The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem and the Compactness Theorem

1994 ◽  
pp. 87-98
Author(s):  
H.-D. Ebbinghaus ◽  
J. Flum ◽  
W. Thomas
1972 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 562-568
Author(s):  
Andreas Blass

Consider the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem in the form: If a theory in a countable first-order language has a model, then it has a countable model. As is well known, this theorem becomes false if one omits the hypothesis that the language be countable, for one then has the following trivial counterexample.Example 1. Let the language have uncountably many constants, and let the theory say that they are unequal.To motivate some of our future definitions and to introduce some notation, we present another, less trivial, counterexample.Example 2. Let L0 be the language whose n-place predicate (resp. function) symbols are all the n-place predicates (resp. functions) on the set ω of natural numbers. Let be the standard model for L0; we use the usual notation Th() for its complete theory. Add to L0 a new constant e, and add to Th() an axiom schema saying that e is infinite. By the compactness theorem, the resulting theory T has models. However, none of its models are countable. Although this fact is well known, we sketch a proof in order to refer to it later.By [5, p. 81], there is a family {Aα ∣ < α < c} of infinite subsets of ω, the intersection of any two of which is finite.


Author(s):  
Heinz-Dieter Ebbinghaus ◽  
Jörg Flum ◽  
Wolfgang Thomas

Author(s):  
Shawn Hedman

We consider various extensions of first-order logic. Informally, a logic 𝓛 is an extension of first-order logic if every sentence of first-order logic is also a sentence of 𝓛. We also require that 𝓛 is closed under conjunction and negation and has other basic properties of a logic. In Section 9.4, we list the properties that formally define the notion of an extension of first-order logic. Prior to Section 9.4, we provide various natural examples of such extensions. In Sections 9.1–9.3, we consider, respectively, second-order logic, infinitary logics, and logics with fixed-point operators. We do not provide a thorough treatment of any one of these logics. Indeed, we could easily devote an entire chapter to each. Rather, we define each logic and provide examples that demonstrate the expressive power of the logics. In particular, we show that none of these logics has compactness. In the final Section 9.4, we prove that if a proper extension of first-order logic has compactness, then the Downward Löwenhiem–Skolem theorem must fail for that logic. This is Lindstrom’s theorem. The Compactness theorem and Downward Löwenheim–Skolem theorem are two crucial results for model theory. Every property of first-order logic from Chapter 4 is a consequence of these two theorems. Lindström’s theorem implies that the only extension of first-order logic possessing these properties is first-order logic itself. Second-order logic is the extension of first-order logic that allows quantification of relations. The symbols of second-order logic are the same symbols used in first-order logic. The syntax of second-order logic is defined by adding one rule to the syntax of first-order logic. The additional rule makes second-order logic far more expressive than first-order logic. Specifically, the syntax of second-order logic is defined as follows. Any atomic first-order formula is a formula of second-order logic. Moreover, we have the following four rules: (R1) If φ is a formula then so is ¬φ. (R2) If φ and ψ are formulas then so is φ ∧ ψ. (R3) If φ is a formula, then so is ∃x φ for any variable x.


1999 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 1407-1425
Author(s):  
Claes Strannegård

AbstractWe investigate the modal logic of interpretability over Peano arithmetic. Our main result is a compactness theorem that extends the arithmetical completeness theorem for the interpretability logic ILMω. This extension concerns recursively enumerable sets of formulas of interpretability logic (rather than single formulas). As corollaries we obtain a uniform arithmetical completeness theorem for the interpretability logic ILM and a partial answer to a question of Orey from 1961. After some simplifications, we also obtain Shavrukov's embedding theorem for Magari algebras (a.k.a. diagonalizable algebras).


2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Seungsu Hwang ◽  
Sanghun Lee

2014 ◽  
Vol 84 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 75-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
MIHAI ANASTASIEI ◽  
IOAN RADU PETER

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-112
Author(s):  
A.G. Podgaev ◽  
◽  
T.D. Kulesh ◽  

The compactness theorem is proved for sequences of functions that have estimates of the higher derivatives in each subdomain of the domain of definition, divided into parts by a sequence of some curves of class W_2^1. At the same time, in the entire domain of determining summable higher derivatives, these sequences do not have. These results allow us to make limit transitions using approximate solutions in problems with an unknown boundary that describe the processes of phase transitions.


1979 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Harnik

The central notion of this paper is that of a (conjunctive) game-sentence, i.e., a sentence of the formwhere the indices ki, ji range over given countable sets and the matrix conjuncts are, say, open -formulas. Such game sentences were first considered, independently, by Svenonius [19], Moschovakis [13]—[15] and Vaught [20]. Other references are [1], [3]—[5], [10]—[12]. The following normal form theorem was proved by Vaught (and, in less general forms, by his predecessors).Theorem 0.1. Let L = L0(R). For every -sentence ϕ there is an L0-game sentence Θ such that ⊨′ ∃Rϕ ↔ Θ.(A word about the notations: L0(R) denotes the language obtained from L0 by adding to it the sequence R of logical symbols which do not belong to L0; “⊨′α” means that α is true in all countable models.)0.1 can be restated as follows.Theorem 0.1′. For every-sentence ϕ there is an L0-game sentence Θ such that ⊨ϕ → Θ and for any-sentence ϕ if ⊨ϕ → ϕ and L′ ⋂ L ⊆ L0, then ⊨ Θ → ϕ.(We sketch the proof of the equivalence between 0.1 and 0.1′.0.1 implies 0.1′. This is obvious once we realize that game sentences and their negations satisfy the downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem and hence, ⊨′α is equivalent to ⊨α whenever α is a boolean combination of and game sentences.


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