Besoyong Dalam Pesta Adat Belian Paser Nondoi di Kabupaten Penajam Paser Utara Kalimantan Timur

Besoyong is derived from the word soyong which means the spell or prayers, then besoyong means speaking or singing the spell. Besoyong is usually used by Paser tribe as the media to speak to the ancients spirits and Sangiyang through their daily lives. Besoyong has started to be sung in Traditional Festival of Belian Paser Nondoi once a year at Penajam Paser Utara regency, East Kalimantan. This research explains about presentations form of besoyong continue with internal and external incentive factors of besoyong presence in Traditional Festival of Belian Paser Nondoi. This research uses the theory of Alvin Boskoff about internal and external’s factors of social change applied as internal and external incentive factors of besoyong presence in Traditional Festival Belian Paser Nondoi. Besoyong can be presented individually and also with ensemble. Internal incentive factors of besoyong presence are to elude from evil ghosts, as the mean to invoke clear weather for the festival, as the mean of healing and ast the mean of asking blessing. External incentive factors of besoyong presence are to elevate the district economics & tourism, and to be functioned as the identity of this region.

Pay-for-performance schemes: Should optimal prices vary across system and clinical quality indicators?

Quality indicators are classified into system or clinical quality indicators. Typically, different levels of an organization steer each of the two types of indicators. Decentralized levels control clinical indicators (blood pressure, blood sugar etc.) while centralized levels control system indicators (waiting time, electronic health records etc.). In this paper we examine optimal pay-for-performance schemes for the two indicators by considering a model consisting of hierarchy of principal-agent interactions where pay-for-performance rewards are distributed to the centralized level (unit of accountability). We find that the optimal pay-for-performance price depends on factors such as the degree and distribution of altruistic preferences, quality costs, the marginal cost of public funds, and the interdependence between the quality variables. The optimal price should differ for system and clinical indicators both when an internal incentive system is in place and when this is not the case. The optimal price for clinical indicators is to reflect the centralized levels’ ability to steer the decentralized level - the type of internal contract that exists between the two levels of the organization. The optimal price for system indicators is independent of the type of internal contract since such indicators are under the control of the unit of accountability. Finally, it is shown that rewarding organizations on the basis of clinical quality indicators can be optimal also when such incentives are not transmitted to the decentralized level of the organization. This conclusion is the result of the indirect effects that non-incentivized variables (system indicators) might have on the incentivized ones (clinical indicators).Published: Online May 2019.

Water-saving service supply chain cooperation under social welfare maximization

The water-saving service (WSS) supply chain equilibrium and cooperative decision models under the scenario without/with the social welfare maximization (SWM) goal are developed, analyzed, and compared, respectively, the numerical and sensitivity analyses for all models are conducted and compared, and the corresponding management insights and policy implications are summarized in this paper. The research results indicate that: (1) the cooperation strategy outperforms the equilibrium strategy regarding the water-consumption reduction, operational performance of WSS supply chain, the corresponding social welfare, consumer surplus, and positive externalities, regardless of whether the SWM is considered or not; (2) a subsidy threshold policy under which the government only subsidizes the WSS supply chain adopting the cooperation strategy is recommended to be designed to maximize social welfare with higher positive externalities; (3) subsidizing the WSS to pursue the SWM contributes to enhancing the water-consumption reduction, improving the operational performance of WSS supply chain and its members, the corresponding social welfare, consumer surplus, and positive externalities; (4) the WSS provider would have an internal incentive to provide WSS without government subsidy when the fixed cost of WSS is low, otherwise, the WSS provider would not have an internal incentive to provide WSS unless with a government subsidy.

INTERPRETATION OF HATE IN CRIMINAL LAW OR QUANTUM CRIMINOLOGY

In an article about criminology is disclosed not very widespread method related to the hate essence and harmfulness, when it comes to the hate interpretation in criminal justice. Considering that to describe the feelings, emotions and passions is quite complex, the author is using fiction and theological reference for the existing knowledge, to show a hatred as manifestations of emotions existence and harmfulness. As a result, the author comes to the conclusions: 1. Hatred is the human expression of feelings, that is directed against a specific object (a person, a group of people, processes, phenomena), characterized by evil, ill-will and that is persistent, with a great intensity and destructivity. 2. Hatred as a crime motive is not included in any Latvian Criminal Law intended to be as a mandatory element for a criminal offense. 3. A controversial question is whether the religious motive is hatred or intolerance motive. In the author's opinion religious motive is human mental functioning internal incentive, passion, disposition, which is based either on a religion preached values or against opinion expressed by the religion. 4. In the author's opinion the fact about instigation of hatred, is basically a crime target materialization, bringing towards a significant level of harmfulness, as it greatly threatens the legally protected interests of public safety and public order, undermining tolerance and integrity. 5. Deep aversion, fear and hatred, could be materialized into defined action, shown as evidence of wrongdoing, which possess a seriousness of a criminal offense.

The Effect of Evidence Strength and Internal Rewards on Intentions to Report Fraud in the Dodd-Frank Regulatory Environment

SUMMARY: There are many unanswered questions and concerns regarding the consequences of the fraud whistleblowing environment created by the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and Dodd-Frank Acts. While SOX requires audit committees to implement anonymous internal reporting channels, the Dodd-Frank Act offers substantial monetary incentives that encourage reporting to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). To mitigate concerns that employees might bypass internal channels, some companies are considering offering internal whistleblowing incentives. However, it is unclear how internal incentives will affect employee whistleblowing behavior. We experimentally examine the impact of an internal incentive on employees' intentions to report fraud. Across treatments, we find a greater likelihood of reporting internally than to the SEC. Evidence strength interacts with the presence of an internal incentive such that SEC reporting intentions are greatest when evidence is strong and an internal incentive is present. When evidence is weak, the presence of an internal incentive decreases SEC reporting intentions. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from the authors upon request.

Modal Analysis on Transmission Gear Train of Planetary Reducer

The planetary reducer has both internal incentive of varying mesh stiffness and external incentive of eccentric quality, which are prone to vibration and noise at work. This paper use ANSYS Workbench to build model, divide grid and carry out modal analysis for transmission gear train of Planetary reducer, and calculate the 6 order modes. The modal analysis result is compared with excited frequency and natural frequency respectively. This paper’s modal analysis is more accuracy, more rational and more scientific than the previous experience design and statics analysis. It not only provides the useful date for acoustic analysis of planetary reducer, but also provides theory basis for avoiding planetary reducer resonance, and lays a foundation for the whole system dynamic response calculation and analysis.

Coordination and Incentive Mechanisms on Collaborative Investment in the Supply Chain

This paper examines coordination problems and corresponding incentive mechanisms between a retailer and a third-party Logistics for jointly investing in an information technology that has the potential to improve the efficiency and security of the supply chain. The conclusion indicates that internal incentive mechanisms, such as investment cost sharing among supply chain partners, are not likely to resolve underinvestment problems completely; Instead, external financial incentive mechanisms, such as tax incentives, need to be considered to coordinate the supply chain.

Analysis on Vibration Response of Gear Transmission System

The inherent characteristics of the wind generators growth gearbox were solved, then the reasons which caused the gear transmission system generating dynamic incentive was analyzed, and also internal incentive and external incentive were given to 2MW wind generators gear transmission system quantitatively. On the basis of these, 2MW wind generators growth gearbox system’s vibration response caused under internal incentive and external incentive was solved and analyzed.

Internal Incentive Mechanism of Public Agent-Construction Enterprises Based on Common Agency Model

Common agency is the main feature of public sector’s internal incentive mechanism. As the public sector, endogenous features of PACE will lead to defects of internal incentive system. Regarding the public agent-construction enterprise as an agent of two principals which are client and government, a common agent model is constructed and analyzed in-depthly. The findings of this paper clarify two aspects of theoretical basis for the regulatory policy: 1) the optimal conditions of an incentive contract; 2) the substitution relationship of the tasks of two principals causes distortion to the incentive mechanism and leads to incentive efficiency loss.