maximization problems. This paper was accepted by Agostino Capponi, finance.

The targeted assignment of incentive schemes

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saskia Opitz ◽  
Timo Vogelsang
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Schemes

The Nature of Innovation and the Origin of Technological Spillovers

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stéphanie Monjon ◽  
Patrick Waelbroeck
Keyword(s):  
Technological Spillovers

Behavioral Ambidexterity: The Impact of Incentive Schemes on Productivity, Motivation, and Performance of Employees in Commercial Banks

2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (S1) ◽  
pp. s45-s62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Faisal Ahammad ◽  
Sang Mook Lee ◽  
Miki Malul ◽  
Amir Shoham
Keyword(s):  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Incentive Schemes ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Impact

The effects of bigger rewards in individual tournaments on efforts and risk taking: evidence from chess

2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 979-995
Author(s):  
Rasyad A Parinduri ◽  
Yoong Hon Lee ◽  
Kung Ming Tiong
Keyword(s):  
Research Design ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Fixed Effect ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Incentive Schemes ◽  
Multi Stage ◽  
Standard Rule ◽  
Chess Players

Abstract We examine the effects of bigger rewards in individual dynamic tournaments on efforts and risk taking using the three-point rule in chess. Most chess tournaments use the standard rule while some tournaments use the Bilbao rule, which is identical to the three-point rule in soccer: We observe the same pairs of chess players playing under both rules, a research design that fits fixed-effect models. We find the Bilbao rule makes games 33% more decisive, mostly to white players’ advantage, who win 50% more games. We identify two mechanisms why the Bilbao rule works: It encourages players to play longer and discourages them from using drawish openings. These results suggest incentive schemes that provide bigger rewards for better performances work in individual multi-stage tournaments in which efforts and financial rewards are directly linked, and in which strategic interactions among teammates and with competitors are less complex.

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